know today, it turned out not to be nearly good enough in 2009. The new
administration should have twisted every arm it could to get a new
international consensus on reducing carbon emissions 30% by 2020. It didn't. We
celebrated Kyoto, as we celebrated so much else, and then, of course, the
waters began to rise appreciably, as did temperatures, as did food and energy
prices. And yet it was all reasonably gradual and so everybody just complained.
If the numbers had shot up dramatically, all together, all at once, well,
perhaps we might have reacted dramatically. Instead, we put off the painful
adjustments. We attempted to muddle through.
There was similar rejoicing around the first troop units withdrawn
from Iraq. After some local tickertape parades and a couple months of R&R,
of course, the soldiers were back in action - in Afghanistan. We didn't
officially invade any other countries. We didn't start any new wars. We simply
increased our "commitments" in "existing theaters of operation". We didn't
notice that our permanent war economy was humming along at the same rate
regardless of troop levels in Iraq.
After all, even though the president made a big deal about canceling a few Cold
War weapons systems, he never touched the trillion dollar military budget.
Whatever was cut from fighting the Iraq War and eliminating the expensive and
unsafe V-22 Osprey helicopter was simply pasted into another part of that
budget. The Army was increased by 65,000 soldiers and the Marines by 27,000.
Our 800-plus military bases received an expensive make-over, our Special Forces
received lots of new high-tech goodies, and we bulked up NATO.
And because the president discovered that he couldn't touch the military
budget, he was never able to find the funds for the domestic programs that had
created so much hope in the electorate: no universal health care, no
transformation of the educational system, no boost for working people. Of
course, the euro overtaking the dollar as the world currency certainly didn't
help matters for the United States.
The resumption of arms control negotiations with the Russians was admittedly a
positive sign, but we were really beyond a moment where "signs" were enough. We
did eventually retire a few more nukes from our respective arsenals, but the
president never took advantage of the new political opening to negotiate
significant nuclear reductions. As a result, the countries that had recently
acquired nuclear weapons, including North Korea, but going back to India,
Pakistan, and Israel, refused to give up their programs. And countries on the
threshold of the nuclear club quietly but resolutely continued to develop their
capacities.
As you know, no one dropped any nukes, nor, despite the dire predictions of the
Panglossians, did terrorists use any dirty bombs. But with the death of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it can happen at any point.
We all thought that closing Guantanamo, ending renditions, and renouncing
torture would be enough to salvage America's reputation in the world. And, for
a brief time, the polls showed an uptick in global feelings toward the United
States. But the president never challenged the deeper framework of the Global
War on Terror. He simply promised to prosecute it more effectively.
Fearful of being labeled weak on terrorism - much as he was worried about a
similar label applied to his military policy - the president continued to
emphasize military means. As a result, "collateral damage" continued in US
attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere. These civilian casualties - as
well as the assassination rather than apprehension of suspected terrorists -
caused America's reputation to decline once again. More importantly, we
continued to create two terrorists for every one that we took out in a war
without end. We continued to sow our own fields with dragon's teeth.
And while we were still trying to find Osama bin Laden, who has proven as
long-lived as he is elusive, we ignored other mounting threats that were not in
the official military Red Alert zone. The worst-case scenarios never developed.
We thought we'd averted apocalypse. Instead, by tinkering on the edges while
basically maintaining the status quo, a different kind of apocalypse, the
slow-motion kind, is now upon us.
The future of futurology
Here's the latest joke making the rounds on futurology lists: Hint for the
young - there's no future in futurology. That's us, always with the gallows
humor.
Seriously, though, I haven't forecast the future in two, maybe three years. I
was so wrong in 2008 that now I just can't muster the energy. My colleagues are
still grinding out predictions. The Chicken Littles are having a field day, of
course. The fact that the sky hasn't yet fallen isn't cramping their style.
After all, when it comes to the sky, it's always just a matter of time.
I still don't buy the argument of the Chicken Littles, by the way. I was wrong
that the administration would change history in 2008, but they are still wrong
that the end will come with a bang, not a whimper. In the long run, as the
economists say, we're all dead anyway.
We Panglossians have, of course, experienced a natural thinning of the ranks.
With the blackouts and the queues at the gas stations, it's hard to be an
optimist these days. It's difficult to keep a smile on your face when yet
another country conducts a nuclear test and yet another island disappears
underneath the rising waves.
As you all know, we're in the middle of another election season now. So there
is more talk of hope and change. I've read some of the Panglossian predictions.
It's just more of the same - fiddling around at the margins while the world
burns. I've tried to warn them. But who listens to me anymore?
My friends sometimes ask what would I have done differently if I could do it
all again. That's the biggest if of all. The conditional that never arrives.
Still, here goes: In 2008, I should have dispensed with the optimism, stopped
playing the inside-the-Beltway pundit game of influence, and talked straight. I
should have written that, unless the new administration fundamentally changed
US policy - reducing the nuclear arsenals, cutting the military budget,
launching a full-speed effort to halve carbon emissions, abandoning the
nonsensical "war on terror" - we would run the risk of Goldilocks.
I should have said: we seek out the comfortable middle at our own peril. Not
too hot and not too cold, not too hard and not too soft, it's a strategy
guaranteed to lull anyone into a dangerous complacency. After all, once you've
made your bed, however comfortable it may be, you have to lie in it. And it's
then, after a few brief moments of self-satisfied sleep, that you're bound to
hear the scratching at the door.
The bears are home. And they're hungry.
John Feffer is the co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the
Institute for Policy Studies.
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