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US opens can of
nuclear worms
By Praful Bidwai
NEW DELHI - The US-India agreement on
nuclear issues is likely to run into problems on
the supply side, in the US and in the Nuclear
Suppliers' Group comprising 44 relatively
industrialized states, as well as on the recipient
side - India.
A joint statement issued by
US President George W Bush and visiting Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington on
Tuesday said the US would now "work with friends
and allies to adjust international regimes to
enable full civil nuclear energy and trade with
India".
Essentially, this means that
Washington has now accepted India as a nuclear
weapons-state, although it is euphemistically
referred to as "a state with advanced nuclear
technology".
That would entail a dilution
of the global nuclear regime founded on the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which only
recognizes five nuclear-weapons states. All five
crossed the atomic threshold before 1967, while
India became a self-declared nuclear power only in
1998.
Under the agreement, signed between
Bush and Singh, the US has promised to sell
nuclear materials and equipment to India and also
to involve it in "advanced" areas of research.
Interestingly, this could mean a role for
India in the international thermonuclear
experimental reactor, which will experiment with
fusion reactions that release energy when nuclei
are forced together - unlike fission, in which
nuclei are split to release energy.
In
return, India would "assume the same
responsibilities" and "acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other leading countries with
advanced nuclear technology", ie, nuclear weapon
states.
Besides "working to prevent the
global proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction", India will take a series of steps
towards "identifying and separating civilian and
military nuclear facilities and programs".
India will also be required to file a
declaration regarding its civilian facilities with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
place them under its safeguards, continue its
"unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing" and
work with the US for the "conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty".
India will also "secure nuclear materials
and technology through comprehensive export
control legislation" and through "adherence to
Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and
Nuclear Suppliers' Group [NSG] guidelines",
although it is not a member of either grouping.
There are deep divisions within the US
establishment over restructuring the global
nuclear order to accommodate India. For instance,
security experts like Ashley J Tellis advocate
that the US should integrate India into the global
non-proliferation regime by treating it as a de
facto nuclear state and transferring nuclear
technology to new facilities, but under
safeguards.
Others like George Perkovich
argue that the "the US and others should not
adjust the nuclear non-proliferation regime to
accommodate India's desire for access to nuclear
technology - the costs of breaking faith with
non-nuclear weapons states such as Japan, South
Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Sweden and others who
forswore nuclear weapons [are] too high to warrant
accommodating India's nuclear desires".
These states are also NSG members and
could put up stiff resistance to Bush's promise to
relax the global non-proliferation regime. The
NSG's guidelines are tougher than many IAEA
safeguards.
Resistance is likely from
within the Indian establishment too. "The first
problem with the agreement is that it misses the
point about the extremely limited scope for
meaningful nuclear cooperation between India and
US," argues A Gopalakrishnan, a nuclear engineer
and former chairman of India's Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board.
"The US has no
worthwhile current expertise in the design,
construction, operation, maintenance or safety of
any of the type of reactors existing or envisaged
in the Indian nuclear power program,"
Gopalakrishnan said.
India's reactors
include two obsolete US-built enriched
uranium-boiling water reactors, more than a dozen
reactors which burn natural uranium with heavy
water, and fast-breeder reactors. The US has no
commercial natural uranium-based heavy water
reactors, the mainstay of the Indian nuclear power
program.
While India could change its
nuclear technology trajectory from natural to
enriched uranium and import US-made reactors, this
would make it too dependent as India has not been
able to enrich uranium in large enough quantities.
External dependence is unacceptable to
many Indian policy-makers, especially in the
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which has had
an unpleasant experience with procuring enriched
uranium fuel for two US-built reactors at Tarapur,
near the western port city of Mumbai.
India does need raw uranium, too, because
its existing mines are rapidly depleting and there
is popular resistance to the opening of new mines.
Importing uranium will need relaxation of NSG
guidelines and the US has promised to bring this
about.
"Yet it is far from clear that the
other 43 members of the NSG will agree," says a
high-level DAE source, who requested anonymity.
"In the past, the NSG failed to reach a consensus
on supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur. The
guidelines demand full-scope safeguards under the
IAEA. This is something we in the DAE are
unwilling to fall in line with."
The same
source said it is difficult to isolate India's
civilian nuclear facilities and activities from
military ones. Often, the two occur in the same
location or laboratory. So having IAEA inspectors
will interfere with India's "sovereignty".
"Besides, most DAE scientists would be
loath to subject, say, fast-breeder reactors to
IAEA safeguards. They are the next stage in our
energy independence plans, and will pave the way
for the use of thorium, of which India has an
abundance. We in the DAE believe in the doctrine
of self-reliance and independence in matters
nuclear," the source said.
However, this
belief is not supported by facts. In the past,
India has lawfully imported or clandestinely
bought nuclear technology or materials from
diverse sources such as the US, China, the former
USSR, Russia, France, Norway and Britain.
But the idea of nuclear self-reliance
remains an article of faith with many DAE
officials and scientists. One of them, A N Prasad,
a former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research
Center, has been quoted as saying that allowing
IAEA safeguards "goes against the national
interest".
Thus the India-US deal does not
have the full support of the principal Indian
agency responsible for its execution. It is also
likely to run into rough weather politically
because there is no broad consensus on the issue
of safeguards or conformity with NSG and MTCR
guidelines.
There is the trickier issue of
India agreeing to extend its moratorium on
conducting nuclear weapons tests. In 1995-96, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was vehemently
opposed by a cross-section of political parties,
but after the 1998 blasts, India unilaterally
declared a moratorium on further tests.
Reiterating that commitment in a joint
declaration with the US is sure to raise fears
about loss of "sovereignty" and vulnerability to
pressure from Washington, and is fraught with
political consequences at home.
The
emphasis in the agreement on promoting nuclear
power to meet "growing global energy demands in a
cleaner and more efficient manner" is likely to
invite opposition from India's environmentalist
movement.
Environmentalists have pointed
to the grave hazards posed by nuclear technology
through its propensity for serious accidents, and
the problem of radioactive waste that remains
menacing for tens of thousands of years.
(Inter Press Service) |
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