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COMMENTARY
Pakistan bent on proliferation
path
By Stephen Blank
The
year 2002 was punctuated by crises either instigated or
abetted by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The war against al-Qaeda, the Korean crisis, the
imminent war against Iraq, and even the
Israel-Palestinian conflict were all aggravated by and
subjected to the stresses that this issue puts upon
governments as they seek security and/or peace.
Indeed,
proliferation plus terrorism has proven to
be an especially destructive trend that has come close
to undermining not just peace but even entire governments,
particularly in Pakistan. Therefore, one may
have been entitled to hope that the Pakistani government
had begun to see the light. Unfortunately, this has not
happened. Indeed, according to Indian officials'
charges, Pakistan has recently increased the flow of
terrorists to Kashmir. Moreover, according to recent
media reports, Pakistan continues to be instrumental in
fueling major proliferation crises large and small,
imminent and somewhat more distant.
Pakistan's
role in abetting North Korea's proliferation is
incontestable. Indeed, it plays a dual role here. On the
one hand, by being an eager customer for Pyongyang's
knowhow and weapons it provides that country with much
of the cash needed to keep its programs going. On the
other hand, Pakistan has more recently supplied North
Korea with essential components needed for its nuclear
program. Thus Pakistan's relationship with North Korea
reinforces both states' proliferation at both ends of
this process, obtaining the cash needed to pay for
ongoing proliferation and transferring or selling the
necessary materials to the proliferator.
In this way, the Pakistani-North Korea
relationship perfectly epitomizes the phenomenon known
as tertiary proliferation, whereby newly nuclear states
or new aspirants to that status assist each other, and
by doing so obtain technological, military, or financial,
as well as political benefits from their relationship.
It may also be the case that Pakistan acts as a middleman
for a third party, in this case China, that does not
want its shipments to North Korea to be directly
traceable. If that is the case, Pakistan would then
resemble Ukraine and Belarus, which assist proliferation and arms
sales to "rogue states" on their own and are regularly
used by Russian firms and authorities as middlemen for
deals that Moscow does not want traced back to it.
But this policy of supporting North Korea in
both aspects of its proliferation policies, sales and
research and development, has a boomerang effect for
Pakistan, not to mention a globally destabilizing
quality. Israeli officials have revealed their
assessment that the recent shipment of Scud missiles
that Yemen supposedly bought from North Korea were going
to Baghdad, not Sanaa. And North Korea has now launched
a crisis that could easily inflame all of Northeast
Asia. It is hard to see what gains, pecuniary or
otherwise, justify Pakistan's efforts to strengthen the
reckless regime in Pyongyang or to directly challenge
the vital interests of the United States, its sole real
protector. Yet that is what it has done.
Nor has
it stopped here. On December 23 last year, Pakistan and
Iran agreed to bury their hatchet from the days of the
Taliban's rule in Afghanistan and to exchange military
delegations. This action is almost always a prelude to
arms sales, so we can expect open announcement of
various conventional weapon sales to Iran, the number
one state sponsor of international terrorism. But it
would hardly be surprising if, along with those open
sales, there were covert transfers of nuclear-related
technologies, given Iran's naked aspiration to become a
nuclear power as soon as possible. Moreover, Iran has
already threatened to extend deterrence to Hizbullah
terrorists in Lebanon should Israel attempt to retaliate
against their attacks. Thus, future arms deals with Iran
could easily fuel the fires of another Middle East
war besides the imminent one against Iraq. Although
Iranian-Pakistani relations have never reached the point
of imminent conflict resembling India-Pakistan
relations; nevertheless, it does not seem to be the most
farsighted policy to assist a neighbor and potential
rival who is a notorious sponsor of terrorism in its
quest for nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, on the
very same day a former chief of Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), its intelligence
agency and the organization having operational
responsibility for the recruitment of many of the
Taliban and other Islamic terrorists of the past decade,
confirmed in writing that Pakistan defied the United
Nations ban on supply of arms to the Bosnian Muslims by
shipping them sophisticated anti-tank missiles. He
clearly justified this activity by alleging that he had
done so to rescue persecuted Muslims. In other words,
these covert arms sales, and helping the mujahideen to
take power in Afghanistan in 1992, among other possible
operations, were justified because as "a true,
practicing Muslim, he would not compromise on the
interests of Islam and Pakistan". Here we see how
religion can serve as a justification of gunrunning and
proliferation, even if only of conventional systems, in
defiance of international agreements.
Since we know that various
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, are active in Bosnia and
Kosovo, this evidence raises the possibility that Pakistan or
elements in the Pakistani intelligence and defense
sector are supplying those forces with
weapons despite international prohibitions.
Given the support
still being given by the ISI to Kashmiri terrorists, the
revelation of connections between Pakistani scientists
and al-Qaeda, the continuing unwillingness of many
Pakistani officials to act against those terrorist
groups, the threats these groups pose to the stability
and security of Pakistan itself, and their abiding quest
for weapons of mass destruction, we are entitled to ask
the government in Islamabad an important question.
It is a question often posed in US war games
after the game is ended and all the participants are
reviewing the command decisions made during the game,
and it normally takes the form of an officer querying
one of the generals: "What exactly were you thinking of
when you made that decision?"
We
must endlessly pose this question to Pakistan, for it is
a crucial front in the war on terrorism, perhaps the
second front for al-Qaeda and its supporters in
and around Afghanistan. Certainly, as President
General Pervez Musharraf knows, it is the most unstable
front around. Consequently, it makes no sense for his
government and officials to continue to play with fire, as
they are clearly doing. And if we do not pressure
Islamabad by posing this question or a variant thereof,
this line of policy will continue until it explodes in
someone's face. In that case, the question we may need
to ask will not be the one above, for it will be too
late by then to do so. Rather, we may then need to ask
where the next fire will burn, and for how long.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contactcontent@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
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