Pakistan's Bhutan gambit worries Delhi
By Ramtanu Maitra

The visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to Bhutan earlier this month with a delegation that filled three Pakistan air force planes has left New Delhi feeling uneasy.

The Kingdom of Bhutan has always been very close to neighboring India. Last January the Royal Bhutanese Army routed a powerful Indian insurgency group, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), at New Delhi's request. In making the India-Bhutan borders virtually insurgency-free, New Delhi felt decidedly comfortable. But with the arrival in Bhutan of a Pakistani prime minister, who is allegedly on a short leash held by the Pakistani army, some in New Delhi see new problems in the offing.

Indian agencies monitoring the visit were surprised to see no less than three Pakistan air force jets land, one after another, at the small Thimpu airport. Considering that Pakistan-Bhutan bilateral trade amounts to less than US$25 million, the large delegation is hard to explain and sparks much suspicion in India.

Admittedly, India is extremely sensitive when it comes to Pakistan's engagement with Nepal, Bhutan and  Bangladesh. Though in Washington such sensitivity is often seen as a lack of confidence and an overt expression of paranoia, New Delhi's concern is very practical. There are clear indications that in both Bangladesh and Nepal, the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has set up groups inclined to sabotage Indian interests in those countries. While the ISI's anti-India activity can be kept under control in Nepal, New Delhi is no longer sure about its ability to do the same in Bangladesh. And to have another front opened in Bhutan would certainly not be helpful.

Indian insurgents in Bhutan
Bhutan is located north of India and east of Nepal. It is a Himalayan kingdom with King Jigme Singye Wangchuk sitting on the throne. From time to time, the throne in Thimpu has proven vulnerable to domestic instability, and every time it was New Delhi that moved in to restore the king's absolute power. As a quid pro quo, Bhutan's king has kept his country closely aligned to India.

India's interest in Bhutan centers on a number of geopolitical factors, including Bhutan's geographical proximity to China. Knowing the strength of China-Pakistan ties, the entry of Pakistan into Bhutan, bordering China, would understandably trouble India. But perhaps the most important factor is the security situation vis-a-vis the insurgency problems in India's northeast, which lies along Bhutan's southern border. New Delhi long argued that the militant groups operating in its own northeastern states constitute a major security threat to Bhutan. Of the many militant organizations operating in the region, three groups - the ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and the Bodoland Liberation Tiger Force - have long indulged in training and sheltering their militants in southern Bhutan, adjoining Assam.

Some intelligence analysts believe the Royal Bhutanese government had, for its own chauvinistic purposes, given tacit approval to the Indian insurgents to move inside southern Bhutan territory in 1991. This is because southern Bhutan was heavily populated by migrant Nepalese, who later tried to make it an independent territory free of the royal writ of Thimpu. The Indian insurgents, according to this view, had the implicit understanding that they were given safe housing by Thimpu in exchange for terrorizing the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas and driving them out of Bhutan. A large number of militants entered Bhutan in 1992 and used its territory as a safe haven for training and launching attacks on the Indian security forces.

Toward the end of the 1990s, Thimpu realized that the militants posed a security threat to Bhutan itself, where they are reportedly involved in killing, extortion and kidnapping. At the same time, the Indian government had been building up pressure on Thimpu to prevent Bhutan's territory from being used against India by the militants. The Bhutanese government tried to involve the militants in negotiations, but their efforts failed. Well-armed and trained, the Indian militants paid little attention to Thimpu's request and refused to leave Bhutan.

Finally, in December 2003, Bhutan launched a military operation to flush out Indian insurgents from its soil. Bhutan's premier, Lyonpo Jigmi Thinley, was at the time attending the 12th South Asian Association of Regional Countries summit in Islamabad. He told the attendees that "all leaders [of those who had launched insurgency in the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal] had been apprehended, others had surrendered or were finding their way out, hopefully to live peacefully in their own country."

The Bhutan government's action was lauded by both the ruling government coalition under the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Congress Party, then the leading opposition. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, then an opposition leader in the Rajya Sabha (India's house of elders in parliament), said Bhutan was being used by insurgent groups to carry out nefarious activities in various parts of India. His party colleague Pranab Mukherjee, who is now India's defense minister, wanted New Delhi to provide all logistic and other support to the West Bengal and Assam governments to counter the movement of insurgents from Bhutan.

With Indian intelligence providing adequate information, and the Indian military cutting off the insurgents' southern escape route, a very large number of ULFA militants were killed. Many more were captured by the Royal Bhutanese security officials. These militants were later handed over to the Indian authorities. At that point in time it became evident that the India-Bhutan security relationship was sealed for good.

So, despite pressure brought on him from Islamabad to permit a Pakistan embassy in Thimpu, King Jigme Singye Wangchuk held his own. He stalled the Pakistanis, pointing out that he needed to consult his "good friend" and neighbor, India, beforehand.

Still, India puzzles over the meaning of Pakistan's move. First, New Delhi is fully aware that Washington is wholly agreeable to India's role in Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Not a single adverse statement has been heard in Washington about India's handling of its northeastern insurgents. Neither the Bush administration, nor the many non-governmental organizations that operate independently in Washington, raised a voice against Indian military operations in northeast India, or Thimpu's mopping-up operation in southern Bhutan.

Further, New Delhi knows that Washington is aware that Pakistan is eager to set up an Islamic network in the region, and that some of these Islamic forces do not like India - or the United States, for that matter. But at the same time, New Delhi believes that the visit of Aziz to Thimpu could not have taken place without the full knowledge of Washington. It is widely acknowledged that both Pakistani leaders, President General Pervez Musharraf and Aziz, drink from the same cup, and that cup belongs to the United States. Why, then, New Delhi wonders, has Washington allowed Pakistan to make its first-ever foray into Bhutan?

There is little doubt that India's deepening concern about Pakistan's alleged role in setting up of terrorist outfits in Bangladesh and Nepal will be conveyed to Aziz, a Citigroup banker and political neophyte, when he arrives in India this week for talks with Manmohan and the Kashmiri leaders. Whether Pakistan's Bhutan gambit will also be brought up in these meetings, however, is anyone's guess.

Ramtanu Maitra writes for a number of international journals and is a regular contributor to the Washington-based EIR and the New Delhi-based Indian Defence Review. He also writes for Aakrosh, India's defense-tied quarterly journal.

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