Page 2 of 2 A leaner, meaner Iranian regime By Mahan Abedin
Khamenei's crucial intervention on 19 June - and subsequent positions since -
has put a brake on the instinctive drive of the Islamic right to carry out a
widespread purge. The conditions have never been so ripe for a full-scale
crackdown on dissent within the system. All the other factions, particularly
the once-powerful Islamic left, are in complete disarray. Their leaders have
been exposed as losers and their supporters have been left demoralized by the
entire state machinery's acquiescence in the final victory of the Islamic
right.
Most importantly, key establishment figures have now been decidedly
marginalized. The biggest loser of all is former prime minister Mousavi. While
Mousavi has legitimate grievances, he
made a series of catastrophic mistakes immediately before and after the
elections.
As the election campaign drew to a close many in Mousavi's camp were alarmed by
his obvious political alliance with former presidents Mohammad Khatami and
Rafsanjani. The alliance with Rafsanjani was particularly puzzling since the
former president had played a leading role in marginalizing Mousavi in the
summer of 1989, which led to Mousavi's "disappearance" from the scene for
nearly 20 years.
Revelations that Mousavi's campaign was being funded by Rafsanjani alienated
his core supporters in the Islamic left (who loath Rafsanjani) and further
pushed him towards a constituency that has no base within the regime. Indeed,
the street carnivals that characterized Mousavi's campaign were painful
reminders of former president Khatami's electoral and political style.
Mousavi's greatest mistake came immediately after the end of polling when he
declared himself the outright winner. The implication was clear: a
contradictory result would be automatically treated as fraudulent. This was the
main trigger for the riots that followed. Mousavi then made one mistake after
another by persisting with his fundamental position that the elections had been
"rigged" (without providing any convincing evidence) and refusing the solutions
that were offered by mediators. These mistakes have destroyed Mousavi's
standing amongst Islamic Republic loyalists (a substantial number of whom
actually voted for him) and effectively consigned him to the very margins.
While Khamenei has cautioned against edging out the former prime minister
altogether, it is very difficult to see how he can be rehabilitated.
Another great loser is former president and arch-oligarch Rafsanjani. Having
been defeated by Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential elections, Rafsanjani had
been sniping at the government for the past four years. He threw everything
into overthrowing Ahmadinejad, but his unlikely support for Mousavi seems to be
his last throw of the dice. Although Rafsanjani distanced himself from the
rioters - and Khamenei has directly supported him by chastising Ahmadinejad for
accusing him of corruption on live national television - the expectations are
that Rafsanjani (once the pillar of the system) will be gradually edged out.
Many other core establishment figures, including losing presidential contender
Mehdi Karroubi and former Majlis (parliament) speaker Nategh Nouri, are
expected to be edged out. But a widespread purge involving their followers is
now unlikely. With a few exceptions, the Islamic Republic has generally avoided
internal purges for fear of upsetting its ideological base. While the situation
today is markedly different, there seems to be enough institutional mechanisms
and ideological/political direction in place to prevent Ahmadinejad and his
followers from putting a complete end to the once lively political scene of the
Islamic Republic.
Towards a new consensus
The overthrow of factional politics in Iran is likely to prove a temporary
phenomenon. Indeed, behind the scenes troubleshooters and mediators are already
trying to forge a new consensus based on radical factional realignments.
One solution that is being taken particularly seriously in key political and
intelligence circles is a “partnership of extremes”; that is a reconciliation
between the core ideological left and ideological right. In other words the two
extremes in the Islamic Republican spectrum would forge a wide-ranging
political consensus to manage national politics for the next four years. This
reconciliation has been made possible by the collapse of centrist and other
factions, in particular the reformed left (led by Mousavi), the liberal left
(led by Khatami), the technocrats (led by Rafsanjani), the traditional
conservatives (led by Nategh-Nouri) and the more moderate ideological right
(led by Ali Ardeshir Larijani).
The defection of a key Islamic left personality to the Ahmadinejad camp may be
indicative of a much larger political shift. Seyed Amir Hossein Mahdavi's
defection is important not only because of his position as a key Islamic left
networker, but also because of his relative youth. Mahdavi is a member of the
central committee of the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic
Revolution (OMIR - not to be confused with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organization,
which is an exiled dissident terrorist organization) and an important figure in
Mousavi's (former) presidential campaigns headquarters.
Mahdavi's long and public revelations of the political, ideological and
strategic "deviations" of OMIR are likely to spur further defections and
possibly spell the end of this organization, which alongside the Forum of
Militant Clergy, has been a key organizational pillar of the Islamic left for
the past 30 years.
While the contours of a broader political alliance have still to be worked out,
there are indications that at the grassroots level at least a substantial
number of Islamic left personalities and activists are willing to fall behind
Ahmadinejad and accept the public hegemony of the Islamic right.
But a durable compromise would require consensus-building on core domestic and
foreign policy issues. In particular the Ahmadinejad government would have to
co-opt certain traditional Islamic left policies; namely a serious (as opposed
to rhetorical) fight against corruption; a more careful management of the
economy (which will require rolling back some of the reforms instituted by
Rafsanjani in the early 1990s); and a more culturally oriented (as opposed to
repressive) approach towards Islamization. In the foreign policy sphere,
Ahmadinejad will have to relinquish his plans to strike a limited deal with the
United States, since any opening towards the "Great Satan" is anathema to the
Islamic left.
There is much potential for cooperation not least because the base of the
Islamic left and the Islamic right readily agree on a range of fundamental
issues. The trick is in creating a new credible leadership for the Islamic left
which can then negotiate in good faith with the formidable Ahmadinejad.
Mahdavi's defection - centered as it is on the themes of youth and radicalism -
is a tantalizing glimpse into the horse-trading and parapolitics that is going
on behind the scenes.
The sum effect of this new political reality is going to be very disappointing
to those people who had hoped that the brief period of street rioting and
mayhem would spell the beginning of the end of the Islamic regime.
Notwithstanding the damage to prestige and legitimacy, the emergence of a
leaner and meaner regime will present new strategic opportunities for Islamic
Republic loyalists in the region and beyond.
Mahan Abedin is a senior researcher in terrorism studies and a consultant
to independent media in Iran. He is currently based in northern Iraq, where he
is helping to develop local media capacity.
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