Page 2 of
2 Iran faces challenges from
within By Chris Zambelis
group alleged to have ties to the
Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey, and Iranian
security forces. Iran claims that PJAK operates in
Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq and receives
support from the US. On the political front,
groups such as the Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan and the Komoleh-Revolutionary Party of
Kurdistan advocate for Iranian Kurdish rights in
the diaspora.
Iranian Baloch nationalist
groups such as Jundallah (Soldiers of
God),
also known as the People's Resistance Movement of
Iran, have orchestrated a series of high-profile
attacks against Iranian security forces dating
back to 2003. Balochs inhabit Iran's impoverished
and desolate southeastern province of
Sistan-Balochistan, a lawless region and smuggling
crossroads. Sistan-Balochistan is a frequent
target for Iranian security forces. As a fiercely
independent tribal society that has been neglected
by a highly centralized state, Balochs have always
felt a sense of alienation from Tehran. Despite a
lack of evidence, Iranian authorities often label
Baloch militants as agents of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in an effort to tarnish the group's
reputation because of their Sunni faith.
Animosity by Iranian Balochs toward Tehran
runs so deep that they look to their kin in the
neighboring Pakistani province of Balochistan, who
are engaged in their own secessionist struggle,
and the Baloch community in Afghanistan in what
Baloch nationalists label "Greater Balochistan".
Iran accuses the US of supporting Jundallah from
Pakistani territory. Baloch nationalists are
represented by the Balochistan People's Party and
a host of other groups abroad.
The
southwestern province of Khuzestan on the
Iran-Iraq border is home to most of Iran's
ethnic-Arab population known as the Ahwazi (Ahvazi
in Farsi). Khuzestan contains much of Iran's oil
and gas wealth, yet remains one of the country's
least developed regions. This is partly a legacy
of the devastation it endured as the front line
for much of the Iran-Iraq War and, according to
many Ahwazis, a deliberate policy by Tehran to
ensure that the region remains underdeveloped and
impoverished.
Despite the fact that most
Ahwazis are Shi'ite Muslims and speak Farsi, they
maintain close tribal and cultural links with
their Shi'ite Arab kin in southern Iraq and
maintain a strong sense of Arab identity. The
region was the scene of a number of bombings and
attacks against government targets in recent
years. Tehran blamed Ahwazi militants, including
the obscure Hizb al-Nahda al-Arabi al-Ahwazi
(Ahwazi Arab Renaissance Party) and other groups
as acting on the behest of US and British
intelligence. Ahwazi nationalists are represented
in the diaspora by the Democratic Solidarity Party
of Ahwaz, the Ahwaz Revolutionary Council, the
Ahwaz Study Center and the British-Ahwazi
Friendship Society.
Tensions in the
ethnic-Azeri community boiled over in May 2006
when a state-run newspaper published a cartoon
they believed likened them to cockroaches. The
publication inspired widespread protests in
Azeri-dominated regions of northern Iran and
communities in Tehran. Despite their Shi'ite
faith, ethnic Azeris mobilized in protest against
what they saw as the ethnic-Persian and Farsi
chauvinism of the clerical regime and to agitate
for greater cultural and linguistic rights.
Although the publishers of the cartoon
were quickly reprimanded and their actions were
condemned by officials in Tehran, the spontaneous
outburst of anger among Azeris, Iran's largest
ethnic minority that shares close links to the
Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia,
especially their kin in former Soviet Azerbaijan,
is another example of the nascent domestic
tensions that could ignite violence and unrest in
Iranian society.
Iranian officials blamed
outside agitators, namely pan-Turkic nationalists
acting on the behest of the US, for inciting the
riots. The ethnic-Azeri cause in Iran is
represented by the Federal Democratic Movement of
Azerbaijan and South Azerbaijan Human Rights
Watch.
Iran's ethnic-Turkmen community, a
predominantly Sunni population that inhabits
northern parts of Iran along the border with
Turkmenistan, appears to be following the lead of
other Iranian minorities and raising its voices in
protest against what it sees as a deliberate
policy to stifle its cultural identity and rights,
especially in regards to religion, language and
education.
Turkmens are also emboldened by
the plight of their kin in Iraq and their attempt
to return to oil-rich Kirkuk, from where they were
expelled along with other minorities as part of
the former Ba'ath regime's "Arabization" program.
Tehran accuses foreign elements based in Iraq and
the wider Turkic world of supporting Turkmen
dissent in Iran. Iranian Turkmens are represented
by the Organization for Defense of the Rights of
Turkmen People and the Turkmensahra Liberation
Organization.
Conclusion The
issues inspiring minority ethnic and
sectarian-based dissent in Iran are the result of
a multiplicity of factors, only one of which can
be attributed to acts of foreign intervention by
outside powers. Deep-seated grievances rooted in
practical issues, such as Iran's inability to
integrate entire communities into its social,
political and economic fabric, is a case in point.
Iran also has to adapt to the changing
geopolitical landscape in the region that is
seeing the rise of new centers of power and
influence, such as Iraqi Kurdistan, which will
reverberate well beyond their borders by serving
as an inspiration to under-served communities to
assert themselves, even through violence.
Notes 1. See "Manifesto
of the Congress of Iranian Nationalities for a
Federal Iran", February 9, 2005. The manifesto's
signatories included the Balochistan United Front,
the Federal Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan, the
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the
Balochistan People's Party, the Democratic
Solidarity Party of Ahwaz, the Organization for
the Defense of Rights of Turkmen People, and the
Komoleh-Revolutionary Party of Kurdistan. 2.
The demographic data were amalgamated from a
variety of sources. It is important to note that
demographic figures for Iran, especially as they
relate to ethnic and sectarian minority
representation, are frequently used to bolster
and/or diminish a given community's presence for
political reasons. This is often the case for data
provided by official government sources or
activists and parties based abroad representing
ethnic and sectarian minority interests. For more
information on the ethnic and sectarian breakdown
of Iran, see Eliz Sanasarian, Religious
Minorities in Iran, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000. Also see Massoume Price,
Iran's Diverse Peoples: A Reference
Sourcebook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005.
Chris Zambelis is a senior
analyst with Applied Marine Technology Inc (AMTI),
an operation of Science Applications International
Corp (SAIC). He specializes in Middle Eastern and
South Asian politics and international terrorism
issues. The views expressed here are the author's
alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinions
or positions of AMTI and SAIC.
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