Page 2 of 2 Iran trapped in a ring of unrest
By Mahan Abedin
Intelligence sources in Tehran contend that most of the "effective" members of
the group (including Rigi's brother Abdul-Hamid) are currently in detention,
where they have disclosed significant amounts of information. Based on this
information, the IRGC has conducted operations on the eastern fringes of the
province and put in place security arrangements that have made it harder for
the group to conduct regular hit-and-run operations across the border.
Moreover, the Ministry of Intelligence has also been involved, in the form of
recruiting and placing agents inside the group as part of a broader effort of
sabotaging Jundallah's long-term aspirations and constraining its operational
environment.
According to intelligence sources in Tehran, evidence of Jundallah's links to
American secret agents and Pakistani state
actors, in particular agents of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is
numerous and beyond dispute. American secret agents, namely agents of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and highly specialized and secret branches of
the United States military, have met key Jundallah operatives and commanders on
numerous occasions in remote hideouts on the western fringes of Pakistani
Balochistan. Moreover, the Americans have supplied the group with communication
devices, in particular encrypted laptops, and large sums of cash in the form of
US dollar notes.
More intriguingly, the training received by Jundallah militants in Pakistan is
far more intelligence-oriented than the type of military and indoctrination
training provided by Pakistani extremist groups. Details of the training -
coupled with confessions by detained members - have led Iranian investigators
to conclude that Jundallah has received training in ISI facilities by ISI
trainers.
The type of training undergone by Jundallah members is closely related to
secret intelligence activity, including conducting and deterring surveillance;
constructing and managing cellular activity; communicating via encrypted
laptops (the encryption is multi-layered and crucially it is bespoke, which is
not widely commercially available); gathering and reporting information in
quick time and in hostile environments; and counter-interrogation techniques.
In addition, the militants had undergone rudimentary military training and
acquired the skills needed to conduct assassinations, mass kidnapping,
preparing and deploying car bombs, and crucially, recruiting, priming and
deploying suicide bombers.
Significantly, Iranian investigators have not detected overt direction by
either Pakistani or American agents. Moreover, it is believed that the group's
more low-key attacks (in particular hit-and-run attacks across the border) are
more a reaction to pressure applied by organized crime gangs than any other
factor.
Jundallah has strong ties to Pakistani, Afghan and Iranian Baloch drug barons
and other organized criminals. Enabling a more permissive environment for
organized criminals - for instance by distracting Iranian border guards, the
Law Enforcement Agency and the IRGC in hit-and-run attacks - brings in
much-needed cash and is believed to be the group's biggest source of finance.
Balochistan: A strategic conundrum
In recent years, the Iranian government and Iranian civil society have grappled
with the problem of how to resolve or at least alleviate the manifold problems
in Sistan and Balochistan. The disaffected people in the under-developed
province are partially right to point out that both state and society were
roused into action as a result of one unpopular group's terrorist actions.
Owing to the sheer complexity of the problems - and the threat posed to local
community cohesion by Jundallah terrorism - the provincial government was
forced to cede much of its authority to the IRGC, which has a proven track
record of restoring security and stability to troubled border provinces both
through military strength and crucially the establishment of community-based
security architectures.
But Sistan and Balochistan poses a set of historical and strategic challenges
that the IRGC - despite its best efforts - is unlikely to be able to overcome
on its own. The province has been a headache for the modern Iranian
nation-state for the past century and any multi-faceted strategic response must
take stock of this troubled historical heritage.
Arguably the biggest local challenge is organized crime, in particular the
daily transit of narcotics across the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. In
September 2007, a senior Iranian intelligence officer told this author that in
a meeting with a top Pakistani Balochi drug baron in 2003 in Dubai in the
United Arab Emirates, the Iranians were offered a tantalizing deal. For
unmolested trafficking of narcotics across the Iran-Pakistan border, the drug
lords were willing to pay the Iranian government an annual tax of US$1 billion;
promised not to distribute any of the contraband within Iran and pledged to
hunt down and kill "enemies of the state" (namely armed Iranian Balochi
secessionists) in Pakistani Balochistan.
Interestingly, the meeting had been brokered by the ISI; and only took place
after Pakistani guarantees that they would prevent hostile American
surveillance. The senior intelligence officer told this author that his curt
response to the offer by the drug baron was that "I deal with God, not with
you".
This account is credible considering that Jundallah emerged on the scene at
around the same time and has forged very strong ties to an assortment of
Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan organized crime gangs.
Beyond addressing the challenges and adverse dynamics inside Sistan and
Balochistan, the Iranian government must address the very serious challenges
posed by the evolving regional strategic environment. While Jundallah thrives
on its relationship with organized crime gangs, its suicide bombing operations
and overtly sectarian rhetoric is a direct consequence of the havoc unleashed
in Afghanistan and Pakistan by American policies after the September 11, 2001,
assault on the United States
Whether the Americans direct Jundallah to conduct terrorist operations in Iran
is irrelevant at this point. What is significant is that they have created a
strategic environment in which such attacks are both practically and
ideologically possible, and no doubt - and notwithstanding perfunctory
condemnation of terrorist acts - the Americans rub their hands with glee every
time there is a major terrorist incident in Iran.
To emerge victorious in the long term, the Iranian government would be well
advised to articulate and implement an alternative strategic vision for the
region. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack the previous Iranian
government led by the liberal reformist Mohammad Khatami hastily condemned the
attack and through its words created the impression that the Islamic Republic
acquiesced to an American-led intervention in Afghanistan. This has led many
regional actors - including those who are potentially Iran's allies - to claim
that the Iranians "collaborated" with the United States. While any real
collaboration was likely minimal, the impression has endured and inflicted
significant damage on the prestige of the Islamic Republic.
While Iran has little in common with the Taliban in Afghanistan and an
assortment of extremist outfits in Pakistan, the crucial point is that these
actors do not pose a strategic threat to the Islamic Republic. In any case,
articulating opposition to American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led
operations in the region do not amount to condoning the actions of their
immediate opponents. The long and arduous route to defeating organized
criminals, armed secessionists and political and religious extremists in Sistan
and Balochistan lies in actively lobbying for the exit of foreign forces from
the region.
Mahan Abedin is a senior researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant
to independent media in Iran. He is currently based in northern Iraq, where he
is helping to develop local media capacity.
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