Autumn has proved a busy season for Turkey as the nation of more than 76
million continues to establish itself as a regional hegemon while pursuing a
policy of "no problems with neighbors". While the process of reconciling with
neighbors - a tenuous agreement with Armenia, de-mining the border with Syria,
a new energy deal with Russia and open amity with Iran - is yielding results,
"no problems with neighbors" may mean new problems with old friends.
Turkish foreign affairs have made recent headlines: on October 10, Turkey
signed an agreement normalizing relations with Armenia. The border between the
two countries, closed since 1993, was opened. Two days later, Turkey canceled a
joint air force exercise with Israel. A few days after that, the European Union
released its
annual report on the progress made by countries aspiring to EU membership.
Naturally, Turkey figured prominently in the report, which many commentators
saw as a balancing act, pitting Turkey's progress - improvements in relations
with Armenia and Syria abroad, and more rights for Kurds and improved
civil-military relations at home - against its shortcomings: a lack of progress
on the Cyprus issue and the recent ruling and fine against the Dogan Media
Group.
The dichotomy inherent in the EU report mirrors larger questions not only about
Turkish politics and society but also about the country's diplomatic posture.
Turkey is familiar with occupying a unique position in world affairs. As
recently as the early 20th century, it was a polyglot Muslim empire with deep
roots in Europe. In the time-worn but geographically accurate phrase, it is the
bridge between Europe and Asia.
Since 1952, it has been the easternmost member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). It is also the only Muslim state that is part of the
alliance. Turkey contributed to winning the Cold War but has been lukewarm
about the fight against fundamentalist Islam and opposed the 2003 war in Iraq.
In fact, the Turkish government famously refused a request from the American
government to use eastern Turkish provinces as a launching pad to create a
second front in northern Iraq. Turkey came under fire from high-ranking
American policymakers who blamed this for the strength of the Ba'athist
insurgency as late as 2005. More recently, Turkey has not been shy about
sending air units and even ground troops to combat what it describes as Kurdish
terrorists in northern Iraq.
Turkey's uncompromising attitude toward the "terrorism" of the Kurdish Workers'
Party (PKK) should, in theory, generate support for similar Israeli policies
and actions against groups in Gaza and Lebanon. This is no longer the case. In
January this year, at Davos in Switzerland, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
made headlines when he directed a high-tempered attack on Israeli policy in
Gaza toward President Shimon Peres. Since then, Israeli-Turkish relations have
suffered more substantive setbacks. The above-mentioned cancellation of joint
air exercises being only one example. Turkey continues to improve its relations
with Syria and, most significantly, is now courting favor with Iran. This new
relationship is of genuine concern.
In an interview with British newspaper The Guardian published on October 26,
the prime minister made several controversial statements. He called Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad a "friend". He claimed that Turkey had no problems
with Iran and its peaceful nuclear ambitions, and that Western nations were
being unfair in calling for restrictions and transparency that would prevent
Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Erdogan went so far as to say that even
if Iran wanted a nuclear deterrent, countries like the United States, Britain
or France, as nuclear powers themselves, had no right to protest. Erdogan
followed his Guardian interview with a visit to Iran and seems intent on
strengthening relations between the two countries even further.
The current administration in Turkey markets itself as a bridging force. It
claims that it will serve as the EU's bridge to its Muslim neighbors and
Muslims already within the EU. In 2008-09, it served as mediator for
backchannel negotiations between Syria and Israel. Turkey has claimed to use
its unique position to bridge the divide between NATO and Iran. Sadly, both for
these challenges and for Turkey's image, these bridges have not yet proved
passable.
The motives behind such acts are not entirely clear. The current Turkish
administration is somewhat promiscuous in its international affairs. On the one
hand it professes love for the European Union, seeks EU membership and is
"Westernizing" in line with the EU's blueprint. On the other hand, Turkey
continues its war against the PKK, is pursuing its own energy policy in
relation to Russia and is flirting with Iran. The government in Ankara still
refused to recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus, even though
Cyprus is a full EU member.
The case of Cyprus should not be forgotten because it holds an important
history lesson. In 1974, Turkey, in spite of its membership in NATO and the
Cold War, invaded the island to prevent its unification with Greece. Greece was
a NATO ally, governed at the time by an anti-communist military junta.
Nevertheless, Turkey was willing to invade and risk splitting NATO. War with
Greece was even a possibility. As recently as 1996, Greece and Turkey have come
close to war stemming from disputes over territory in the Aegean. Such examples
are important. They demonstrate that in matters of national security, Turkey
will not defer to traditional alliances; it will choose the path along which it
feels most secure.
Unfortunately for the West, this path seems to be taking Turkey away from the
United States, the European Union and the NATO alliance. The current Turkish
administration is making decisions that may determine Turkey's alliances for
years to come. If the present course is not reversed, the effect may be to burn
the very bridges that, for years, Turkey sought to build.
Andrew Novo, DPhil Candidate St Antony's College Oxford, UK.
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