The last trick up Mubarak's sleeve
By Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV - "Jimmy Carter will go down in American history as 'the president who
lost Iran'," Israeli analyst Aluf Benn wrote on Sunday. "Barack Obama will be
remembered as the president who 'lost' Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt, and during
whose tenure America's alliances in the Middle East crumbled."
Comparing Obama and Carter is a common theme among Israeli analysts. While Benn
qualifies his own comparison by pointing out that "unlike Carter, who preached
human rights even when it hurt allies, Obama sat on the fence and exercised
caution", there
is a widespread perception in Israel that Obama is overly idealistic, doesn't
understand the Middle East well, and his policies will bring about a disaster,
both for the United States and for the Jewish state.
The fear behind this perception is that Muslim masses are not ready for
democracy, and that if unleashed on their current autocratic rulers, they will
create militant theocratic societies, as happened during the Iranian revolution
of 1979. In fact, some analysts see Iran as benefiting and taking advantage of
the events to expand its own influence.
Both assumptions can be disputed: for example, the Egyptian opposition has
tried hard to distance itself from exclusively religious slogans, and has
largely united behind the secular Mohamed ElBaradei. However, from a
geopolitical point of view, the broader conclusion that Egypt is lost as an
ally probably holds, at least in the short- and mid-term.
Should the protesters take power, even in the best-case scenario it will take
time to forge new relationships on all levels. There is every indication that
the new government would be reserved towards Egypt's former allies, and at
worst, even animosity can be expected.
The Muslim Brotherhood, one of the main opposition forces (and possible
coalition partner), has frequently threatened in the past to annul the peace
treaty with Israel; for the first time since the start of the demonstrations,
reports surfaced on Sunday that the protesters were turning their anger on the
US and Israel.
Paradoxically, the American administration interfered mostly on the side of the
protesters. It is impossible to verify reports that the US "backed Egypt
uprising planners", but in the past few days, Obama put a lot of pressure on
the Egyptian president to announce broad reforms, to allow freedom of
expression and to unblock communications such as cellular phones, access to the
Internet and social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter). The Americans even
reportedly threatened to reduce their military aid for Egypt, currently around
US$1.3 billion a year, if Mubarak failed to comply.
According to Foreign Policy blogger Marc Lynch, "the [US] administration ... is
trying hard to protect the protestors from an escalation of violent repression,
giving Mubarak just enough rope to hang himself, while carefully preparing to
ensure that a transition will go in the direction of a more democratic
successor." When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on Sunday that
"we want to see an orderly transition [in Egypt]… that will bring about a
democratic participatory government," and Obama himself later supported her
comments, their remarks only strengthened this impression.
This is why, should a new regime in Egypt turn against the US, Obama would get
a lot of the blame. For the very same reason, should the regime survive - this
currently remains a possibility - Egypt would prove to be a very unruly ally,
to say the least. Mubarak is not known to tolerate betrayal, and this is how he
will view the actions of his close ally.
The battle is far from over. In the words of The New York Times, "More than at
perhaps any other point since the uprising began, the tumult Sunday seemed
perched between two deepening narratives: a vision of impending anarchy offered
by the government, and echoed by many Egyptian fearing chaos, against the
perspective of protesters and many others that the uprising had become, as they
described it in a list of demands posted in Liberation Square on Sunday, 'a
popular revolution'."
After the police forces were overwhelmed on Friday and the army stepped in, the
former disappeared from the streets of several major cities, and a period of
lawlessness and looting set in. During attacks on several prisons, an unknown
number of prisoners broke out. Looters attacked the Egyptian museum and damaged
two mummies. "Thieves raped my daughter in front of my eyes, without showing
mercy," a resident of Cairo, Said Mahmoud, told Ynet. Up to 60 rapes were
reported, and many citizens organized neighborhood watch groups armed with
clubs and knives.
These scenes, amplified by the state media, caused many to have second
thoughts. Sunday's demonstrations were reported to be palpably smaller than
those of the previous days. Still, a sizeable core group of protesters
(estimated at 20,000 in Tahrir Square) persisted through the night, united
around the figure of ElBaradei, and continued to call on Mubarak to step down.
A fresh detachment of elite tank units was dispatched to the square, but did
not fire on the crowd. The protesters distanced themselves from the atrocities,
organized human chains to protect the museum, and blamed the looting and
jailbreaks on instigation by the secret police.
It is possible that parts of Mubarak's security apparatus, with or without his
consent, took part in instigating the chaos. This would echo what has happened
in similar circumstances in countless other places, and, if executed
stealthily, could damage the support base of the protesters. American
think-tank Stratfor reports, "Egyptian plainclothes police allegedly were
behind a number of the jailbreaks, robberies of major banks and the spread of
attacks and break-ins in high-class neighborhoods."
According to Stratfor, there is a rivalry between the Egyptian army and police.
The army is a symbol of national unity, and large parts of it sympathize with
the protesters in varying degrees. During the last days, there were many
instances of soldiers joining the rallies, and pictures circulate of protesters
carrying junior officers on their shoulders.
The police, on the other hand, are widely perceived as an instrument of
oppression. Even though it was overwhelmed on Friday, it is very well organized
and diverse. Its sudden disappearance from the streets is by itself strange.
Despite that it is hard to verify the reports - and unreasonable to blame all
looting on the police - it seems that the regime anticipated the chaos and
wanted the people to start missing the police a little.
If successful, this strategy could give Mubarak one last chance to turn the
tide. On Sunday morning, he seemed broken down; the appointment of his
confidante and intelligence chief General Omar Suleiman as vice president - a
post that has been vacant for 30 years - was widely interpreted as a prelude to
a transition of power. Chaos was rampant and rumors circulated that he had left
Cairo. Even the American administration had apparently written him off.
However, Obama may possibly have jumped the gun. Mubarak is one of the world's
oldest and most experienced leaders. While many described him as disconnected
from reality, he was possibly laying low and waiting for the opportune moment
to play his last remaining cards.
Stratfor also reports that on Monday, the police will be back in many places.
This will be a crucial test for Mubarak's strategy. It will also be a test for
the relationship between the army and the various forces of the Interior
Ministry. We should also keep in mind the question how the appointment of a
government dominated by the military might play into the internal intrigues.
As I argued in my previous story
Days of rage in Egypt (Asia Times Online, January 28, 2011), another
decisive factor is how well the protesters will be able to organize and rally
around clearly-defined goals. Stratfor seems to believe they are not: "The
demonstrators are deeply divided among themselves and thus far do not appear to
have been able to generate the type of mass movement that toppled the Shah of
Iran's regime in 1979."
The situation remains extremely volatile. Even if Mubarak survives the
protests, he is reportedly very ill, and may well step down in the near future.
What all this will mean for Egypt's foreign policy is unclear. Israeli analysts
have speculated that Israel might need to revamp its operational doctrine and
to beef up its forces in the south. In Stratfor's analysis:
If Egypt
were to abrogate the Camp David Accords and over time reconstruct its military
into an effective force, the existential threat to Israel that existed before
the treaty was signed would re-emerge. This would not happen quickly, but
Israel would have to deal with two realities. The first is that the Israeli
military is not nearly large enough or strong enough to occupy and control
Egypt. The second is that the development of Egypt's military would impose
substantial costs on Israel and limit its room for maneuver.
However,
a close - and perhaps informal - short-term alliance between Egypt and Israel
is not unconceivable under certain circumstances. If Mubarak survives, he and
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might well find themselves in the same boat
of American allies that Obama has picked a fight with (Netanyahu has campaigned
among world leaders to go easy on Mubarak, the Israeli Ha'aretz daily newspaper
reported early on Monday). The two leaders would also have a common grudge
against Hamas, which, according to reports, broke the Egyptian blockade of Gaza
during the past days and attempted to form a new front against Mubarak.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the Iranian standoff. It doesn't seem
so far that Iran is directly involved in the tumult in Egypt. However, if
Israel is threatened with a new, if hypothetical and removed in time, front in
the south, would that draw resources away from the Iranian crisis, or would it
make it more urgent? It is hard to answer this question right away, but clues
will most likely emerge in the coming days and weeks.
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