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COMMENTARY
US ties weigh heavily in
Pakistan
By Mushahid Hussain
ISLAMABAD - Pakistan has begun 2003 on a
difficult and dangerous note, its doubts increasing
about the direction of its newfound special relationship
with the United States and its role in the US-led war on
terror.
At the beginning of last year, Pakistan
was being lionized as a strategic partner in the war on
terror. Today, Pakistan's status veers between a
publicly professed friend and one that is privately
being perceived by some quarters in Washington as a
potential foe.
This turnaround should be a
wake-up call to the Pakistan military establishment,
which had become complacent that the US connection was
both solid and strategic, and hence, a revival of the
good old days of the Cold War, when Pakistan was said to
be the US's "most allied ally".
But such
optimism may have been misplaced. Last week, Pakistani
and US military forces had their first clash across the
Durand Line, after a Pakistani border guard allegedly
fired and wounded a US soldier followed by US F-16
planes dropping a 500-pound bomb on Pakistani territory,
damaging a deserted seminary.
This incident
coincided with the January 3 anti-US demonstrations
called by the religious political parties to protest any
military strike against Iraq.
In the wake of
this incident, there is confusion about the causes and
conflicting versions of whether the US military is
allowed the right of pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban
remnants into Pakistan from Afghan territory.
Even if the maiden military clash between the
Pakistan and US forces was "accidental", it sends a
larger message, which should provide ample room for
discomfort for the Pakistan military establishment and
the government. The message is three-pronged:
First, the US military seems to be blaming the
Pakistan army for its own failings in Afghanistan,
notably the failure to stabilize the situation there or
achieve the primary mission objective: getting Osama bin
Laden.
The constant refrain heard from US
military commanders is that Pakistan could, and should,
do more. For instance, the Washington Post reported
January 4 that "while US officials stress in public that
Pakistan has taken steps to control Islamic militants
from al-Qaeda and the Taliban, some say privately that
the Musharraf government could do more to combat them in
the border areas but has chosen not to".
Second,
there is an increasing lack of trust in Pakistan's
leadership, armed forces and intelligence services about
their capacity to deliver in the war against terror.
Since August, US military leaders have been talking of
"hot pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants into
Pakistani territory", a statement first made by
Lieutenant General Dan MacNeill, US military commander
in Afghanistan.
This despite the fact that
Pakistan has sent 70,000 troops into the sensitive
tribal areas straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
for the first time in its 55-year history. It is a step
Islamabad took at the risk of ignoring local
sensibilities, which could provoke a backlash.
Third, the conflicting versions of what is
actual policy regarding US troops crossing over into
Pakistan show that clearly, one of the governments is
not telling the truth.
The US government has
publicly stated that its troops have the right to cross
into Pakistan, and, the Post last week reported that
"this is done with the express consent of the Pakistani
government". Pakistani officials deny any such
authorization.
Even if the clash was accidental
as is being portrayed by both sides, it is certainly not
isolated, since there is a new pattern of policies aimed
at portraying Pakistan a potential foe in the US media,
or at the very least, an untrustworthy partner.
There are several examples of this. First, the
United States is focusing on two rogue states as the
culprits on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction - Iraq and North Korea - and presenting
Pakistan as a nuclear conduit to both.
Second,
Pakistan is kept on a short leash, as if on probation,
and the language used for its role in the war on terror
is remarkably similar to that employed for Yasser
Arafat's Palestinian Authority: constant demands being
urged to do more, as if what has been done is not good
enough and does not meet US standards of loyalty.
Third, Pakistani expectations of economic
benefits for its role in the war on terror have not been
met, although two other key Muslim allies, Turkey and
Egypt, are being promised financial rewards. Fourth, the
latest humiliation is the US move of putting Pakistanis
among those nationals who will be registered and
fingerprinted in the US for fears of alleged terrorist
connections. On Thursday, Pakistan's Foreign Minister
Khurshid Kasuri remarked, "Pakistan is at the forefront
of the war on terrorism, a frontline state, and it is
unfair to bracket Pakistan with other countries."
Fifth, all through the two 2002 crises with
India, at no time did the United States publicly ask the
Indians to defuse tensions despite the heavy troop
deployment. In Pakistan's view, the onus was always on
it while US promises to facilitate a dialogue on Kashmir
have not been met.
Instead of blaming the United
States, or carping about its "unreliable friendship",
Pakistani policymakers should make an introspective
appraisal of where things went wrong and why. There is
no doubt that the decision after September 11 to side
with the United States and dump the flawed Afghan policy
was a correct one.
It would have been better had
Pakistan done the U-turn to withhold support for the
Taliban on its own volition rather than under duress,
but this was long called for. However, policymakers did
not seek an adequate quid pro quo for Islamabad's
support to the United States.
Pakistanis feel
shortchanged despite their services rendered, including
the arrest of over 400 of the 600 al-Qaeda detainees in
Guantanamo Bay, the provision of four airbases and
extensive overflight rights to US planes and troops plus
unfettered access for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to arrest and interrogate suspected
terrorists.
Pakistani policymakers are
discovering a painful reality. In the US-led war on
terror, Washington's definition of its national interest
could change not only the focus from Afghanistan to
Iraq, but also allow it to shuffle friends and shift
allies.
(Inter Press Service)
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