Iran softens its nuclear
stance - for now
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
A new report on Iran's controversial nuclear program will be released this week
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ahead of the September
deadline set by the Barack Obama administration in anticipation of more
multilateral sanctions on Iran. All indications are that after a temporary
lull, the Iran nuclear crisis will loom large again come this autumn.
Tehran is not looking forward to this prospect, which will likely worsen
internal fissures in the government made worse by the contested presidential
elections in June and still not entirely resolved. Amid accusations of rights
abuses and criticism of the ongoing political trials, these internal fissures
are likely to
continue haunting President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and they have dire diplomatic
ramifications.
The government has adopted several remedial steps aimed at both calming the
home front and aimed at enhancing - mostly nuclear and regional - diplomacy.
Ahmadinejad's introduction of a largely technocratic cabinet featuring three
female ministers and several Western-educated PhDs is a welcome step forward.
His cabinet has fallen shy of expectations of an inclusive, coalition cabinet
of "national unity" in which some dissident politicians would be recruited, but
Iran's political evolution is obviously a work in progress and such
expectations may have to wait. The significance of Ahmadinejad's smart gender
politics should, nevertheless, not be overlooked (see
Ahmadinejad unveils some gender savvyAsia Times Online, August 19.)
Equally important is the government's apparent determination to put a stop to
alleged rights abuses and place on trial various "rogue officials" who have
been involved in illegal behavior such as the torture and rape of prisoners.
This would fulfill the president's post-election promise of upholding the law
for all - and to respect the right of the opposition to organize and express
itself freely.
On the foreign front, last week's visit to Tehran by Syria's President Bashar
al-Assad, who had condemned "foreign meddling in Iran", was an important
development for Iran's regional diplomacy. It further cemented the strategic
relationship between these two key Middle Eastern states that are at odds with
Israel and its patron state, the United States.
Ahmadinejad has decided to not replace Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who
is considered more dovish compared with Saeed Jalili, who heads the powerful
Supreme National Security Council and who is also Iran's top nuclear
negotiator. But depending on developments in Iran's foreign policy, Jalili
could still take Mottaki's place, particularly if Iran perceives moves against
Iran by the US and its Western allies as unfair and unduly restrictive.
Such moves could include a fourth round of United Nations sanctions targeting
Iran's oil industry and imported fuel, not to mention military action, in light
of the growing saber-rattling against Iran by hawkish military voices in the US
and Israel. [1]
Iran softens - can Washington reciprocate?
In a clear sign of new flexibility on the nuclear issue, Iran has agreed to
allow the IAEA to inspect the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak,
south of Tehran, as well as to upgrade the IAEA's ability to monitor the
nuclear facility in Natanz, central Iran.
Insisting that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful, such transparency
measures on the part of Iran are long overdue and are in step with the
country's nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.
The new head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, the US-educated physicist
Ali Akbar Salehi, has pinned his hope on the IAEA appreciating Iran's extensive
cooperation with the UN atomic agency. He has called on the IAEA to "normalize"
Iran's file, given the absence of any evidence of illicit nuclear activity on
its part.
The lack of evidence has been admitted by, among others, the new head of the
IAEA, Yukiya Amano, who in his first press conference in July confirmed the
agency's lack of any information on Iran's purported "proliferation" drive. The
drive has been alleged by Israel and some Western governments despite the US
intelligence community's report in December 2007 that found Iran's program has
been peaceful since 2003.
Obama's intelligence chiefs continue to offer nuances on Iran's nuclear
program, saying that Iran "may" possess a bomb by 2013 "if" it decides to
divert its uranium-enrichment program to weapons-grade enrichment. The wheels
of Washington policymaking are slowly but surely turning in the direction of
confrontation with Iran. Washington, though, already has its hands full with
two dangerous crisis situations in Iraq and Afghanistan and an unstable
situation mention Pakistan - all three Iran's immediate neighbors.
Experts say this makes renewed talk of war with Iran seem absurd, especially it
seems focused on an aerial bombardment of select Iranian nuclear facilities
that would have no long-term impact. As pointed out by various pundits, this
would have the adverse affect of pushing Iran out of the orbit of the NPT and
all cooperation with the IAEA.
It would be tantamount to an immediate "North Koreaziation" of Iran, say
pundits, where Tehran would set aside any hesitations about going fully nuclear
as a shield against future attacks. Put in other words, the greater the threat
against Iran, the greater the chance it will tread the path of proliferation.
That is one reason why the West should heed Iran's call for "interaction"
instead of "confrontation", to paraphrase a Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who
hinted at Iran's willingness to engage in nuclear dialogue with the "Iran Six"
nations. (The five permanent members of the United Security Council - the US,
France, China, Russia and Britain, plus Germany.)
Iran is now about to unveil its own "package" of ideas about how to solve the
nuclear standoff. Part of the debate within Iran is whether a temporary halt of
the enrichment activity - putting it on "standby" during the coming talks - is
called for. Another option is to refrain from adding new centrifuges and
maintaining the level of cascades as the talks progress. This is partly due to
Iran's confidence that with its nuclear transparency and respect for NPT norms,
it would have the upper hand in any legal discussions.
"Iran wants to have the same right as other countries such as Germany, South
Korea and Japan, that have peaceful nuclear fuel cycles and there is no
international regime that can say, 'no you can't', because of [unfounded]
suspicions," a Tehran University professor who advises the government told the
author. He added that he nonetheless recognized that Iran could "do more to
dispel the suspicions - the decision to let inspectors visit [the facility at]
Arak is a right decision in the right direction."
Thus, all eyes will be on the IAEA and its new leadership as it attempts to
balance pressures from the US and its allies on the one hand and mostly
pro-Iran non-aligned nations on the other. All this while making sure that the
recent progress in Iran-IAEA cooperation and the related nuclear
confidence-building is not lost over undue criticisms of Iran.
Within Iran's parliament, or Majlis, the mood is not particularly in favor of
compromise. If the IAEA is interested in seeing Iran's re-adopt the intrusive
Additional Protocol and the like, it must refrain from issuing reports that
understate the value of Iran's transparency effort.
Israeli has continued to exert pressure on the IAEA by accusing it of
withholding information on Iran's alleged proliferation. Responding to such
tactics, which are embraced by elements of Western media, must form a crucial
aspect of an Iranian public diplomacy offensive before the Iran Six consider a
fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran in September.
"It is absurd for Washington to impose these artificial deadlines on Iran, when
the direct negotiations have not even begun yet and, again, the White House
speaks through coded messages that give the impression that it wants enrichment
suspension ahead of negotiations, just as the [George W] Bush administration
requested," the Tehran professor said.
Artificial or not, a deadline set by the West is fast approaching, and with it
early winds portending an escalating crisis, at a time when neither Iran nor
the US can afford it. Compared with Iran's new flexibility the White House's
stance appears to be the opposite, considerably increasing the risk of a
full-blown crisis.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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