Page 2 of 2 A sharp reminder for
Musharraf By Philip Smucker
and
the jihadis. Washington turned a blind eye to
Zia's machinations and supported the dictatorship.
Musharraf capitalized on a similar
political dynamic and constitutional mandate in
2002 elections, when Bhutto's PPP was left out of
the mix and religious parties in NWFP swept to
power. Most observers believe that Musharraf is
now determined to win
another five years in office
by the end of 2007.
A prolonged crisis in
the border areas would be beneficial for Musharraf
in the short run. It would enhance what Dr Ayesha
Siddiqa calls in her new and controversial book,
Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military
Economy, the military's traditional
"parent-guardian" role in politics - thus
weakening prospects for the kind of pluralism for
which so many citizens long.
The general
clearly has his benefactors in Washington excited
about the prospects of going after the extremists,
and any concerted effort to reinvigorate the
frontier peace deals is not likely to please them.
For weeks, Washington has been pressing
Musharraf to scupper the deals he made in North
Waziristan and Bajaur, two al-Qaeda and Pakistani
Taliban hotbeds where the military had tried but
previously failed to assert its writ between 2002
and 2005. Those two areas are thought to provide
possible hideouts for senior al-Qaeda leaders,
including Osama bin Laden's deputy and chief
propagandist, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
"The
truth is, those deals did not work," Washington's
National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley told
CNN's Suzanne Malveaux in an interview last
weekend. "You see that he [Musharraf] is now
taking steps to get more troops in place."
While the general ordered what amounts to
a troop surge late last week, Pakistan's radicals
were the ones who called off the peace deals - in
writing - by distributing fliers in the
marketplaces. By doing so, they have called
Musharraf's bluff and hit him hard with
al-Qaeda-inspired suicide attacks.
Hadley
did not flinch from telling CNN that the US would
give Musharraf "all the appropriate support that
we can".
Last week, the US raised the
reward money for a lead on bin Laden's capture or
death to US$50 million, doubled from $25 million.
President George W Bush could use a capture or
kill of bin Laden to bolster his approval ratings,
which have plummeted to between 26% and 32% in
recent polls.
The US public has grown
weary of the Bush administration's floundering
"war on terror". Bin Laden and Zawahiri remain at
large and both Iraq and Pakistan are now seething
with new anti-American jihadis, who have
capitalized on Muslim perceptions - true or false
- that Washington has launched a broader war
against Islam.
Though Pakistani military
officials have in the past often attempted to
distance themselves from Bush's "war on terror",
those attempts will appear increasingly futile if
Musharraf is forced on to a renewed war footing.
General Hamid Gul, the former chief of
Pakistani intelligence, said, "Musharraf is
getting on the wrong side of the fence now."
Speaking by phone from his home in Rawalpindi,
outside Islamabad, Gul, who has well-established
jihadist ties, warned that the US, through its
continued support of Musharraf, risks an
increasingly "hostile Pakistan" on its hands.
Despite this, Gul expressed doubts that Musharraf
will go in hard after religious ideologues and
militants in the border areas, as he has vowed.
Many in Pakistan's old elite, particularly
those who have recently used religious schools and
jihadis to bolster the Taliban in Afghanistan, are
still hoping to preserve ties between the
religious right and the military. As the crisis
along the frontier grows, there are growing debate
and disagreement as to how to confront al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, if at all, said contacts in
Islamabad.
Though Musharraf may strengthen
his political hand in the short run, he stands to
tarnish the military's reputation in the long run,
said others. This would happen if public opinion
blamed the military rather than a democratically
elected executive branch for excesses against
common citizens.
If Musharraf is forced
into fighting in the hinterlands and the crisis
grows out of hand, the general and his army also
stand to be accused directly of dividing Pakistan
along religious lines.
Philip
Smucker is a commentator and journalist based
in South Asia and the Middle East. He is the
author of Al-Qaeda's Great Escape: The
Military and the Media on Terror's Trail
(2004).
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times
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