| |
COMMENTARY
India: Time to dispense with
illusions
By Ramtanu Maitra
Officially, New Delhi still insists that the
vexed Kashmir dispute with Pakistan can only be resolved
bilaterally. Unofficially, however, the dispute has
patently been internationalized. In the context of the
war on terrorism, India has opened many channels with
Washington in an effort to engage US muscle to force
Pakistan to a settlement. But to date, far from gaining
headway in the bitter half-century-old dispute, India
seems rather to have lost the strongest card it had -
namely, the ability to act independently in the matter.
How New Delhi handles this strategic reality
will be a crucial test of India's post-Cold War policy.
Recent bouts of whining suggest that the mandarins of
the South Block have yet to come to grips with the new
geometry their own initiative has, ironically, brought
about.
New Delhi's hopes
With the Bush
administration's identification of the Afghanistan-based
al-Qaeda and the Taliban as the primary targets in a new
world war against terrorism, New Delhi glimpsed a light
at the end of the tunnel of Pakistani-sponsored
cross-border terrorism within India over Kashmir.
It was a neat and compelling vision, and in a
bold and hopeful strategic move, India enthusiastically
cast its lot with the Bush campaign. With the
Pakistan-supported insurgency stopped, New Delhi
figured, Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf
would have no choice but to come to the negotiating
table, with very few cards in his hand.
Removal
of the pro-Pakistan and Pakistani Inter-Services
Intelligence-controlled Taliban, and their replacement
by the pro-India Northern Alliance was a welcome
prospect in New Delhi. The seizure of power in Kabul by
the Northern Alliance on the shoulders of the Americans
brought India back into Afghanistan with a bang. India
has since set up a military base in Tajikistan bordering
Afghanistan in the north. It is no secret that the
Northern Alliance, long supported by India, Russia and
Iran, is virtually holding the US-backed Pashtun leader
and Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, a hostage in Kabul.
Even as the fleeing terrorists took refuge in
Pakistan, consolidating their position there in
collusion with the Islamic militants within Pakistan,
and the level of violence was, predictably, raised
against India and against Western interests in Pakistan,
India braced to play out the logic of the war against
terrorism.
With the terrorist attack on India's
parliament in December 2001, New Delhi raised the
stakes, bringing in 700,000 soldiers along the
India-Pakistan border as a countermeasure, hoping that
the US would move in to not only ease the situation, but
also work toward resolving the underlying dispute, and
would also work toward stopping the Pakistan-sponsored
terrorism in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indians
hoped that Washington would act on the realization that
the war-like situation was created by the infiltration
and terrorism was sponsored by Pakistan. Predictably,
the American analysts rang the alarm of a nuclear
exchange and Washington began a hectic liaison between
the two countries to stop a war breaking out.
Musharraf came under increasing pressure from
the US to loosen the national sovereignty rein and allow
the Americans free access to the nooks and crannies of
Pakistan. Predictably, the Americans were expected to
move in to dismantle the Pakistani ISI and weaken the
base of the fundamentalist faction within the Pakistani
army.
But the gear got stuck at that point, and
nothing moved forward. Despite repeated pleadings, New
Delhi began to realize that Washington would not go any
further. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee told reporters on September 24, following the
terrorist killings inside the Akshardham temple in
Gujarat, that the US pressure on Pakistan to abandon
support of terrorism appeared not to be working and
asserted that India would have to fight its own battle
against the menace.
Where India was
fooled
It is obvious now that New Delhi did not
read Washington correctly. Driven by their "initial
success" in Afghanistan, New Delhi believed that the
American establishment would bend backwards to satisfy
India. Such an expectation, perhaps, was based on a
belief that Washington considers it important to build
up Delhi as the bulwark against the growing Chinese
economic and military power.
When Musharraf,
under duress, agreed to US Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage's demand to stop infiltration into
India, New Delhi was more than pleased. Last week, the
New York Times interviewed at least three Pakistani
terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. These
individuals said clearly that Islamabad prevented them
from infiltrating into India in the months of May and
June.
But come July, Islamabad has given them
carte blanche, and sacks full of cash, to infiltrate and
disrupt the holding of state assembly elections in the
India-held part of Kashmir. A similar report also came
from the US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill.
There are reasons why India cannot "fight the
battle against the menace" of terrorism independently.
To begin with, there is a greater convergence today
between India and the US on key international issues,
stretching from common support to missile defense and
rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the
importance of limiting the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court. As the biggest victim of
international terrorism, India is more enthusiastic than
Europe about the American war since September 11. India
is more interested to work with the United States on
nuclear issues and the Kashmir issue than with
Europe.
Growing closeness
In India
today, the growing closeness of US-India relations in
military affairs draws regular headlines. The men in
uniform, who had longed for American weapons and weapon
technologies for decades and were provided with
less-sophisticated Russian weapons by New Delhi, seem to
be the most prominent promoters of the growing India-US
relations in military and strategic affairs.
In
fact, the men in uniform in India have now, perhaps for
the first time, begun to cast a long shadow over India's
foreign policy establishments. The shadow is by no means
as overwhelming, or as ominous yet, as the one the
Pakistani military casts over that country's hapless and
debilitated institutions. In addition, the Israeli lobby
within India, which also draws succor from the men in
uniform, is keen to push India's arms dependence on both
Israel and the United States. India's inability to speak
out clearly against the Israeli blackmailing of the
Palestinians, or against the US and Britain-led drumbeat
against Iraq, is a testimony to that effect.
On
the other hand, the US-Pakistan relation will strengthen
further in near future. The US acquisition of 54,000
acres on a 99-year lease in the North West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan, as reported in the press,
makes it evident that Washington is planning to
establish a base and direct the operations not only
against the Taliban-al Qaeda forces with the help of
Pakistan's armed forces, but use the base simultaneously
as a jump-off point for Central Asia.
In the
context of the United States' burgeoning relations with
Central Asian nations, Washington is going to depend on
Islamabad and the Pakistani army. As a result, it is
almost a certainty that the US-India relationship will
get rocked. Washington is not going to change its policy
on Pakistan in the foreseeable future to accommodate
India.
In addition, the fast-changing scenario
in Afghanistan in the coming months may pose new
problems in India-US military relations. It is not
wholly unlikely that the Pakistani ISI will regain
control in Kabul in the coming months. A new Pashtun
leader, other than Hamid Karzai, may emerge on the
scene, backed by the ISI, and the Taliban.
Despite its best wishes, and lacking other
options, Washington will back such a government, and
once more lean on Pakistan to keep its foothold in
Afghanistan. And, the Northern Alliance once again may
end up in the opposition, battling against a government
backed by Pakistan and the United States.
(©2002
Asia Times Online Co Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contactcontent@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
