Page 5 of 5 SPEAKING
FREELY All along the watch tower
By Peter J Middlebrook and
Sharon M Miller
smuggling; a situation
which must surely be unacceptable to the UN.
8. The role that Pakistan has to play in
bringing peace is pivotal. Unless Pakistan is made
to feel secure in its relationship with both India
and Afghanistan, it is unlikely to build a common
Afghan-Pakistan-Indian axis as a powerful new
alliance that could
at
one moment call into question Pakistan's
inalienable right to full national sovereignty.
9. Failure to develop an unbreakable
political and military consensus linking
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India will only expedite
the realignment of states north of Afghanistan
toward a political bent that is congenitally
Chino-Russian, and one that is destined to
strengthen ties with Iran. With US-Anglo interests
in Central Asia (including Kazakhstan) already
facing displacement, failure to rapidly cement
political and military ties between Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India could have very profound
implications for Western interests in Central and
southern Asia for decades to come.
10.
While the amnesty program initiated by President
Karzai was a significant initiative; even if it
had been accepted by the Taliban, it inevitably
would have failed to reconcile the grievances of
history; not least because the Bonn Agreement
deliberately excluded the Taliban from engagement
in the forward process.
However, given
that the resentment of history continues to fuel
future discontent, perhaps nothing less than a
full transitional justice program will suffice to
finally bring everyone around the table to reach a
common conclusion; the war has left deep scars in
the minds and hearts of all Afghans and that
demands nothing less that an acceptable process of
closure. It is recommended that the country
undertakes a transitional justice program, similar
to South Africa, more substantial than Rwanda,
whereby grievances can be aired and the
discontents of history and frustration can finally
be released.
Notes [1]
Ironically, and against the logic that Pakistani
Pashtuns should be part of a Pashtun Afghanistan,
there are in fact more Pashtuns in Pakistan than
in Afghanistan. Currently, 28 million Pashtuns
live in Pakistan (14.8% of the population) against
12.5 million in Afghanistan (42% of the
population). Pashtuns are split across four major
tribal groups (Sarbans, Batans, Ghurghusht and
Karlans) and are composed on more than 100 local
tribes. [2] The Guardian, November 21, 2006,
Page 13. [3] See
http://www2.hq.nato.int/ISAF/mission/mission_operations.htm.
[4] See
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/cs-hist-setting.htm.
[5] Shir Ali's son had died, delaying any
decision, because the court had been called into
morning. [6] See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Afghan_wars.
[7] North West Frontier Province has never
been properly named for political reasons. In the
late 1990s, Pashtuns pushed for NWFP to be renamed
Pushtunkwa, but this was unacceptable to Pakistan
as it possessed an ethnic dimension and in May
2006, President General Pervez Musharraf offered
to rename the NWFP Khyber, which was then turned
down by the proponents of Pushtunkwa. [8] The
three Anglo-Afghan wars of 1839 to 1919 were
fought largely by the British East India Company
as both a military and commercial power. [9]
Moreover, with the waning of Pashtun interests in
what is now Pakistan as a result of the collapse
of the Durrani Empire, and with losses to the
Sikhs, Balochis and Persians, the Durand Line was
probably seen as a convenient way to demarcate
what remains a heavily contested hinterland beyond
the effective purview of all de jure states;
British, Russian, or Afghan. [10] A treaty
ending a war (as was the case with the
Anglo-Afghan wars) may adopt the principle of
uti possitetis juris whereby the parties of
a particular treaty are to retain possession of
(as they possess) that which they forcibly seized
during war. In contradiction to uti possitetis
juris, the principle of status quo ante
bellum (state of things before the war) can
also be applicable if deemed so. The fact that
Afghan authorities have never taken the case of
the Durand Line to the International Court of
Justice must signify broad acceptance of the
current international border with Pakistan, at
least with regard to formal state interests.
[11] With a particular focus on the provinces
of Konar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabol,
Kandahar, and Helmand. [12] The formal
inauguration of the province took place
five-and-half months later on April 26, 1902 on
the occasion of the historical "Darbar" in Shahi
Bagh in Peshawar held by Lord Curzon. The province
of NWFP then comprised only five districts. They
were Peshawar, Hazara, Kohat, Bannu and Dera
Ismail Khan. The Malakand, which consisted of
three princely states of Dir, Swat, Chitral was
included in it. NWFP also included the four tribal
administered agencies, Khyber, Khurram, North
Waziristan and South Waziristan (now seven). The
first chief commissioner of NWFP was Harold Deane.
A strong administrator, he was followed by
Ross-Keppel in 1908, Keppels whose contribution as
a political officer was widely known amongst the
tribal/frontier people. [13] ISAF IX, the
current ISAF mission, is led by Headquarters
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, commanded by General
David Richards. [14 ] ISAF integrates its
efforts with the highest levels of authority at
the government of Afghanistan, with the United
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, with
the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, the
US-led coalition, and with other actors of the
international community. [15] The role of PRTs
is to assist the local authorities in the
reconstruction and maintenance of security in the
area. These are run via five regional commands
(RCs), RC Capital located in Kabul, RC North
located in Mazar-e-Sharif, RC West located in
Herat, RC South located in Kandahar and RC East
located in Bagram. These in turn have provincial
reconstruction teams that report to them, five in
the north (Kunduz, Meymana, Pol-e Khomri,
Mazar-e-Sharif and Feyzabad); four in the west
(Herat, Farah, Qala-e-Naw and Chaghcharan); four
in the south (Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Tarin kowt
and Qalat) and 11 in the East (Bagram, Bamyan,
Sharan, Ghazni, Gardez, Asadabad, Jalalabad,
Panjshir, Mitharlam, Kowst and Nuristan). There
are no PRTs in RC Capital. They are supported by
forward support bases - one in Mazar-e-Sharif, one
in Herat, one in Kandahar and one in Bagram. [16]
See
http://www.hq.nato.int?ISAF/mission/mission_role.htm.
Dr Peter J Middlebrook and
Sharon M Miller, MA-CPA, are joint managing
directors of Middlebrook & Miller LLC,
(www.middlebrook-miller.com) an international
consultancy and think tank specializing in
national security/energy and post conflict
reconstruction. Middlebrook, who has a PhD from
the University of Durham, UK, served as a World
Bank adviser to the government of Afghanistan in
the development of the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy. Miller was an adviser to the
chief economic adviser to the Afghan president and
is currently undertaking doctoral research at the
Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the
University of Exeter in the UK on US foreign
policy towards the Middle East and North Africa
with regard to national energy policy.
(Copyright 2006 Middlebrook & Miller.
Used by permission. )
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
