| |
US sticks with
Musharraf
By Ehsan Ahrari
President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan
is in an unenviable position, a situation in which most
heads of Muslim states find themselves these days as
they attempt to reach a balance between living up to the
expectations of the Bush administration in its global
"war on terrorism", and not appearing to be stooges of
Washington within their respective domestic arenas.
But Musharraf's troubles are also the result
of the growing power of transnational terrorist groups
in his country and of his own unwillingness to loosen
his grip on power. He has escaped two recent assassination
attempts - one on December 14 last year and the second
12 days later - which are unambiguous signs of his
growing unpopularity. Yet Washington remains ambivalent
about whether he is doing enough to fight terrorism in
his neighborhood.
The capture of Saddam Hussein
in Iraq has intensified the need for capturing Osama bin
Laden. Besides, the security situation in Afghanistan,
if it has not yet hit the bottom, is far from being
labeled as "improving". The Taliban-al-Qaeda forces have
manifested their boldness by escalating the frequency of
their attacks at a time when Afghan officials are
grappling with the debates on the nature of the
distribution of power in their next government. The
guerrilla methods in Afghanistan are an exact copy of
the tactics in Iraq. They are determined to escalate
chaos, for that is the only situation that guarantees
their long-term survival.
Given the escalated
pace of resistance in Afghanistan, the question remains
how much support the movement in Afghanistan is
receiving from Pakistani Islamist groups. The North-West
Frontier Province is governed by an Islamist coalition,
which is an elected entity. At the very least, that
region is not unfriendly to al-Qaeda-Taliban
functionaries and sympathizers. One can imagine how much
power the Islamists are gathering in Pakistan by the
fact that Musharraf agreed to one of their long-time
demands that he either give up his position as the
army's chief of staff or step down as president. He has
agreed to resign from his army post toward the end of
this year.
Musharraf drove a hard bargain. In
return for his promise to end his military career, he
has an agreement from the opposition for more absolute
power than in the past. What will he do with that power
is a question that begs a persuasive answer. The
Pakistani press has shown an ample amount of skepticism
that this bargain will lead their country to democracy.
One such report is spot on in pointing out, "According
to General Musharraf, these developments should (a)
strengthen democracy and (b) set the stage for
desperately needed political stability to steer the
country out of rough waters. But we have serious
reservations. This is a warped 'democracy' ... surely by
strengthening such an unnatural 'democracy' General
Musharraf is further distorting the political system
rather than straightening out its internal tensions and
contradictions."
At the same time, Musharraf's
grand bargain with the opposition does not guarantee his
personal security or the stability of Pakistan. That is
an issue that continues to worry Washington. What if
Musharraf is assassinated? What is the guarantee that
sympathizers of Islamist and al-Qaeda groups will not
gain access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? Troubling
questions, but no assuring answers. Experts in
Washington are speculating, however, that the nuclear
weapons in Pakistan are under sufficient safeguards.
Besides, they argue, given the dominance of the army in
the affairs of Pakistan, it is not likely to jeopardize
its privileged status by jeopardizing the ultimate
source of its power, control of nuclear weapons. There
are also reports that the US has provided ample
technical support for the security of the Pakistani
nuclear arsenal. And the US is playing down the
significance of recent revelations that Pakistani
scientists helped develop Iran's nuclear program, as
this happened more than a decade ago.
The Bush
administration seems to have to concluded that it will
bank on Musharraf's support in its global "war on
terrorism". Thus a decision has been made at the highest
levels that all necessary measures must be taken to
ensure the personal security of Pakistan's president.
The US has sent electronic jamming devises that
apparently played a crucial role in foiling the December
14 attack on his life. In addition, the US has
intensified intelligence sharing with Musharraf's
security forces. In addition, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has been helping the Pakistani side in the
investigation of the two attacks and also to forestall
such future attempts.
As the two attacks on him
have underscored, Musharraf's choice regarding his
handling of Islamist and al-Qaeda groups boils down to
following the same hardline approach of "search and
destroy" single-mindedly. Al-Qaeda's second in command,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, has already depicted him an "enemy"
of Islam and a "puppet" of the US, thereby called for
the toppling of his government. If Musharraf lets up
now, terrorists in Pakistan will smell blood and may
become even bolder in their plots in the coming months.
To be sure, all is not about gloom and doom for
Pakistan. In its dogged attempts to eradicate
Islamist-al-Qaeda forces, the government of Pakistan is
expected to reap considerable economic and military
payoffs. The Bush administration is already seeking a
US$3 billion package of economic and military assistance
over the next five years. About half of this sum will go
toward military equipment and training. Given its huge
economic needs, Pakistan especially welcomes that
development.
The US knows that, with all its
liabilities, Pakistan remains a firm ally. In the 1980s
it proved its credentials by playing a crucial role in
helping Washington expel the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan. In the beginning of the 21st century, it is
proving to be firmly on the US side in its global "war
on terrorism". One only hopes that the consequences of
supporting the US do not turn to be too detrimental for
Pakistan.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic
analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
