Page 2 of 2 Obama's strategy and the summits
By George Friedman
The Russian dimension
Let's diverge to another dimension of these talks, which still concerns Turkey,
but also concerns the Russians. While atmospherics after the last week's
meetings might have improved, there was certainly no fundamental shift in
US-Russian relations.
The Russians have rejected the idea of pressuring Iran over its nuclear program
in return for the United States abandoning its planned ballistic missile
defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States
simultaneously downplayed the importance of a Russian route to Afghanistan.
Washington said there were sufficient supplies in Afghanistan and enough
security on the Pakistani route such that the Russians weren't essential
for supplying Western operations in Afghanistan.
At the same time, the United States reached an agreement with Ukraine for the
trans-shipment of supplies - a mostly symbolic gesture, but one guaranteed to
infuriate the Russians at both the United States and Ukraine. Moreover, the
NATO communique did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted
to NATO, although the German position on unspecified delays to such membership
was there as well. When Obama looks at the chessboard, the key emerging
challenge remains Russia.
The Germans are not going to be joining the United States in blocking Russia.
Between dependence on Russia for energy supplies and little appetite for
confronting a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate threat to Germany,
the Germans are not going to address the Russian question. At the same time,
the United States does not want to push the Germans toward Russia, particularly
in confrontations ultimately of secondary importance and on which Germany has
no give anyway. Obama is aware that the German left is viscerally
anti-American, while Merkel is only pragmatically anti-American - a small
distinction, but significant enough for Washington not to press Berlin.
At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and Armenia looks
to be on the horizon. Armenians had long held Turkey responsible for the mass
murder of Armenians during and after World War I, a charge the Turks have
denied.
The US Congress for several years has threatened to pass a resolution
condemning Turkish genocide against Armenians. The Turks are extraordinarily
sensitive to this charge, and passage would have meant a break with the United
States. Last week, they publicly began to discuss an agreement with the
Armenians, including diplomatic recognition, which essentially disarms the
danger from any US resolution on genocide. Although an actual agreement hasn't
been signed just yet, anticipation is building on all sides.
The Turkish opening to Armenia has potentially significant implications for the
balance of power in the Caucasus. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war created an
unstable situation in an area of vital importance to Russia. Russian troops
remain deployed, and NATO has called for their withdrawal from the breakaway
Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There are Russian troops in
Armenia, meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded. In addition, there is talk of
an alternative natural gas pipeline network from Azerbaijan to Europe.
Turkey is the key to all of this. If Ankara collaborates with Russia, Georgia's
position is precarious and Azerbaijan's route to Europe is blocked. If it
cooperates with the United States and also manages to reach a stable treaty
with Armenia under US auspices, the Russian position in the Caucasus is
weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe opens up,
decreasing Russian leverage against Europe.
From the American point of view, Europe is a lost cause since internally it
cannot find a common position and its heavyweights are bound by their
relationship with Russia. It cannot agree on economic policy, nor do its
economic interests coincide with those of the United States, at least insofar
as Germany is concerned. As far as Russia is concerned, Germany and Europe are
locked in by their dependence on Russian natural gas. The US-European
relationship thus is torn apart not by personalities, but by fundamental
economic and military realities. No amount of talking will solve that problem.
The key to sustaining the US-German alliance is reducing Germany's dependence
on Russian natural gas and putting Russia on the defensive rather than the
offensive. The key to that now is Turkey, since it is one of the only routes
energy from new sources can cross to get to Europe from the Middle East,
Central Asia or the Caucasus. If Turkey - which has deep influence in the
Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans - is prepared
to ally with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and a long-term
solution to Germany's energy problem can be found. On the other hand, if Turkey
decides to take a defensive position and moves to cooperate with Russia
instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is locked into
Russian-controlled energy for a generation.
Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans, Obama
chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe that is out of
options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going to Turkey to discuss what
the treaty with Armenia means and to try to convince the Turks to play for high
stakes by challenging Russia in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia's
junior partner.
This is why Obama's most important speech in Europe was his last one, following
Turkey's emergence as a major player in NATO's political structure. In that
speech, he sided with the Turks against Europe, and extracted some minor
concessions from the Europeans on the process for considering Turkey's
accession to the European Union. Why Turkey wants to be an EU member is not
always obvious to us, but they do want membership.
Obama is trying to show the Turks that he can deliver for them. He reiterated -
if not laid it on even more heavily - all of this in his speech in Ankara.
Obama laid out the US position as one that recognized the tough geopolitical
position Turkey is in and the leader that Turkey is becoming, and also
recognized the commonalities between Washington and Ankara. This was exactly
what Turkey wanted to hear.
The Caucasus is far from the only area to discuss. Talks will be held about
blocking Iran in Iraq, US relations with Syria and Syrian talks with Israel,
and Central Asia, where both countries have interests. But the most important
message to the Europeans will be that Europe is where you go for photo
opportunities, but Turkey is where you go to do the business of geopolitics. It
is unlikely that the Germans and French will get it. Their sense of what is
happening in the world is utterly Eurocentric. But the Central Europeans, on
the frontier with Russia and feeling quite put out by the German position on
their banks, certainly do get it.
Obama gave the Europeans a pass for political reasons, and because arguing with
the Europeans simply won't yield benefits. But the key to the trip is what he
gets out of Turkey - and whether in his speech to the civilizations, he can
draw some of the venom out of the Islamic world by showing alignment with the
largest economy among Muslim states, Turkey.
Dr George Friedman, is chief executive officer of
Stratfor, a global intelligence company based in Austin, Texas.
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