Page 2 of 2 War games, mind games
or the real
deal? By Sami Moubayed
leaders fear that somebody will
attack Israel - or Israel will feign an attack -
and then blame it on Hezbollah, using the ordeal
as a pretext to relaunch war against Lebanon. This
time, unlike the case in 2006, the Israelis will
be more prepared for Hezbollah.
Amid all
of this tension comes a puzzling factor -
increased media talk about a military
confrontation between Israel and Syria. That would
have been possible in July 2006. As the war
dragged on in
Lebanon, Olmert found it
increasingly difficult to explain to the Israelis
why his army was not winning a battle against a
small group of guerrilla warriors. It was feared
that if pressure rose within Israel, Olmert would
attack Syria to prove to the Israelis that he was
serious and capable of fighting the problem
(Hezbollah) and its backers (Syria and Iran).
Part of that argument still stands. Olmert
is still in a difficult position and, on the
anniversary of the war, has solved none of
Israel's worries with Hezbollah. A Round 2 with
Lebanon, however, would seem more likely than a
Round 1 with Syria. The Syrian Arab Army, although
untried in battle for many years, is well armed
and well trained. It can fire real missiles at
Israel - not just Katyusha rockets. It has a
military pact with Iran. There is no real reason
to attack Syria unless Olmert wants to fabricate
an excuse to go to war against the Syrians.
That can easily be done in a variety of
ways. One way would be if an attack were launched
against Israel by one of the many armed groups in
Palestine. This attack would be blamed on Hamas,
which is supported by the Syrian government.
Already there is a campaign to root out Hamas from
within the occupied territories, with Israel
attacking it from outside and Fatah fighting it
from within.
Proponents of the
Israel-versus-Syria war claim such a conflict
would lead to a weaker Damascus and the flushing
out of Hamas. All of that, naturally, would
incapacitate Hezbollah. Another way to wage war on
Syria would be if hostilities were created on the
Lebanese-Israeli border, and then blamed on
Damascus.
On July 11, the Jerusalem Post
quoted a recent intelligence report saying that
war with Syria is possible if Olmert does not find
a peaceful solution for his problems with Syria.
The newspaper added that if war were to break out,
it would be many times worse for Israel than its
confrontation with Hezbollah last year.
Some people believe that Syria is the one
interested in war, not Israel. They point to an
alleged massive Syrian troop buildup along the
Golan Heights. Supporters of this argument claim
that such a war would do wonders for Bashar
al-Assad's government in Damascus (just as the
October 1973 war served his father's career) and
make it increasingly difficult for Arab countries
allied to the US, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Lebanon or Egypt, to support any anti-Syrian
maneuvering in the international community, or
through the UN.
In his inauguration speech
at the new Syrian Parliament in May, Assad noted
that war was possible with Israel because "there
is no progress in the peace process and there is
not any contact with Israel, whether secretly or
publicly, because Israel is not ready for the just
and comprehensive peace which needs strong
leadership that can take decisive decisions".
The deputy chief of staff of the IDF,
Major-General Moshe Kaplinsky, came out this week,
however, saying the opposite, claiming that war
with Syria is unlikely. He added, however, that
Israel is ready to counter any attack, coming from
Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria or Iran.
"I hear
the voices but to the best of our assessment,
which is also my personal assessment, we do not
expect a war this summer from Syria," Kaplinsky
said. Israel's mobilization on the Syrian border
was in response to Syrian troop movement, he
added, calling it a "defensive" measure. He also
noted that "Hezbollah is rebuilding itself. But we
are ready for all possible scenarios."
Part of this preparation is training 70%
of Israel's reservists and exercising military
units along the Golan. One of Israel's most famous
units, the Golani Brigade, has just completed
high-profile war games. Guy Hazoot, the officer in
charge of the 91st Division deployed along the
border with Lebanon, noted: "The worst case is
war, and we have to be prepared for the worst
case."
According to further press reports
from United Press International, quoting
"well-informed sources in Washington", a
"confrontation between Syria and Israel may happen
this summer".
Dennis Ross, the Middle East
envoy under former US president Bill Clinton, was
quoted in the online edition of Yedioth Aharanot
saying that there is "a risk of war" between Syria
and Israel this summer. He added, "The Syrians are
positioning themselves for war."
Somebody
out there, either on the Israeli side or the
Syrian one, has read his Middle East history too
well. In May and August 1973, Sadat repeatedly
threatened to go to war against the Israelis.
Frantic, Israel would mobilize to fight, and Sadat
would do nothing. Every time, the mobilization
would cost Israel about US$10 million. Because he
always threatened to go to war against Israel and
never did anything, nobody believed him when he
threatened war in 1973. That is exactly what Sadat
wanted.
One week before the war on October
6, 1973, the Egyptian Army began moving toward the
Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large
troop movement toward the canal, did not do
anything in response, thinking this was one of
Sadat's many failed promises of war. He needed
these gestures, they believed, to build his
reputation in the Egyptian street. Movement of the
Syrian Army toward the Golan Heights at the same
time was puzzling but not worrying because Israeli
was convinced that Syria would not go to war
without Egypt. That explains, among other things,
why the Israelis were caught off guard on October
6, 1973.
And today, the mobilization of
troops has become an old joke in Syrian-Israeli
relations. Whenever one party mobilizes, the other
goes on alert, and nothing happens. Will it be
different in 2007?
Sami Moubayed
is a Syrian political analyst.
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