WRITE for ATol ADVERTISE MEDIA KIT GET ATol BY EMAIL ABOUT ATol CONTACT US
Asia Time Online - Daily News
             
Asia Times Chinese
AT Chinese



    Middle East
     Mar 16, 2010
Power lines take shape in Iraq
By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - It is now certain that the final results from Iraq's March 7 parliamentary elections will not be out before the end of March. What we do know for sure is that voter turnout was impressively high, at 62%, and that the State of Law Coalition, headed by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, has the lead across southern Iraq, within the capital Baghdad and in the oil-rich province of Basra, effectively winning seven provinces out of a total of 18.

Ex-prime minister Iyad Allawi, a secular Shi'ite and former Ba'athist, is also winning the vote in the predominately Sunni al-Anbar province and the controversial city of Kirkuk, which is inhabited by Arabs and Kurds. Both leaders are bracing themselves for the premiership - Maliki for a continuation, Allawi for a thundering comeback.

Abbas Bayati, a member of parliament close to Maliki, was

  

quoted over the weekend saying, "The prime minister's strong showing in the election proves that he deserves to keep his job." There is a long way to go, though, and much will depend on who takes Baghdad, where more than a fifth of the 325 parliamentary seats are concentrated.

The big news is that the Iran-backed Iraqi National Alliance (INA), which swept the 2005 parliament, has certainly lost its hold and will not return to power in 2010. Even in religious centers like Najaf and Babil the INA did not win a clear majority, lagging strongly behind the State of Law Coalition. Maliki's team has seemingly taken 42% of votes in Babil and 47% of votes in Najaf - a steady rise from the provincial elections of 2009, in which Maliki's list received only 16% in Najaf and 12.5% in Babil. Another sticking point is Kirkuk, which Allawi's list claims to have swept - contradicting claims made by heavyweight Kurdish parties which argue that they have won no fewer than six of 12 seats in Kirkuk.

The oil-rich area has been a subject of hot debate since 2003, with Kurds demanding its incorporation into Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Arabs - and neighbors like Turkey - vow that Kirkuk will never become Kurdish. Kurds claim that Saddam Hussein, during his systematic campaign against them, uprooted thousands of Kurdish families from Kirkuk to illegally change its demographics and make it an Arab province. Allawi is not a fan of Kurdish ambitions in Kirkuk and if he returns to power not only will it mean that Kirkuk members of parliament will not be Kurdish, the chances of a referendum on Kirkuk's future ever being held will be slim.

So far, neighboring capitals have been silent over the preliminary results. Riyadh, Damascus and Tehran, however, are anxiously watching to see who will become the new master of Baghdad. The Syrians and Saudis, many believe, want Allawi back, dismayed with Maliki for his handling of Sunni demands and relations with Damascus.

They believe the prime minister failed to bring about reconciliation or stability, in fact cornering Sunnis into a helpless position in which, out of government and power, they had little say in decision-making in Baghdad. Iran wants Maliki back if it cannot secure the victory of one of its heavyweight proxies in the INA.

Tehran certainly would not welcome Allawi back, given his strong secular tendencies, Ba'athist history and strong relations with Saudi Arabia. Apart from religious, political and strategic ties to Iraqi Shi'ites, Iran cannot afford to lose its influence in Baghdad. It fought hard for this influence during the 1980s, sending thousands of young men to die on the battleground against Saddam's soldiers.

Since Saddam's downfall in 2003, Tehran has persistently tried to get its allies into power - men like ex-prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and the Hakim clan that leads the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), both major components of the INA. In 2008, Iran offered a loan of US$1 billion for projects in Iraq ($20 million of which went to Najaf) and in 2009 it awarded a $1.5 billion contract for the proposed construction of a complex of houses, schools, hotels and shops in Basra - which ironically has now voted for Maliki rather than the INA.

Having said that, opponents of Iran should not get their hopes up too high and speculate on an Iranian defeat in Iraq. Although the INA will probably fail at taking over parliament this year, it continues to be the strongest force in the Shi'ite community, thanks to the heavyweight influence of men like Ammar al-Hakim of the SIIC and cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Maliki is not a Shi'ite heavyweight in the same mold and comes across as a pan-Iraqi leader with a combination of Sunni and Shi'ite support.

That is no surprise since soon after becoming prime minister in 2006 Maliki decided that he wanted to market himself as an Iraqi leader, and not just a Shi'ite one, explaining why he refused to join the Iran-backed INA this year. Although these same politicians had brought him to power in 2006 and bolstered his regime from 2006 to 2009, Maliki realized that he couldn't earn acceptance or the respect of the Arab neighborhood if he remained the Maliki of the 1990s, that is, the head of an Islamic political party that dreamed of an Iran-style theocracy in Baghdad.
Maliki stressed that he was a spokesman for all of Iraq, and not just Shi'ites. Originally, this put him in a difficult position, since Shi'ites, dismayed at the change, refused to accept him and Sunnis, angry at his anti-Sunni past, also refused to give him the benefit of the doubt.

For all practical purposes Maliki was seen as politically finished when three massive terrorist attacks struck the capital in August, October and December 2009. Iranian, Saudi and Syrian anger with the prime minister was almost certain testimony that his days as premier were numbered. But over the past six months Maliki has managed to bounce back, dishing out political rewards left and right and banking on the huge state apparatus under his control and under that of his ministers, all of them members of the State of Law Coalition.

The Iraq that will emerge once the dust has finally settled will be one divided between moderate Shi'ites (in appearance if not at heart) and seculars like Allawi, who head a joint team with Sunnis. The era of radical political groups, like the SIIC for Shi'ites and the Iraqi Accordance Front for Sunnis, is clearly over.

And so is the heyday of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which not only failed at foiling the elections but which will most likely have to deal with two arch enemies who are likely to create a cabinet of national unity - Allawi and Maliki. Neither will come out with a clear majority, judging by the preliminary results, meaning that the two will get the lion's share of seats in parliament, and have to rely on one another to form a cabinet.

It is likely that Allawi will propose any person other than Maliki if he cannot secure the position for himself; Allawi will not tolerate Maliki again as prime minister. This would leave the path open for a third name - probably an independent - to rule under the watchful eye - and command - of Maliki and Allawi.

Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward magazine in Syria.

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)


Now the hard part for Iraq - and the US
(Mar 9, '10)


1. Iran's spies show how it's done

2. A titanic power struggle in Kabul

3. Israel puts US on notice

4. When the Mekong runs dry

5. The demise of a 'good-for-nothing bandit'

6. China assesses its gold strategy

7. US, China struggle with mid-life crisis

8. China-US ties strained like never before

9. India seeks a new direction

10. China has a Congo copper headache

(Mar 12-14, 2010)

 
 



All material on this website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings), Ltd.
Head Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East, Central, Hong Kong
Thailand Bureau: 11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110