A mission impossible for Ban Ki-moon By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
NEW YORK - This week, United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon embarked on
an extensive tour of the Middle East in the hope of silencing the guns in Gaza
by convincing Israel and Hamas to accept UN Security Council Resolution 1860
that calls for an "immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire, leading to
the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza".
In light of Israel's deep military incursion inside Gaza and Israel's rejection
of the UN demand as "unworkable", Ban's ability to achieve his peace objective
may be a hope against hope.
Increasingly frustrated and dismayed that his repeated call on the
warring parties in Gaza to stop fighting has fallen on deaf ears, the UN chief
has been unequivocal in his strong condemnation of Israel's "disproportionate
use of force". He is travelling to Israel, the West Bank as well Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey, but perhaps he should have started with the
US capital, where Washington policy-makers as well as lawmakers have solidly
stood behind Israel's military gambit to topple Hamas.
It would be premature to brand Ban's tour as doomed to failure as this depends
mainly on developments on the ground, in the theater of conflict, where the
asymmetrical warfare engulfing urban centers with citizens trapped in between
has yet to yield a decisive outcome, in light of stiff resistance by Hamas
fighters forcing Israel's mobilization of reservists.
After three weeks of heavy bombardment and a full-scale ground assault by
several mechanized divisions and thousands of troops, Israel still cannot claim
to have finished Hamas' ability to fire rockets into Israel and, indeed, may
not be able to clinch that objective short of full military control of Gaza
City and other urban centers, where Hamas' main power in waging guerilla
warfare resides.
The fact is, the longer this war drags on and the Israeli army advances deeper
into "Hamas territory", the harder it will be to achieve a ceasefire and
disengagement of forces. By the time Ban's Middle East round is over, the
re-occupation of Gaza City by the superior Israeli army may be a fait accompli
but, in the event that is not the case and Israeli war planners sense an acute
underachievement in reaching their objectives, they might then give more
attention to Ban's seeming "mission impossible".
Ban's shining hour
By all accounts, despite low morale at the UN and the delay in the UN Security
Council's action regarding the Gaza crisis, this is Ban's shining hour and he
deserves much credit for living up to the expectations from him by the world
community. That is, to act quickly and decisively while trying to be
even-handed by in essence criticizing both sides in the conflict.
This he has done by repeatedly criticizing Hamas' rocket firing into Israel
while also condemning Israel's disproportionate response, particularly after
Israel hit two UN schools.
Compensating for an occasional lackluster performance with respect to other
international crises facing the UN since he assumed the world organization's
mantle of leadership two years ago, such as Darfur and Myanmar, Ban's strong
advocacy of peace in Gaza and his ability to project an independent dynamic
accounts for a luminous turning point in his tenure in office.
Had this crisis transpired a year ago, when a considerably more reticent Ban
was still learning the ropes of UN leadership, the chances are the UN Security
Council would still be debating a truce resolution for Gaza. But, thanks to his
office's ability to marshal the forces at the Security Council, and with a
much-needed positive input by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Ban
finally succeeded in getting what he had vociferously called for since Israel
commenced its campaign on December 27, the call for an immediate ceasefire -
even if it has been ignored.
"The [secretary general] is deeply disappointed that Israel has ignored the
Security Council's mandatory call for an instant ceasefire," said a
high-ranking UN official to the author on the condition of anonymity, adding,
"But he also knows that he has a strong mandate from the international
community when he meets with leaders in Israel and the Arab world."
After speaking with several UN officials at the US Secretariat, this author was
surprised by their above-moderate optimism about the net result of Ban's peace
mission. "This is not a popular war for Israel and the Non-Aligned Movement
countries have unanimously criticized Israel's actions, therefore it would be
rather foolish for Israel to ignore the [secretary general's] plea for peace,"
said the same UN official.
Foolish or not, Israel is prosecuting the military campaign with the stated
intention of achieving a long-term solution to the menace of Hamas' rockets
and, henceforth, much depends on Ban's persuasive ability to convince Hamas
leaders to cease firing their rockets in exchange for a truce. Yet, at this
stage it is unclear if Ban will meet with the Hamas leaders and limit himself
to meeting the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank; certainly, Hamas
leaders would be disappointed if Ban evaded them in Damascus and Cairo.
A critical question at this hour is the nature of the connection between the UN
effort and the parallel ceasefire effort undertaken by Egypt and France, whose
joint truce proposal has been "under study" by both Israeli and Hamas
negotiators for several days. Currently, there is insufficient synergy between
the two efforts, leading to minor misgivings on the part of some of Ban's
lieutenants that there may be "too many heads" negotiating right now in
"different forums" over the same issue.
"We hear contradictory things about the Cairo process and the [secretary
general] may be able to inject some UN elements into what has so far been a
regional effort," said one insider. Bridging any "gap" between the two may come
in the form of an "international presence at Gaza's borders".
But, which borders? Certainly, Israel is not thrilled about the prospect of a
UN force at the Israel-Gaza border that could, in effect, act as a buffer that
could tie Israel's hands vis-a-vis Hamas in the future. It simply wants one at
the Egyptian border to monitor cross-border transactions both on and under the
ground, given the wealth of tunnels dug by Hamas over the past couple of years.
An all-inclusive international monitoring of all Gaza's borders may be a better
solution, one that would simultaneously address Israel's concerns about arms
flows into Gaza as well as Hamas' concerns for unfettered access to goods from
the Israeli side. "This is all hypothetical as long as Israel keeps marching in
Gaza," the UN official told the author, pointing out that in all likelihood
Israel "will enforce a unilateral security zone inside Gaza for some time -
that could mean more than just a few weeks or even months."
If so, then any quick truce achieved in the near term may be fated to be broken
shortly thereafter, like a precarious tiny bridge meant to withstand
hurricane-level turbulent waters. Israel is determined to expunge the ghost of
the 2006 war in Lebanon against Hezbollah that harmed its image as a regional
superpower and, therefore, may be unwilling to heed Ban's plea for peace that
could give Hamas a face-saving exit and then declare a moral victory. This does
not bode well for Israel that, seemingly, is not satisfied with anything less
than a clear and unambiguous capitulation under the banner of a ceasefire.
Given the latter, an inherent danger in Ban's peace effort is unmistakable: he
may end up being perceived as an indirect salesman for Washington's bid to
yield a one-sided truce that would leave no ambiguity about Israel's decisive
upper hand in the conflict compared with a devastatingly bruised and battered
Hamas.
Playing brinksmanship, Hamas is only too keenly aware of the US-Israel
intentions of the truce and are exploring ways of achieving some tangible
benefits that would chip away at Israel's ability to declare the Gaza war a
"total and unambiguous victory".
Should Hamas maintain its steadfast resistance for another week or so, then it
will be in a position to garner more points at the negotiation table, given the
present efforts of the George W Bush administration to bring this conflict to
an end before the next president, Barack Obama, is sworn into office on January
20.
Either way, Obama will inherit the Gaza crisis, and if the battles are still
raging when he is in command of US policy, then the table may start to turn
against Israel, even in Washington.
This is one reason why this is such a critical week in this conflict, with
diplomacy serving as an extension of the on-going war; whether or not the
UN-led peace diplomacy can provide a palliative short-term solution is unclear,
although it is obvious that the real decisions for war and peace are not made
at the UN but rather by powers that often use UN machinery to project their
power.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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