When
diplomacy is never saying sorry By Victor Kotsev
The most recent
source of suspense in the Turkish-Israeli
relationship is an important upcoming report by a
United Nations inquiry into Israeli raid of the
Turkish aid ship Mavi Marmara. The incident
in international waters on May 31, 2010, left nine
activists dead and over 50 people, including
several Israeli soldiers, wounded.
The
media intrigue, boosted by numerous leaks from
politicians, is being loudly drummed up in both
countries (and, to a lesser extent, in the
international media), but it is important to keep
in mind that both Ankara and Tel Aviv face more
pressing challenges at home and abroad. The
question looms large, therefore, whether or not
this spat is much more than a smokescreen designed
to divert attention and to serve indirectly
related agendas of the two countries.
The
upcoming report was originally intended to help mend
Turkish-Israeli ties which
have been in decline since Operation Cast Lead in
Gaza in 2008-2009, and under incredible strain
after the Mavi Marmara raid. However, its
final draft is said to hurt both countries, and
its impact to seriously endanger their ties. If
Ankara and Tel Aviv can reach an understanding on
their own, the report could be toned down;
intensive negotiations are underway.
The
sticking issue is Turkey's demand that Israel
apologizes for the raid and pays compensation to
the families of the victims. Israel, which claims
that its soldiers acted in self-defense, has so
far balked at the idea of issuing any kind of
apology, even though its government has been
discussing this possibility over the last few
days. Some reports claim that Israel has quietly
agreed to pay compensation in the past, but that
an apology remains a red line for many in Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's center-right
coalition.
The four-member inquiry panel,
backed by UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon,
includes both an Israeli and a Turkish
representative, and was launched in August 2010.
Its conclusions examine and draw on investigations
that both countries conducted independently, and
are considered more authoritative than those of a
previous report, released by the United Nations
Human Rights Council last September, which
squarely laid blame on Israel. [1]
Arguably, the Turks are responsible for
most of the noise surrounding the inquiry itself.
Israel conducted a high-powered investigation into
the incident, headed by retired Israeli Supreme
Court justice Jacob Turkel and including two
prominent international observers. Its findings,
signed also by international legal experts, were
released in January. The Turkel report criticized
the Israeli army for operational failures, but
concluded that "the actions taken [by Israel] were
found to be legal pursuant to the rules of
international law." [2]
Turkey reacted
angrily to the Israeli report, but its own
investigation into the incident was much less
extensive and seemingly carried much less weight.
The Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration,
nevertheless, stuck to its guns. "We expect the UN
investigation to be balanced so we won't get what
we want and Israel won't get what it wants, but
apology and compensation are a red line for us," a
Turkish official told Reuters in February.
By May, however, the full extent of the
damage done to Turkey's position by the Turkel
report and Israeli diplomacy became visible. An
alarmed Ankara threatened to pull out of the
United Nations investigation, claiming a
pro-Israeli bias of the draft. [3]
In
June, after the parliamentary elections in Turkey
which were won by the ruling AKP (Justice and
Development) party, intensive negotiations to
resolve the crisis started between the two
countries. The United States played an important
role behind the curtains, allegedly promising
Ankara "a major role in Mideast [peace] talks" if
it stopped the Turkish participants in the Freedom
Flotilla movement from sailing again to Gaza this
year. [4]
The move worked spectacularly,
and for a while it seemed that the Turkish-Israeli
rift was almost over (see my article Gandhians
come thundering, Asia Times Online, July 8,
2011). However, the issue of the apology remained
unresolved, and the upcoming report elevated it
again to a crisis status.
According to
information provided to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz
by anonymous Israeli officials, the UN draft
report justifies the Israeli blockade on the Gaza
Strip and criticizes the actions of the Turkish
government, but also accuses Israel of using
disproportionate force. It does not demand an
apology from Israel. [5]
According to
leaks in the Turkish press, however, the report
accuses Israel of sending its commandos "to kill".
[6]
Turkey remains adamant about the
apology, and it has been dangling both carrots and
sticks in front of the Israeli government. On the
one hand stands the promise of full normalization
of diplomatic, military, intelligence, and
economic ties between the two countries. [7] On
the other hand stands the threat of "diplomatic
action". [8]
Such measures could include a
visit to Gaza by Erdogan (lending international
legitimacy to Hamas), further downgrades in
diplomatic representation (there has been no
Turkish ambassador in Israel for over a year), and
possibly international lawsuits against Israeli
soldiers.
The Israeli government is
holding intensive debates on its course of action.
Last week, Israeli Attorney General Yehuda
Weinstein advised Netanyahu to apologize, and
expressed his belief that Turkey could be
persuaded not to file any lawsuits against Israeli
soldiers in exchange. [9] This has been a
problematic issue so far, and some Israeli
analysts have claimed that an apology might in
fact make lawsuits more likely.
Hardliners
in the Israeli government have been more vocal in
the media about the debates, indicating that they
perceive a danger that they may lose the argument.
Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
condemned Netanyahu for "his inclination to agree
to an Israeli apology to Turkey over the deadly
IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] raid on a Gaza-bound
ship last year," as a Ha'aretz report has it. [10]
According to other media reports, it was
the Israeli officials who requested the latest
postponement of the release of the UN report. It
is important to see how this crisis plays out, not
so much because of its intrinsic importance, but
because it is indicative of the course of several
larger crises in the Middle East which are
gathering steam.
There is, for example,
the Syrian crisis. It was a major incentive for
both Israel and Turkey, which are Syria's
neighbors, to pursue a reconciliation, since it
threatens to destabilize the entire region; the
only way to avoid a serious spillover would be for
regional powers to act together and with
determination.
Syria was likely also on
the mind of the United States as it pushed
Jerusalem and Ankara to mend fences. The Syrian
upheaval is gradually sliding toward a proxy
conflict between Iran and the United States and
its allies; even a possible Turkish military
intervention is reportedly in the works.
The Iranian nuclear crisis is also at a
critical point. The United States clearly is eager
to resolve any outstanding issues between its
allies in this moment.
On the other hand,
however, stands Turkey's desire for a prominent
role in the Muslim world. After the fall of former
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Ankara arguably
received a boost in this ambition. Still, it is
reluctant to challenge its other main competitors
- Saudi Arabia and Iran. It has domestic troubles
of its own, including a restive Kurdish
population, and an economic crisis that is bound
to be exacerbated by the problems in Syria and the
rest of the Arab world.
A cheap way for
Erdogan to get credit with the Arab street is to
pick a fight with Israel; the more symbolic the
fight, the better. The Mavi Marmara
incident seems like a gold mine in this respect,
and this likely explains a large part of the
Turkish reticence to accept anything less than an
apology.
Prominent in Israel's
calculations, on the other hand, are both the
Iranian crisis and the upcoming Palestinian
declaration of independence. Netanyahu has held
his cards close to his chest on both issues. It
remains to be seen whether he will seek to mend
his international standing as much as possible
prior to September, indicating that he is
committed to a purely diplomatic exit from all the
different crises, or if he will escalate further
all fronts, gambling on the assumption that a
military flare-up anywhere in the region will
reshuffle all the cards and make an apology
superfluous.
It could be that Netanyahu
ends up being unable to twist the arms of his
unruly right-wing coalition partners into agreeing
to an apology. It could also be that a military
flare-up, in Syria, Iran, Lebanon or Gaza, is
imminent.
While the current crisis between
Israel and Turkey is hardly significant in the
long run in and of itself, it could provide
important clues to these questions.
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