Revolution fuels Iran's ambitions
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran has raised
the temperature of the nuclear standoff with Tehran a couple of degrees by
claiming there is credible data that "raises concerns about the possible
existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the
development of a nuclear payload for a missile".
This reflects the more assertive stance of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog
under Yukiya Amano, who took over as secretary general last December. Amano
admitted in his first press conference there was no evidence of nuclear
weaponization on Iran's part. In the new report, however, the IAEA writes,
"Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the agency
to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
These accusations will likely boost the diplomatic efforts of the United States
and other countries to impose new UN sanctions on Iran and, as a result,
attention is now focused on a coming UN Security Council meeting on Iran in
March.
Esmae'il Kowsari, a senior Iranian legislator, said on Monday that sections of
the report were politically motivated and "unreal", adding that Tehran plans to
inform the IAEA member states of these misgivings. "Unfortunately, Amano's
report is two-sided and some unreal issues have been intermingled with real
issues," he told the Fars News Agency.
Prior to the UN meeting, a new US intelligence report is likely to be published
that revises the US intelligence community's findings in December 2007 that
Iran's nuclear program has been peaceful since 2003.
Though the IAEA report indicates that the authority has received new
information regarding Iran since Amano's first press conference that would
justify his turnaround, the "neutron triggers" alluded to in the report
reinforce suspicions that a disinformation mill is operating when it comes to
Iran. Amano's predecessor, Mohammed ElBaradei, had described such information
as "hype".
An IAEA report from February 2008 said that all of several "outstanding issues"
with Iran had been successfully resolved after the implementation of an
Iran-IAEA work plan. Iran's nuclear file could have been normalized as a
result. Instead, the country is being subjected to a new round of accusations
regarding nuclear and missile proliferation activities.
Iran views progress in its nuclear sector as serving its national interests and
as reducing its dependency on foreign countries. A layer of deterrence added
through a potential nuclear capability is seen as enhancing Iran's national
security posture.
However, it is far from clear that - absent of a serious threat to national
security - Iran will tread the path towards full nuclear weapons status.
Rather, Iran will likely aim for "semi-nuclear" status.
The reluctance to seek full nuclear status is linked to Iran's
self-understanding and how it views its international role. Tehran today is the
product of a 1979 revolution that was aptly described by the late French
philosopher Michel Foucault as a revolt against the "world order", not simply
an old order.
If Iran were to join the nuclear club, it become part of an old world order
where nuclear powers such as India pay lip service to global disarmament while
increasing their own arsenal. Some politicians in Tehran are unaware of the
fact, but Iran's original revolutionary idealism continues to weigh heavily on
the decisions taken by its leaders.
This goes to the heart of the "Iran exceptionalism" displayed during the
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). In that conflict, the Islamic Republic made a
conscious and costly decision not to respond to Iraq's biological warfare in
kind. Despite some 60,000 Iranians being injured or killed by Saddam Hussein's
use of chemical weapons, Iran did not reciprocate as it deemed such weapons as
un-Islamic and amoral.
The decision was not an easy one, and it pitted the late Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini against military commanders. An Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps
commander who spoke at Tehran's College of International Relations said
Khomeini used logic to persuade dissenting voices that acting like Saddam might
win Iran battles, but it would lose Iran its distinction as a different and
superior regime.
This legacy of "Iran exceptionalism" can be seen today in Iran's nuclear
program. Iran sees itself as taking a leadership role for non-aligned nations
that is ideologically and religiously underpinned, since Tehran is still
committed to acting as a revisionist power that addresses global injustice.
Iran's "nuclear ambition" is still often misinterpreted as if the country is
pursuing nuclear capabilities for the sake of power and prestige. Without a
doubt, this element is present in Iran's nuclear program, but there is a red
line on nuclear weapons that is connected to Iran's plans to change
international society.
Tehran believes that a greater Iranian nuclear capability will strengthen the
hands of non-aligned nations seeking to pressure "nuclear club" nations towards
meaningful, rather than cosmetic, disarmament. By freezing Iran's march toward
nuclear weapons midway, Tehran can use concerns about the country's "next
steps" as a sophisticated disarmament strategy. A semi-nuclear posture also
benefits Iran's regional security calculations, since Washington has long
treated the Persian Gulf as an "American lake".
Secondly, bargaining leverage can be derived from a semi-nuclear status, as
this will set new standards for non-proliferation. This will benefit the vast
majority of the world's nations who do not have nuclear weapons and are quite
powerless when it comes to influencing and shaping the policies, postures, and
doctrines of the "nuclear club".
This is not to naively assume that Iran does not seek power. Rather, the
political system's identity remains what this author has long characterized as
a "quasi-state", which constantly integrates narrow national and broader
globalist interests as the central axis around which all issues of national
(security) interests revolve. This is tied in with Iran transcending the
Islamist world view of the state as completely cosmopolitan and imbued with the
notion of co-existence with other nations and religions.
The antipathy toward nuclear weapons shown by Iran's Spiritual Leader Ali
Khamenei, which he repeated this past week, is genuine and not fake, as many in
the West fear. Much as this seems an abstract doctrine, it has important policy
ramifications.
Beneath such expressions are ambitions of a different kind, that is, for Iran
to play a leading role in "global management". Such sentiments are often heard
from President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, though he does not explain that Iran's aim
is not simply to join the management team, rather to restructure the global
hierarchy in non-hegemonic and horizontal directions. Seeking this input in
global affairs demands a complex and multifarious nuclear game on Iran's part
that is geared to garnering concessions from the hegemonic powers on several
fronts.
This is certainly an ambitious agenda for a developing nation that has been in
many ways under siege since the founding of the Islamic Republic 31 years ago,
and there is a chance that Iran could succumb to nationalistic temptations and
become a full member of the nuclear club.
However, Iran will most likely steer a middle path as a semi-nuclear state, the
hallmark of which will the continuation of a post-revolutionary state that
combines nationalism and patriotism without losing sight of larger global
realities in which Iran has to operate in to satisfy its own internal and
national security demands.
That path is strewn with overt signs of conventional military build-up, clearly
reflected in this week's launching of an ultra-modern naval vessel and in
Iran's missile program. But a unique distinction in such developments is that
they are fueled by a historical self-understanding that will propel
policymakers toward a policy of near distancing with regards to nuclear
weapons.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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