News of the kidnapping of Iranian guards
at the Iran-Pakistan border and Iran's accusation
of US complicity with Sunni extremists operating
from within Pakistan have ignited renewed interest
in the ups and downs of relations between Iran and
Pakistan.
Historically, different factors
have affected Iranian-Pakistani political
relations since the creation of Pakistan. As
neighbors and Muslim countries, the two have
always had close relations.
Iran
was the first country to recognize Pakistan soon
after its independence in August 1947.
During the first decade of independence,
successive Pakistani governments attached high
priority to establishing bilateral relations with
Iran. In the early 1970s, Pakistan's success in
ending a powerful separatist insurgency in the
province of Balochistan, bordering Iran, would not
have been possible without the support of the
Iranian military. This, in fact, set the
precedence for Pakistan's involvement in the
anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s.
During the 1990s, relations between the
two countries declined as a result of two
concurrent developments: the rise of anti-Shi'ite
terrorist activities in Pakistan and the
assassination of Iran's counsel general, Sadeq
Ganji, in Lahore in 1990, and subsequently the
coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
When the Taliban captured the Afghan city
of Maza-e-Sharif, they not only massacred thousand
of Hazara Shi'ites, they also murdered scores of
Iranian diplomats, straining Iran's bilateral ties
with Pakistan, which at the time backed the
Taliban.
When General Pervez Musharraf
came to power in 1999, he visited Tehran and
promised to address the terrorist activities in
Pakistan; subsequently relations between the two
countries improved. After the execution of Ganji's
assassin by the Pakistani government in February
2001, Iran gained a new level of confidence in
Pakistan's determination to curb anti-Shi'ite
extremism in that country.
Still, as long
as the Taliban remained in power in Kabul,
supported by Pakistan, and Iran was committed to
backing the anti-Taliban forces, relations between
Iran and Pakistan were held hostage to some extent
by the developments inside Afghanistan. The
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the
United States and the subsequent fall of the
Taliban paved the way for the mending of bilateral
relations.
Immediately after the Taliban's
demise, Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi,
paid a two-day visit to Islamabad and reached an
understanding with his Pakistani hosts on the
situation in Afghanistan. Both sides agreed to
assist in the establishment of a broad-based
multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan under the
United Nations' auspices.
Another
important turning point in Iran-Pakistan relations
transpired with president Mohammad Khatami's visit
to Pakistan in December 2002, the first by an
Iranian president in 10 years. During the visit,
both sides discussed how to improve bilateral
relations and regional security, focusing
especially on Pakistani-Indian relations, in the
light of Iran's declared willingness to mediate
between them. As a result of Khatami's visit, Iran
and Pakistan signed four agreements and a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) aimed at
enhancing their bilateral relationship, mainly in
the fields of trade, plant quarantine, science and
technology.
Pakistan's prime minister, Mir
Zafarullah Khan Jamali, paid a return visit to
Iran in October 2003, and reached a landmark
preferential trade agreement. Another agreement
was on the revitalization of a trilateral
commission among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan
aimed at pushing for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. Jamali visited Iran again in February
2004 to attend the Developing Eight (D-8) meeting.
In March 2004, Iran's first vice
president, Reza Aref, visited Pakistan. His talks
centered on further strengthening the existing
cooperation between the two countries. The
following agreements were signed during Aref's
visit: a preferential trade agreement; an MoU
between the export promotion bureaus of the two
countries; an MoU to establish a joint investment
company; an instrument of ratification of the
agreement for avoidance of double taxation; and a
customs cooperation agreement.
Economic
relations The most important issue in
Iranian-Pakistani economic relations is the low
level of economic exchange; both countries need to
encourage and increase relations in this sphere.
Trade between Pakistan and Iran during 2005 was
barely more than half a billion US dollars. Still,
this must be considered an improvement over the
previous years: trade between the two countries
declined in 2001-02 from $394 million to $166
million. Pakistan lost Iranian markets for
transport equipment and leather because of reports
of delays in shipments of the poor quality of
products.
A report prepared by the
Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and
Industry stated that the erection of unnecessary
trade barriers caused a reduction in Pakistan's
exports to Iran in 2002. Iran canceled an order
for Pakistani wheat because of its poor quality.
The main reason for the trade deficit between the
two countries lay in the differential between
Pakistan's exports to Iran and its importation of
crude petroleum and furnace oil from Iran at a
cost of $141 million (in 2002). In late 2002,
Pakistan began to import Iranian electricity for
Balochistan province.
On a more positive
note, the recent economic reforms in Iran have
improved the climate for foreign investment,
including by Pakistani companies. Also, Iran has
been encouraging the private sector to do business
with the neighboring countries. In this regard,
the Mutual Economic Cooperation Commission has
prepared the ground for economic ties between Iran
and Pakistan. The 13th session of this commission,
held in December 2002 in Islamabad, completed its
work with a note of success, pushing for the
enhancement of opportunities for the private
sectors of both countries to increase their
exchanges.
During 2003-04, the volume of
bilateral trade was about $376 million. Trade and
economic cooperation was discussed in detail at
the 14th session of the Joint Economic Commission
held in Islamabad in March 2004. The whole range
of economic activity between the two countries was
reviewed and ways and means to enhance cooperation
were discussed.
The second issue that
affects Iranian-Pakistani economic relations is
the problem of petroleum smuggling between the two
countries. The problem has increased in recent
years, fueled by the differential in oil prices
across the common border. While several rounds of
negotiations have taken place between Iranian and
Pakistani officials, they have yet to yield
results.
Without doubt, boosting security
is important for encouraging commercial relations
and preventing cross-border smuggling,
notwithstanding the alarming news of kidnapping of
more than a dozen Iranian guards at the
Iran-Pakistan border this month.
In spite
of the above-mentioned problems, there are hopeful
signs that the economic and other ties between
Iran and Pakistan will improve, particularly if
the much-talked-about "peace pipeline" between
Iran and India transiting through Pakistan turns
into reality; the estimated profit for Pakistan is
one-half billion dollars annually. This aside, the
two countries are now laying the emphasis on the
establishment of a fiber-link network and improved
communications and transport links, including the
railway systems.
Impact of regional
issues While Iran and Pakistan are
neighbors, their regional outlooks are somewhat
different as a result of the different type and
nature of national security challenges and threats
facing each country.
India:
Relations with India are an important issue that
affects Iranian-Pakistani relations. Pakistan is
concerned about the North-South Corridor that Iran
and India seek to establish together with Russia.
In the light of Iran's good relations with India,
Pakistan is concerned about the impact of those
relations on its disputes with India - over the
core issue of Kashmir as well as other regional
and geopolitical issues. Iran has declared its
willingness to mediate between India and Pakistan
on Kashmir. In his visit to Pakistan, Khatami
stated: "We will do everything possible to remove
tensions between India and Pakistan." In 2004,
when tensions between India and Pakistan
escalated, Iran was the first country to contact
Musharraf and Indian prime minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee with a view to defusing the crisis.
The proposed Iran-India gas pipeline via
Pakistan remains problematic. On the one hand,
this could act as an ideal platform for initiating
regional economic interdependence. Iran is the
fifth-richest country in mineral reserves,
possessing some 10% of world's oil reserves and
14.9% of the world's natural-gas reserves,
simultaneously serving as the connection link
among a diverse set of regions, the Persian Gulf,
the Caspian Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and
the South Asian subcontinent. In both India and
Pakistan, energy demands exceed supplies, while
Iran is in an ideal position to play the role of
supplier.
While in principle there is no
problem between Iran and Pakistan over the
proposed gas pipeline, India's lingering security
concerns, eg concern that Pakistan would use it as
security leverage in the future, hamper the
realization of this important project.
Afghanistan: Pakistan and
Iran have shared the fallout of decades of
upheaval in Afghanistan, partly in the form of
millions of Afghan refugees, many of whom have not
returned to Afghanistan since the Taliban's
downfall in 2001. Since then, Iran and Pakistan
have tried to improve relations strained for a
decade by policy differences over Afghanistan,
both sides coming to a recognition of the fact
that sustained peace and stability are in their
interests and not only those of the people of
Afghanistan.
As a result, both Tehran and
Islamabad gave support to the political process
initiated in Afghanistan by the Bonn Agreement
(among the Afghan political factions) while
extending a helping hand to President Hamid
Karzai's government in its efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan. A first step was the signing of the
Kabul Declaration on Good Neighborly Relations by
Iran and Pakistan on December 22, 2002.
A
serious problem affecting Iran and Pakistan from
Afghanistan is the burgeoning drug traffic, which
has served as the main financial source for
extremist groups, including the remnants of the
Taliban. The illicit drug-smuggling networks also
serve as a conduit for the transfer of small arms
and explosives and for human trafficking. Drug
traffickers have been using Iran's territory as
the shortest major land route for the transit of
narcotics from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Europe.
Iran spends $400 million annually in its
effort to control the drug traffic, and Iran and
Pakistan need to bolster their security
cooperation in their fight against this menace.
Both countries could cooperate in attracting
international aid on this project as its has much
greater repercussions than purely regional ones.
On the contrary, the matter affects many countries
around the globe, requiring a globalized strategy
led by the regional states.
Security
cooperation: Over the past few years, Iran
and Pakistan have taken several concrete steps to
increase their security cooperation, including:
The Pakistani-Iranian Joint Ministerial
Commission on security was established in November
2001 to deal with the problems of terrorism,
smuggling, sectarian violence, extremism and
narcotics. The initial meeting of this commission
was held in September 2002.
There has been a renewal in consultations
between the foreign ministers of both countries on
bilateral relations and on regional and
international developments. The first of such
consultations was held in July 2001.
Regular interactions between Pakistani and
Iranian intelligence officials have been ongoing
since October 2001. These interactions are held
between senior-level Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) and Iranian intelligence officials and focus
on the future of Afghanistan, Iran's role in seven
cultural centers in Pakistan, cross-border
broadcasts, etc.
Both countries have agreed to solve security
and border issues in a special security committee.
Presence of foreign powers:
Iran and Pakistan have somewhat divergent
perspectives with respect to the presence of
foreign powers in the region. Iran is concerned
about the post-September 11 military cooperation
between the US and Pakistan. However, both
countries share long-term perspectives on how to
deal with the intrusiveness of foreign powers in
the region. Both Iran and Pakistan, for instance,
opposed the United States' unilateral action in
Iraq, calling for a central role for the UN.
However, although Iran and Pakistan have
reached a basic geostrategic understanding
regarding both Afghanistan and Iraq, their
relations may be harmed as a result of the
hostility between Iran and the US and Pakistan's
close relations with both the US and Israel;
repeatedly during 2005, Pakistani officials stated
their steadfast opposition to any US military
strike against Iran via Pakistani territory and/or
airspace.
Nuclear cooperation:
During the past couple of years, the
revelations concerning the transfer of nuclear
technology to Iran by the Pakistani network led by
Abdul Qadeer Khan have ignited heated debates and
discussions about the nature of nuclear
cooperation between the two countries. Iran is
concerned about the reports of Pakistan's nuclear
cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
Iranian
concern is fueled by, among other things,
unconfirmed reports of a secret Saudi-Pakistani
agreement, harking back to a high-level visit to
Pakistan by a Saudi prince in 2003 after a Saudi
defense official's visit to Pakistan's nuclear
facilities, prompting serious speculations in
Tehran that the Pakistani nuclear network headed
by Khan might have traded far more sensitive
nuclear technology and know-how to the Saudis than
it did to Iran. After all, Khan has visited Saudi
Arabia on a number of occasions, albeit for the
benign purpose of attending conferences, and the
Sunni connections between Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia run pretty deep.
Saudi officials
have denied rumors of an oil-for-nukes pact
between Riyadh and Islamabad, but Iranian
policymakers are put on guard by such rumors,
deemed credible in the light of Pakistan's
history, its close ties to Saudi Arabia, and its
cash dependency on the oil-rich Saudis. Without
doubt, a potential motivating factor, other than
Israel, for a Saudi nuclear-weapons program is the
alleged existence of such a program in Iran, which
in turn may have been influenced by the threats of
Saudi nuclearization.
Iran is pleased by
the recent statements by Musharraf that Pakistan's
nuclear assets are under strict custodial controls
and that any clandestine proliferation network has
been dismantled.
In conclusion, Iran's and
Pakistan's concerns and interests are interlinked
in the new regional and international climate. New
problems as well as new opportunities have been
created for both countries, affecting their
bilateral and multilateral relations, since the
events of September 11, 2001. Both countries need
to devote more energy to boost their economic
trade, enhance their security cooperation, and to
identify practical ways to tackle the problems
facing the region.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Volume X11, Issue 2, Summer 2005,
with Mustafa Kibaroglu.
(Copyright
2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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