Page 2 of
2 Muqtada strikes another political
blow By Sami Moubayed
fronts. First the Arab world
abandoned him. Then came the US, which started to
lose faith in his wisdom and doubt his sincerity
in bringing stability to Iraq.
The Sunni
Accordance Front walked out on the prime minister,
along with al-Fadila, the Allawi team, and now
finally and completely, the Sadrists. The UIA now
only has 136 deputies (53 of them Kurdish allies),
and Maliki sees that now - more than ever
-
his days are numbered. If the Sadrists say "no" to
the prime minister from within Parliament, that
would bring the total number of his parliamentary
opponents to 127 out of 275.
Adding to
Maliki's worries is rising Sunni anger over the
recent assassination of tribal leader Sheikh Abdul
Sattar Abu Risha, who was killed by a bomb near
his home in Ramada, believed to be the work of
al-Qaeda. A year ago, Abu Risha, an ally of both
the US and Maliki, launched Anbar Awakening,
bringing dozens of Sunni tribal leaders together
to work with Iraqi and US forces to combat
al-Qaeda in Iraq.
His assassination proves
just how fragile security is under Maliki, who can
neither help control the situation nor even
protect his leading allies who are working for the
same objectives.
National Security Adviser
Muwafaq al-Rabei described Abu Risha as a
"national hero" who was "unparalleled" in the
nation's history, adding that his murder was a
"national disaster".
Had Muqtada (who is
vehemently anti-Qaeda) been around, working with
Abu Risha and Maliki, then perhaps the clout of
Osama bin Laden's network would not have been that
powerful and the prime minister's Baghdad security
plan would not have been in shambles.
Maliki began the US-backed plan after
falling out with Muqtada this year, and instead of
concentrating his efforts on combating al-Qaeda,
focused on the Mahdi Army to please the Americans.
As a result, al-Qaeda continued to thrive, and the
Mahdi Army turned against Maliki.
Neither
the Americans nor the Sadrists were pleased, and
the ones to pay the price were the Iraqi people.
As if Sunni anger were not enough, Maliki received
more troubling news this week when the disbanded
Ba'ath Party announced that it would be willing to
work with Allawi, who has his eyes set on
replacing the prime minister.
The Izzat
Douri branch of Ba'ath announced that it is "more
than willing to work with Allawi, because we see
him as a nationalist and Iraqi patriot, and not a
sectarian figure". Although its members do not
agree with all that he did when serving as prime
minister in 2004, "we have no doubt that he would
represent the interests of Iraq, not of Shi'ites,
or Sunnis, or any other group", a clear reference
to Maliki.
More than ever before, Muqtada
is proving to be a pragmatic politician who has
surpassed all expectations. Who is the mastermind
behind his political scheming, however, is
unclear, since Muqtada clearly could not formulate
strategy and take political initiatives of the
sort he is doing without the advice of seasoned
statesmen.
When he rose to fame in 2004,
many speculated that he was a temporary star, a
radical cleric wanna-be who would never become a
serious player in Iraqi politics. Neither his age
(in this 30s) nor his religious credentials,
experience or alliances were enough to make him a
national leader.
Muqtada learned fast,
however, probably inspired by the Hezbollah model
in Lebanon and the character of its very popular
and charismatic leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The
Lebanese chief also came to power at an early age,
in his early 30s, and managed to impose himself on
everybody and everything in Lebanon within a
relatively short time.
This is becoming
increasingly true of Muqtada. Many believed
initially that Muqtada had one prime objective -
evacuation of US troops. They saw him as a
political player only when it came to combating
the US, not thinking that he had a serious
political agenda for himself and his followers.
Today, three years later, it is clear that
Muqtada's agenda surpasses withdrawal of US troops
from Iraq. He has a much more ambitious aim:
ruling Iraq. Wisdom started showing when he laid
down his arms at the request of Sistani, to avoid
a bloodbath for the Shi'ite community. He promised
to take part in the political process and came
across as an obedient man who would listen to
advice from veterans like Sistani.
His
uprising against the US in 2004 and then prime
minister Allawi gave him all the legitimacy he
needed to shake off his immature image. It gave
him war medals that he could use to tell ordinary
Iraqis: "If I join the political process, one
cannot blame me. At least I tried to win
independence with arms, unlike Iraqi politicians
who are acting like stooges for the United States.
If I work with the political system, it will be
'honorable cooperation' aimed at gradual
independence."
Survival after such a war
with the US, he claimed, was in itself a victory.
The Iraqis - at least Iraqi Shi'ites - believed
him and forgave him for taking part in a
US-created political system, the same system he
had originally denounced. It would have been very
difficult for Muqtada to join the political system
without having first waged war against it.
From within it, however, he began to apply
the Hezbollah model through the wide array of
charity organizations he operated. Poor people
became increasingly dependent on him for survival.
Meanwhile, Muqtada was cultivating alliances
within political circles. People said yes to him
fearing his wrath and rising political influence.
Then came Maliki, who needed him for
legitimacy, giving Muqtada the opportunity of a
lifetime by granting the Sadrist bloc posts within
the government. In return, Muqtada told his
followers to support the prime minister. Muqtada
milked the government offices given to him,
stretched them to their potential and then, when
done with their benefits, walked out on them and
the prime minister.
Muqtada's credibility
has not been shaken by having been part of the
Maliki regime. It was Maliki's reputation that
suffered from being a friend to Muqtada. The young
cleric did not need to prove himself to anybody:
his war medals were still shinning. Maliki,
however, had a lot of explaining to do, to Sunnis,
Kurds and the US, as to what exactly was the
nature of his relationship with Muqtada.
This is not how things were supposed to
turn out, after all. Weren't the Shi'ites supposed
to remain united rank-and-file behind the prime
minister? Wasn't Muqtada going to help Maliki root
out Sunni militias in exchange for the prime
minister's promise never to crack down on the
Mahdi Army?
Maliki actually faced an
unbearable situation. He had to please either the
increasingly ambitious Muqtada or the increasingly
demanding George W Bush. He tried to walk the
tightrope and please both - something that
apparently was impossible.
Sami
Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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