Iran's parliament mounts a challenge By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
By all indications, compared with his first four-year term, Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad's second term will be more inward-looking, with domestic
issues taking priority over foreign policy issues.
His decisions to cancel appearances at an African summit in Libya early last
month and the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Egypt in mid-July show that his
focus remains on internal issues in the uncertain aftermath of the
post-election unrest.
The prioritization of "internal" versus "external" issues is likely to
continue for some time, or at least until Iran's house is back in order,
politically. Achieving this will require a skillful approach by Ahmadinejad,
especially given the strength of his critics, which include members of
parliament (Majlis), and a hardline faction known as the Principalists (osoolgarayan),
which is an amalgam of different tendencies,
One of these tendencies is led by the powerful speaker of the Majlis, Ali
Larijani, who is currently marshalling forces to exert maximum influence on the
thorny issue of the next cabinet's makeup.
According to unconfirmed reports in Iran, Ahmadinejad and Larijani had a
one-on-one "secret meeting" in the past few days, followed by Ahmadinejad's
attendance at a Principalist caucus in the Majlis building where he elaborated
on the "framework" for choosing the cabinet, although without mentioning any
names.
A joint committee of the Majlis and the executive branch has been set up to
review the candidates for cabinet and sub-cabinet posts, but it is unclear how
closely Ahmadinejad will work with the Majlis. There is contradictory
information from various Majlis members on this matter. One parliamentarian,
Alireza Manadi, has said that "Majlis deputies have no information regarding
the president's decisions concerning the selection of ministers".
Larijani echoed this sentiment at a press conference, saying that while the
president's lack of consultation with the Majlis did not break any laws, it was
nonetheless "unprecedented".
Combining public and private diplomacy, Larijani's aim appears to be rather
ambitious, that is, "seeking a share of the posts", to paraphrase a critical
commentary on a website sympathetic to Ahmadinejad. Both Larijani and his
supporters have flatly denied this charge.
The Majlis seal of approval on Ahmadinejad's cabinet picks is a constitutional
necessity, and Ahmadinejad's political strength is considered to have been
weakened as a result of the post-election turmoil. The star of Larijani, who
has the confidence of Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appears
to be on the rise.
Iran's parliament would gain legitimacy from an enhanced role and its members
taking a more active role in their oversight functions, so this could lead to
more effective parliamentary politics in the months and years to come.
Mohammad Taghi Rahbar, the head of the Majlis clergy, has said that a special
Majlis committee investigating alleged abuses by authorities against street
protesters is busy at work. He said it is pressuring the government to follow
through with trials of the "rogue agents", including prison officials at the
notorious Kahrizak prison, alleged to have tortured, raped and executed some
detainees.
Although the supreme leader has ordered the closure of Kahrizak, some
parliament members involved in the investigative committee have admitted
ignorance about the prison's current status.
Moreover, in a move that is sure to raise the ire of Ahmadinejad and his
supporters, Larijani in the press conference alluded to the complaint of
reformist candidate, Mehdi Karrubi, regarding the situation of political
prisoners, as well as a "detained journalist," promising to pursue such
complaints.
A mini-campaign to undermine the authority of Larijani has been launched in
response to these maneuvers. He is now being accused of harboring sentiments
for defeated reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi before the elections, and
some conservative Majlis members have questioned the validity of his doctoral
degree.
Larijani's position appears firm however, reflected in his ability to collect
some 200 signatures from other Majlis members for a letter to Ahmadinejad on
the subject of cabinet members. This may be the principal reason why
Ahmadinejad opted to attend the Principalists' gathering mentioned above -
after initiating a major shakeup in the crucial Intelligence Ministry.
After a report by Hassan Younsei, the son of a previous intelligence minister,
Ahmadinejad has dismissed Haj Habibollah, the deputy minister for internal
intelligence, Firouz Abadi, deputy for intelligence technology, and reportedly
Mansouri Zadeh, the deputy for parliamentary affairs.
Meanwhile, the Majlis' jockeying for influence in determining the cabinet posts
has been deemed "politics of public speculation" with various members trying to
weigh in on the president's selection process. For example, several have
publicly supported Shahabeldin Sadr's nomination as the next public health
minister over other nominees.
Shuffling posts, such as replacing the current interior minister with the
current defense minister, is also reportedly in the works, and there are
confirmed reports that Ahmadinejad is on the verge of combining the Ministry of
Commerce with the Ministry of Industries - to be led by Rostam Ghasemi, the
current commander of a key military barrack, Khatam al-Anbiah. Such
appointments are bound to enhance Ahmadinejad's already strong relations with
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
An important selection will regard the Ershad (Culture) Ministry, which covers
the executive branch's relations with the book industry, artists and other
cultural outlets. This is significant in light of complaints by many artists
during the past four years over what they deemed undue restrictions, and
chances are Ahmadinejad's pick will be someone who is in favor of relaxing
those restrictions.
Also unknown is the question of whether or not the president's promise of
economic restructuring, alluded to in his inaugural speech before the Majlis
last week, will include the resurrection of the Budget and Planning
Organization.
During pre-election campaigns, Mousavi made this a top priority. Should
Ahmadinejad opt to bring the organization back to life, this would be
tantamount to an "internal efficacy" of the reformist movement and a tangible
sign that even in defeat a candidate and his grassroots support can still
prevent a total defeat, by focusing on influencing the drift of policy
decisions.
As calls grow from a number of hardline politicians and media pundits for
Mousavi to be put on trial for "inciting riots" after the elections, it is
ironic that some of Mousavi's policy prescriptions could be implemented by the
incumbent president he competed against. Iran's complex and dynamic political
system is capable of many such ironies.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
