AN ATOL INVESTIGATION
Iranian spy still a teasing enigma
By Mahan Abedin
More than 10 days after his return to Iran, Shahram Amiri remains an enigma
with many wondering whether he was "kidnapped" by the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) as he now claims, or whether he was a spy who got
cold feet, or even whether he was an Iranian "double-agent" from the very
outset.
After a lengthy investigation involving interviews and conversations with
scores of knowledgeable sources in Iran, Asia Times Online can now reveal some
of the essential background features of the case.
However, the central question, namely what happened in Saudi Arabia in late May
and June 2009 remains unresolved. Aside from Amiri, the only people who are
privy to the full truth is a small
circle of Iranian and American intelligence officers, and it is highly unlikely
they will ever part with their secrets.
With the stakes so high and an apparently minor defection leaving such a
profound impact on the already intensely idiosyncratic Iranian-American
relationship, the full details of this case may never be revealed to the global
public.
CIA disinformation
Immediately after Amiri touched down on Iranian soil this month, the Iranian
public relations campaign kicked into an even higher gear, depicting his return
as the third success at the expense of the CIA in recent months. The first
success being the capture of Jundallah terrorist leader Abdulmalik Rigi in
February and the second the freeing of a kidnapped Iranian diplomat in
northwest Pakistan in late March.
While the official Iranian line leaves a lot to be desired and is geared
foremost to achieving public relations and propaganda goals, it is the American
- and more specifically CIA version - that is most contradictory and
unbelievable.
Earlier in the year, CIA officials, keen to counter Iranian claims that Amiri
had been kidnapped in Saudi Arabia in late May while performing the hajj
(pilgrimage) , tried to present Amiri as a major defector using their contacts
in the American and international media. These allegations sit uneasily with
verifiable information that Amiri was neither an official nor had access to
classified information. Even the CIA now appears to admit that Amiri did not
have access to extraordinary secrets.
The second major CIA blunder came in early June 2010 when the agency reacted to
a webcam recording broadcast on Iranian TV in which Amiri claimed he was in
Tuscon, Arizona, following his "kidnapping" in Saudi Arabia in a joint
operation by Saudi and American secret services.
The CIA quickly forced Amiri to make a counter-video in which he denied living
under duress in the United States and expressed a desire to pursue his
education in America. The artificial nature of the recording - with an
uncomfortable Amiri clearly reading from a script - shows the CIA in the worst
possible light.
It was clear then that this case, quite aside from its intricate intelligence
dimension, was now essentially a propaganda duel between the CIA and Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), with the latter sprinting to the
finishing line in what would soon prove to be an undisputed and dramatic
victory.
Sure enough, Amiri made a third video (most likely at the behest and direction
of the MOIS), shown on Iranian state TV in late June, in which he claims to
have escaped from US security agents and was hiding in a safe place.
While Amiri does not explain how he had managed to escape the clutches of the
CIA, this third and final video made a total mockery of the CIA-produced video
and is a clear indication that the Americans had applied a degree of duress and
coercion on Amiri.
Just exactly how Amiri came to make these videos, and more to the point how the
MOIS was able to establish direct communication with him whilst he was under
the ostensible control of the CIA, remains one of the most intriguing aspects
of this case.
According to "knowledgeable" sources in Tehran, Amiri had not been subject to
the strictest levels of security, with the CIA apparently housing him in
relatively unsecured accommodation in Tuscon, Arizona. It appears that Amiri
was left alone for prolonged periods without on-the-spot monitoring and
supervision by CIA officers. This arrangement was a direct consequence of the
agency determining that Amiri was of no significant intelligence value, thereby
considerably eroding the incentive to impose strict security on his dwelling
and movements.
But the CIA disinformation blunders came thick and fast once it became apparent
that the MOIS had persuaded Amiri to return home. While some American officials
were willing to admit that Amiri was not that important after all (if only to
soften the blow of his departure), the dominant line from the agency was that
he had provided significant "original" information and had been rewarded with a
US$5 million payout.
To those familiar with the intelligence world, the CIA allegations come across
as absurd fabrication. For if Amiri was indeed rewarded with $5 million, that
would make him arguably one of the best-paid spies in history. Even Aldrich
Ames, the CIA officer who betrayed some of the agency's most sensitive secrets
in a 10-year period to the KGB and the post-Soviet SVR, and who was finally
arrested in early 1994, made just over $2 million for his services to the
Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Having surpassed the magic $1 million
figure, Ames is regarded as one of the best-paid spies ever.
CIA officials also anonymously tipped off the media that Amiri had been
recruited inside Iran and that he had assisted the agency for a number of years
before using the opportunity presented while on the hajj in May 2009 to
finally defect to the United States. Aside from their questionable propaganda
value and the fact that they contradict other statements casting doubt on
Amiri's usefulness, these statements are remarkably careless and unscrupulous
inasmuch as they can be used as evidence against Amiri in any future espionage
trial, irrespective of their accuracy.
Extensive defector program
CIA officials have repeatedly claimed to the media that Amiri's "defection" was
part of an elaborate plan to encourage further defections from inside Iran's
nuclear program. Some media reports have even named this secret program as the
"brain drain" plan, which aims to both gather information on Iran's nuclear
program and deprive the Iranians of capable human resources.
According to the CIA - as relayed by American and international media -
intelligence garnered from human sources comprise the essential features of
this program. Following interviews with knowledgeable sources in Tehran who are
aware of this program, Asia Times Online is now in a position to dispute the
CIA's claims.
According to these sources, Amiri was targeted by the Americans after an
elaborate signals intelligence (SIGINT) operation involving the US National
Security Agency (NSA) and Britain's secret eavesdropping center, the
Cheltenham-based Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
While the Americans had come to learn of Amiri's position at the Malik Ashtar
University of Technology by data-mining within the Iranian-American community
in the US and obtained his mobile number through this method, virtually nothing
else thereafter involved human sources.
Instead, the NSA (with some assistance from GCHQ) was able to develop an
elaborate profile of Amiri by tapping his phone. This enabled the NSA to build
up an exhaustive network of Amiri's contacts, some of which pointed to
officials connected to Iran's nuclear program. It was likely at that point that
the decision was made to approach Amiri directly to entice him to defect to the
United States.
The assistance of GCHQ makes sense as it was the British who first fully
developed the technique of mobile phone surveillance, not only to eavesdrop and
gather intelligence but to map out the social network of a target, back in the
mid- and late-1990s.
One of the earliest victims of this form of high-tech espionage was notorious
south London gangster Kenneth Noye, who had fled to Spain after a road rage
murder in 1996. Unable to track down Noye, who became infamous in the 1980s
following the Brinks Mat robbery in 1983 and the subsequent killing of an
undercover police officer, the police requested the help of GCHQ.
While the prolific use of SIGINT resources to track Iran's nuclear program
comes as no surprise, the extent of the NSA's targeting of Iranian scientists
and officials has had Iranian counter-intelligence deeply worried. Despite the
deployment of counter-measures, such as banning the use of mobile phones by
some highly-placed officials and scientists, it is distinctly possible that the
Americans may try to lure other targets, in the same manner as Amiri.
This explains the fierce determination of the MOIS to win back the junior
scientist, either by threats or inducements. While this successful interference
with CIA post-defection programs is a clear blow to the agency's prestige, it
remains to be seen whether it has had the desired effect of deterring potential
defectors.
Amiri: Dead man walking?
It is an indicator of the serious divisions in security and judicial circles in
Tehran that when Asia Times Online asked a source close to this story whether
Amiri would be expelled from the Malik Ashtar University in the wake of this
strange affair, that the reply was: "Currently the real debate centers on
whether to expel him from this planet rather than from his university."
Indeed, the majority of people who spoke to Asia Times Online, including
journalists, sources in the judiciary and people close to the security
establishment, cast an element of doubt on the official version of events.
The main point of contention is exactly what happened in Saudi Arabia in late
May and early June 2009. Prior to Amiri's return to Iran, informed sources were
focused on constructing elaborate hypothesis from three basic scenarios:
Amiri had been "kidnapped" by the CIA, as alleged by the Iranian government.
Amiri had been induced to defect by the CIA.
Amiri had been "kidnapped" by Saudi intelligence who in turn sold him to the
CIA.
The second and third scenarios are far and away the favorites, and sources
close to the story have told Asia Times Online that Iranian intelligence has
learnt that the Saudis played a much more proactive role in Amiri's "defection"
than previously thought.
Moreover, while various scenarios have been put forward regarding the incentive
offered to Amiri, it is safe to assume that the prospect of research
opportunities and a solid career in the US would have held greater appeal to a
scientist, than the offer of large sums of money.
Furthermore, there is one scenario that is being increasingly promoted by
sources close to the Iranian government, namely that Amiri had been a double
agent from the start. According to this scenario, Amiri was sent to the US to
confuse the American government about Iran's capabilities in the nuclear sector
and prepare the grounds for the humiliation of the CIA.
This scenario is unlikely for a simple reason: Iranian intelligence does not
have the capability to deceive the core CIA by such an elaborate operation.
While the MOIS dominates the intelligence landscape in the Middle East, it has
neither the intelligence nor the cultural resources to deceive major Western
agencies on their home soil.
Furthermore, while the MOIS has consistently deceived and defeated the outer
layers of the CIA and broader American intelligence, it lacks the experience
and capacity to successfully engage the core CIA in a bare-knuckle intelligence
fight.
In any case, speculation about Amiri as a double agent inevitably opens up
another and even more complex scenario; that Amiri may in fact be a triple
agent, now working at the behest of the CIA inside Iran. Despite the fact
intelligence agencies take great care to shroud their work in mystery, the
truth is often more straightforward than it appears.
The widespread suspicion in Tehran is that Amiri has struck a deal with the
MOIS that shields him from further investigation and eventual prosecution. This
has caused serious divisions and is bitterly resented in particular by
ideological supporters of the Islamic Republic who believe that it is judges
and by extension the judicial system that is supreme, not secret intelligence
agencies.
Accordingly, many believe that the only way for truth and justice to prevail in
this case is for Amiri to either volunteer himself or be submitted to the
revolutionary prosecutor where he can provide a full and honest account of his
relationship with the CIA. If tried and convicted under charges of espionage on
behalf of the United States, Amiri would be handed a mandatory death sentence,
irrespective of his obvious cooperation with the MOIS.
This scenario does not appear to be realistic, at least not for the foreseeable
future. The reality at present for many people within and outside the
establishment is that despite being horrified by what they see as the
transformation of a traitor to a hero, they appear to be unable to do anything
about it.
Mahan Abedin is a senior researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant
to independent media in Iran.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
