Page 1 of 2 Opposition struggles for control of Tripoli
By Mahan Abedin
In recent months, the world of Lebanese politics has shown growing signs of
stability. Following the elections of June 2009, won by the pro-Western March
14 coalition, the government led by Saad Hariri has shown noticeable (if not
grudging) willingness to accommodate opposition demands and has been careful
not to alienate the powerful Hezbollah movement, which commands an armed force
that is markedly stronger than any the Lebanese state could muster.
But the politics of accommodation that seem to be holding sway in Beirut - at
least for now - do not extend to Tripoli, Lebanon's second-biggest city and
home to the country's Sunni Muslims, who comprise just under one-third of the
country's total
population. Here, the Future Movement led by Hariri is continuously taking
steps to thwart the opposition and maintain its tenuous dominance of the city's
factionalized politics.
As the biggest and most influential component of the so-called March 14
coalition, which sprang up in early 2005 in the wake of the assassination of
former prime minister Rafik Hariri, the Future Movement has plenty of financial
resources to buy influence in Tripoli. It can also rely on the sectarian
loyalties of most of the city's inhabitants, especially during periods of
internal conflict.
This article concentrates on the main Tripoli-based opposition coalition, the
Islamic Action Front (IAF), and examines its prospects in the light of the
demise of its founder and leader, Fathi Yakan, who died last June.
The IAF was formed in early August 2006, at the height of the Hezbollah-Israel
war of that summer. It was ostensibly formed to provide a broader basis of
support for Hezbollah's "resistance" and unite Lebanon's Sunni Muslims behind
the predominantly Shi'ite Islamist movement. But following the war, the IAF
developed into a fully fledged political coalition comprised of various Sunni
Islamist groups.
It was based predominantly in Tripoli, but had branches all over the country.
From the beginning in August 2006 to June 2009, the IAF was defined by the
towering personality of Dr Fathi Yakan, a leading Islamist leader and
ideologue, and the founder of the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Yakan's death in June 2009 has raised serious questions about the long-term
durability of the Islamic Action Front.
Tripoli: Bastion of Sunni Islamists
On the surface, the port city of Tripoli is a conservative place populated for
the most part by devout Muslims. Probe a little deeper, and the contradictions
of modern Lebanon are all too apparent. This is the kind of place where heavily
bearded Salafis mingle comfortably with cosmopolitan and suave Lebanese
businessmen who lead a jet-set lifestyle. It is also the place where the most
meticulously hijabi women (cloaked all in black) walk
shoulder-to-shoulder with stunningly beautiful young women wearing the tightest
jeans imaginable and taking care to expose as much upper-body flesh as they can
get away with.
The power and influence of the Islamists is strongest in the Abi Samra quarter,
a large district situated on a hill to the east of the city. Here, a dizzying
array of Islamist groups maintains offices and national headquarters. These
groups range from the Jamaa al-Islamiyah (the Lebanese branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood) and its offshoots, the Pan-Islamic Hizbut Tahrir, to an assortment
of Salafi-orientated groups and institutions.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon has sided with the March 14 coalition, a
stance that has led to considerable internal debate and squabbles. The late
Fathi Yakan, who left the Jamaa al-Islamiyah in 1992, led a dissident wing of
the Muslim Brothers movement in Lebanon until his death in June 2009. Yakan,
who founded the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1960s,
openly sided with Hezbollah, a Shi'ite Islamist movement backed by Iran,
especially after the July-August 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war.
The Salafis in Tripoli are a divided lot. Most Salafi groups in the city
receive funding from three foreign sources - Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.
Most of them have also received funding and other forms of support from the
Future Movement at some point. There are widespread and credible accounts of
the Future Movement funding the Salafis to undercut support for Hezbollah both
locally and nationally.
The Salafis in Tripoli and the north of Lebanon, including leaders,
activists and active supporters, are split into about half-a-dozen main
groups and an assortment of smaller outfits. Most of these groups are involved
in religio-social activism and tend to shun politics.
But arguably the biggest Islamist current in Tripoli is the Tawhid (Monotheism)
movement led by Sheikh Bilal Shaaban and Sheikh Hashim Minqara. Understanding
this complex movement is crucial to unraveling the labyrinthine oppositional
politics in Tripoli.
Tawhid movement: An unfulfilled promise
The Tawhid movement can trace its ideological heritage to the 1970s, where it
took inspiration from Islamist ideology, Arab nationalism and pride in the
unique local Tripolitanian culture and identity.
Partly rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Tawhid became a force in its
own right in the early 1980s, when it articulated all three components of its
ideology to mobilize large sectors of Tripoli in the direction of Islamization
and greater local autonomy. The founder-leader of the Tawhid movement was the
late Sheikh Saeed Shaaban, one of the key founders and leaders of the Lebanese
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood when it was formed in 1962.
In the early and mid-1980s, as Lebanon sank deeper into civil war, the Tawhid
movement took over the city and imposed a de-facto Islamic emirate. As its
power and influence grew, the movement inevitably came into conflict with the
Syrians, who were interfering more forcefully than ever in Lebanese politics.
The conflict climaxed in 1985-1986, when the Syrians launched an operation to
oust Tawhid from power. At one point, even the then-Iranian president,
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei (the current leader of the Islamic Revolution),
intervened directly in the conflict, urging the Syrians to desist from
destroying the movement.
The pro-Iranian orientation of the Tawhid movement is what elicited the
intervention at the highest levels of the Iranian government. The late Sheikh
Saeed Shaaban had been impressed by the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran and
sent both of his sons - Bial and Moaz - to Iran to learn more about the
embryonic Islamic Republic taking shape in that country.
Following its ouster by the Syrians in 1986, the Tawhid movement has struggled
to make a comeback. Today, the movement is effectively split into two factions;
one led by Bilal Shaaban (a son of the late Saeed Shaaban), who is based in Abi
Samra, and the other by Hashim Minqara, who is based in the Western Mina
district.
I met Hashim Minqara at the Issa Bin Maryam mosque in the Mina district, which
serves as his headquarters. Dressed in clerical attire, with a white beard and
a swollen form, Minqara, now in his late 40s, does not immediately come across
as a military man. But that is precisely how he made his mark in the Tawhid
movement, by leading its armed wing initially against the communists and other
local foes and then against the Syrians. Local legend has it that prior to his
arrest, Syrian soldiers pumped 72 bullets into his body but somehow he
miraculously survived.
Speaking in a painfully soft voice, Minqara takes care to review the
ideological and military battles of yesteryear. Watching Minqara speak, there
is no indication that he spent 14 years in Syrian prisons, before he was
released in 2000. He spent three-and-a-half of those years in solitary
confinement. There is a total disconnect between this man's legendary
reputation and the mild and scholarly persona that he projects in interviews.
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