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3 OPINION The case for pragmatic
idealism By James A Baker
said
for maintaining a bilateral dialogue, if only to
avoid misunderstanding and missteps.
No,
the fundamental reason we should be prepared to
speak to our enemies is that it is in our interest
to do so. This is why we maintained an embassy in
Moscow throughout the Cold War. And this is why
even so staunch an anti-communist as president
Ronald Reagan was prepared to
negotiate with the Soviets. His motto - "Trust but
verify" - remains an irreplaceable injunction for
any negotiations. Talking to a hostile government,
whether it was Moscow during the Cold War or
Damascus today, is not appeasement.
It was
and still is good foreign policy.
The
previous two maxims can sometimes be difficult for
some Americans to accept. And so my ninth maxim is
that we should be mindful that values are
important - but that they aren't the only thing
that should guide our policy.
Sadly, we
cannot formulate or implement American foreign
policy according to the principles of Mother
Teresa. Foreign policy is not social work.
Americans are often motivated by the most
altruistic of humanitarian impulses. But when the
body bags start coming home, it is extremely
difficult to rally public support if there is no
overriding national interest.
Promoting
democracy and free markets around the world is
rightly central to US foreign policy. A freer,
more prosperous world is a better world for our
own citizens and people everywhere. Our productive
(if not always perfect) relationships with the
mature market democracies of western Europe and
Japan can serve as a model in this regard.
But we must remember that progress toward
democracy and free markets is neither inevitable
nor without its own strains.
Both
democracy and free markets can be decidedly mixed
blessings in the short run. Economic reforms can
lead to strains that prompt populist backlashes,
and elections cannot be counted upon to produce
stable, responsible regimes. The popular success
of Hamas among Palestinians and Hezbollah in
Lebanon are cases in point.
So should we
support free markets and democracy? Of course we
should. But we should be especially careful not to
underestimate the difficulties countries can face
as they embark on the path to democracy.
Above all, we should always remember that
in foreign policy, "stability" is not a dirty
word. It can serve as the foundation for economic
and political reform. Its alternative is
frequently internal chaos and external conflict.
Sometimes destruction can be "creative". More
often it is just destructive.
The example
of World War I is sobering. It followed
immediately on the heels of a period of
unparalleled economic integration that some have
called the "first golden age of globalization".
One of the most influential books of the prewar
period, Norman Angell's The Great Illusion,
argued that general war had become impossible
because of the economic advantages of peace. Yet
we know what followed - one of the bloodiest
periods in human history. So we should be very
wary when talk turns to "inevitability". What man
creates, man can destroy.
A last, but by
no means least, important guiding principle:
domestic support is vital to any successful
foreign policy.
The will of the American
people is the final arbiter of foreign policy in
our democracy. Generating and sustaining domestic
support for foreign policy is in every way as
important as the policy itself. Without that
support, specific policies risk repudiation at the
polls or, worse, public disenchantment with
foreign engagement in general.
The polling
on Americans' views of foreign policy represents a
mixed bag. Some surveys suggest a rise in
isolationism. More clear is a turn against the use
of force as an instrument of US foreign policy.
The Iraq war has contributed to both. Whatever
one's views of the war and its conduct, it is
incumbent on all who believe in US engagement on
the world stage to contest any retreat to
isolationism.
So how do we best apply
these 10 maxims in the context of an overall
approach to conducting US foreign policy? The
approach I suggest does not fall easily into the
traditional categories of foreign policy -
"realism" or "idealism". It contains the best
elements of both.
What I suggest might be
called "pragmatic idealism". While firmly grounded
in values, it appreciates the complexity of the
real world - a world of hard choices and painful
tradeoffs. This is the real world in which we must
live, decide and act.
It is a world that
Ronald Reagan understood. He was, famously, a man
of deeply held convictions. But he was also
pragmatic. When I was his chief of staff, he often
told me, "Jim, I'd rather get 80% of what I want
than to go over the cliff with my flag flying."
The Gipper, of course, was right.
I am not
proposing a dogmatic list that must be checked off
for each foreign-policy challenge we confront. On
the contrary, these maxims embody a mindset marked
by a realistic assessment of events and a
practical response to them. They represent
anything but elements of a rigid ideology that
forces events into preconceived notions and
creates "either/or" choices that are both false
and dangerous. This approach embodies one of our
most distinctive national characteristics: we
Americans are a practical people less interested
in ideological purity than in solving problems.
Our pragmatism should inform our foreign policy.
Such a balanced approach can help us avoid
both the cynicism of "realism" and the
impracticality of "idealism". It is based on an
optimistic view of man but is tempered by our
knowledge of human imperfection. It promises no
easy answers or quick fixes. But neither did the
containment policy pursued by US administrations,
Democratic and Republican alike, during the Cold
War. Yet that policy ultimately triumphed.
It was based, much like the approach I
have sketched, on a unique melding of idealism and
realism. It eschewed the temptations of both
isolationism on the one hand, and rollback of
communism through direct conflict with the Soviet
Union on the other. And it reflected, at an
important level, a confidence about the future
that we need to recapture.
Such an
approach does, I am convinced, offer our surest
guide and best hope for navigating our great
country safely though this precarious period of
unparalleled opportunity and risk in world
affairs.
James A Baker III was
the 67th secretary of the US Treasury and the 61st
secretary of state. Last year, he co-chaired the
Iraq Study Group with Lee Hamilton. Currently, he
is co-chairing the National War Powers Commission
with former secretary of state Warren Christopher
and is the author of the recently published
Work Hard, Study ... and Keep Out of Politics!
Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public
Life (Putnam, 2006).
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