Page 2 of
2 The Saudi arms deal: Why
now? By Dan Smith
fact, Congress had already
expressed its frustration about Riyadh's failure
to be more actively engaged in furthering US (and
therefore implicitly Saudi) objectives.
In
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, Congress had directed
that Saudi Arabia was not to receive any funds in
the State Department's foreign-operations
appropriation. But as usual, the legislation
contained an escape clause: the ban against
assistance became
moot
if the president certified that the Saudis were
cooperating in the "war on terror". Much to the
dismay of many in Congress, Bush so certified each
year.
Timing An unanswered
question about the proposed arms deal is: Why now?
Had the administration moved before November 2003,
the announcement would have been seen in the
region as an audacious - given the "success" of
US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq - but
credible recommitment by Washington to the
then-25-year-old policy of diplomatic, economic,
and military (conventional and nuclear)
containment of Tehran's ambitions in the Persian
Gulf by increasing Riyadh's military stance.
But looking at the Saudi record and
Riyadh's increasing propensity to act in its own
interests without coordinating with Washington,
there is the suggestion that the Bush
administration is suddenly wary of its "other"
flank in the Persian Gulf - the one occupied by
the Saudi-dominated six-member Gulf Cooperation
Council. Militarily overcommitted in midsummer,
the White House has only two cards to play: pump
up fear of Iran acquiring enough enriched uranium
to build a nuclear weapon, or bribe the regional
allies.
For a few months the nuclear fear
factor seemed to work, but Tehran seems to have
become "reasonable" enough in its position to
defuse tensions with most of the main actors in
this dispute. This left the Bush administration
with bribery, spiced with a touch of traditional
Sunni-Shi'ite sectarianism that underpins
relations between Riyadh and Tehran even when they
cooperate (eg, the just-formed Iraq security
subcommittee that will consider steps to reduce
the influx of weapons and fighters into Iraq from
Iran).
This also explains the visit last
week by the US secretary of state and the
secretary of defense to the region on an
old-fashioned, bribe-them-first-then-twist-arms,
whistle-stop campaign to make sure regional
"allies" - this time including the Saudis - are in
line behind US policy.
Inconvenient
inconsistencies But the multibillion-dollar
arms deal has some inconsistencies that could
cause the two secretaries problems. The most
immediate one is the policy message represented by
the sheer size of the arms deal.
Washington has been insisting that there
is no military solution to the region's trauma.
Yet it is proposing not only $20 billion in
weapons to the Saudis but another $13 billion to
Egypt and $30 billion to Israel - a total of $63
billion for weapons in a part of the world already
awash in modern arms. And this total apparently
doesn't include $40 million in guns, bullets,
rockets, missiles, small-arms ammunition,
night-vision goggles, and spare parts for the
Lebanese Army this year and another $280 million
for 2008. Nor does it include the $3 billion Iraq
is spending on weapons and ammunition - all of
which are contributing to the current mayhem in
these two countries.
Nonetheless, since
Israel has already said it will not oppose the
sale, it is unlikely that Congress will vote to
block it or even to amend it. As for the Pentagon,
it hopes to save money through economy of scale
for items produced for either the Saudis or
Israelis. And of course US companies that build
weapons and munitions are pleased at the prospect
of new contracts and new profits.
The
irony in this whole affair is that Bush started
the Iraq war over weapons that never existed and
that have not been used since 1945. Now his
administration seems to think the way to end the
war is to make sure that there are more weapons -
ones that kill thousands every day. Go figure!
Dan Smith is a military-affairs
analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus, a retired US
Army colonel, and a senior fellow on military
affairs at the Friends Committee on National
Legislation. His blog is The Quakers' Colonel.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
