Page 2 of 2 In cold blood: Sunnis feel
the heat By Sami Moubayed
not
a Shi'ite cleric denouncing al-Qaeda in public.
This was a radical Islamic Sunni group that is
modeled after al-Qaeda - a novelty in Iraqi
politics.
Groups in this new political
alliance, called the Political Office of the Iraqi
Resistance, include the 1920 Revolution Brigades,
Ansar al-Sunna and Iraqi Hamas. They claim they
were offered arms and funds from Iran but turned
them down, to maintain their Iraqi character. They
also deny being supported by Syria: "We are the
only
resistance movement in modern history which has
received no help or support from any other
country."
Causing a stir for the attack on
al-Qaeda, one of the group's spokesmen, from Ansar
al-Sunna, said, "Our people have come to hate
al-Qaeda, which gives the impression to the
outside world that the resistance [leaders] in
Iraq are terrorists. We are against indiscriminate
killing. Fighting should be concentrated only on
one enemy."
He noted that "a gap has been
opened between Sunnis and Shi'ites under the
occupation" and blamed al-Qaeda for that, also
accusing the Americans for bringing al-Qaeda to
Iraq. Al-Qaeda, it must be noted, cannot tolerate
moderates, whether in the Sunni or the Shi'ite
community.
It becomes increasingly
difficult to persuade young men to wage war
against people - accusing them of being infidels -
if these people are carrying nothing but an olive
branch, as Sistani has done. Radicals like to
confront radicals. They cannot confront moderates
for long because moderates embarrass them, and
force them to show some moderation in their
conduct. The only way to avoid moderation is to
eliminate its symbols from Iraqi society - men
like Sistani.
Opposition stalls Another development in Sunni politics is the
cancellation of a meeting for the "Iraqi
opposition" that was scheduled to be held
Damascus, Syria, on Monday. The meeting was to
include former Ba'athists and opponents of Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki. It was to be chaired by
Sunni Harith al-Dari, the veteran leader of the
Muslim Scholars' Association who is on the wanted
list of several Shi'ite groups in Iraq, including
the Shi'ite-led Ministry of Interior.
Syria called off the meeting, saying it
would be rescheduled - a polite way of saying
never. The move put a damper on the hopes of the
Iraqi Sunni politicians who had expected
unconditional support from Damascus to oppose the
US occupation.
However, Damascus had
promised the British last November that it would
help bring security to Iraq and support Maliki's
cabinet. Step 1 was to send Walid al-Moualem, the
minister of foreign affairs, to Baghdad. Syria
then reopened its embassy in Iraq, which had been
closed since 1980.
This gave great
legitimacy to Maliki, a man who is desperate for
Arab support and recognition, given that most
people see him either as a stooge for Iran, or the
Americans.
By establishing diplomatic
relations with Iraq, Syria was also legitimizing
the post-Saddam Hussein administration in the eyes
of angry Iraqi Sunnis. It was one thing when a
pro-American country such as Jordan or Egypt
recognized Maliki, but another if this gesture
came from Syria - an obstacle to US schemes in the
region that has neither signed a peace treaty with
Israel nor taken orders from Washington.
Then Syria received both Iraqi Interior
Minister Jawad al-Boulani (a member of the SIIC)
and President Jalal Talabani, promising to help
increase border security to prevent insurgents
from making their way into Iraq.
On August
7, Vice President Adel Abdul-Mehdi (also of the
SIIC who is close to the Americans) is due to
arrive in Damascus. This will be a very important
step for the Syrians and Iraqis, given
Abdul-Mehdi's influence in Shi'ite politics and
his excellent relations with both Tehran and
Washington.
Reportedly, the Iraqis told
Syria that if the opposition meeting took place,
then Abdul-Mehdi would not go to Damascus. Another
reason, floated in press reports, is that Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, during his latest
visit to Damascus and meeting with President
Bashar al-Assad, voiced his concern about hosting
such a conference in Syria. Most of the members of
the Iraqi opposition are outright opponents of
Iran and highly critical of Ahmadinejad's role in
Iraqi politics since 2005.
All this means
is that the Sunni community in Iraq is taking
blows from a variety of sources. It would be no
surprise if the murder of Sistani's men was blamed
on Sunni fanatics, and this might lead to a wave
of revenge attacks by angry Shi'ites, similar to
what happened with the Samarra bombings in 2006
and 2007.
These attacks on Shi'ite shrines
were blamed on Sunnis - without a shred of
evidence - and radical Shi'ite groups used it as a
blessing in disguise to strike at their
traditional enemy. They killed notables, burned
mosques and set entire neighborhoods ablaze.
While taking fire for a murder they
probably did not commit (they must not be blamed
for the terrorism of al-Qaeda) Sunnis are finding
it increasingly difficult to follow the leadership
of one Sunni authority. After the demise of
Saddam, the Sunnis have had no true leader to
follow. His successor in Ba'ath circles, Izzat
Ibrahim al-Douri, is a colorless figure who,
despite all that is written about him in the
Arabic press, does not have a real following in
the Sunni community - certainly not the kind that
Saddam enjoyed.
Sunnis also do not have a
platform. Syria is becoming increasingly
off-limits to them. So are Jordan and Saudi
Arabia, and certainly Iran. The political system
in Baghdad does not encourage, or even want, their
political activity. The days ahead will be
difficult for Sunni activists in Iraq, and the
assassination of Sistani or his aides will only
make it more difficult for them.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst. He is the author of Steel
& Silk: Men and Women Who Shaped Syria
1900-2000 (Cune Press, 2006).
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