Page 2 of 2 The struggle for Kirkuk
turns ugly By Sami Moubayed
because they refused to recognize
and support a new, Shi'ite-led post-Saddam Iraq.
His alliance with Shi'ite military groups,
like the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr, which has
engaged in sectarian war with the Sunnis since
2004, makes a rapprochement with the Sunnis even
more difficult. The friendship between Iraqi
Sunnis and neighboring or regional Sunni Arab
countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and
Syria is even more alarming to Maliki, who fears
that they are
all
conspiring to bring down his government and
replace him with the secular former prime minister
Iyad Allawi.
Last week, Maliki addressed
Iraqi officers, calling on them to strike "with an
iron fist" at whoever tried to work with outside
forces against the political process (forgetting
perhaps that he is a product of "outside" meddling
in Iraqi affairs). Maliki's statement came after
Sunni Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi openly
called for neighboring Arab states to help Iraqi
Sunnis maintain the Sunni and Arab character of
Iraq, and wrestling it from the hands of Shi'ite
politicians, militias - and Iran.
Although
they had differences in the past over the
distribution of power between the president and
his prime minister, Maliki and Talabani have
reconciled to prevent the Allawi scenario from
materializing. For one thing, Allawi would never
allow militias to operate - neither the Kurdish
Peshmerga nor the Shi'ite Madhi Army nor the Badr
Brigade of the SIIC. Nor would Allawi support the
idea of further autonomy for the Shi'ites.
Talabani's interview in Al-Hayat showed strong
messages of support for Maliki and the Shi'ites,
who in turn are reciprocating with support on the
issue of Kirkuk.
Trying to defend the
Iraqi Shi'ites from accusations of being agents of
the Iranians, Talabani said, "I think that the
Shi'ites of Iraq will never follow the Shi'ites of
Iran. They are in disagreement with Iran over the
issue of vilayat-e-faqih [rule of the
clergy]. This is a big issue, reminding us of the
international community movement and the
differences between China and Russia. Najaf
[located in Iraq] is the Shi'ite Vatican and not
Qum or Mashad [located in Iran]. Most of the
Shi'ite shrines are located in Iraq [not Iran]."
He added that as Shi'ite leaders living in
Iran under Saddam did not make them agents of the
Iranians: "We all resided in Iran, but that
doesn't make us Iranian." Talabani was making a
poor argument, claiming that it was Iran that
followed Iraqi Shi'ites and not the other way
around. Historically this may be correct, but in
today's world, Talabani knows that Iran is an
international Shi'ite superpower that has control
over Shi'ites worldwide, and not only in Iraq.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Iraq, for
example, is an Iranian who does not even have an
Iraqi passport. In another gesture, Muqtada came
out recently in favor of reconciliation with Iraqi
Sunnis - something that is very difficult but
which if it happens could give a great boost to
Maliki's standing in Iraqi domestic politics.
A stronger Maliki means stronger support
for the Kurds and the Shi'ites. Muqtada called for
an end to sectarian violence and announced that
after a recent attack on a Sunni shrine, he
contacted Sunni leaders and offered to have his
army protect holy Sunni places of worship,
suggesting joint prayers between Sunnis and
Shi'ites. The Sunnis turned him down, however, not
for security reasons, as they claimed, but because
simply they trust neither Muqtada nor his boss,
the prime minister.
Muqtada then spoke of
a possible coup to oust Maliki, saying that this
would be a coup against so-called
"Shi'itification", but added that Maliki's
government was not governing in a Shi'ite manner,
but was closer to being secular. He warned the
Arab states that are supportive of ending Maliki's
tenure in office, saying: "The Arabs need Iraq
more than Iraq needs them. What is happening here
can explode in their own countries."
He
also denied links to Iranian intelligence. Muqtada
has his own reasons for fearing Allawi since, when
serving as prime minister in 2004, the man
launched a ruthless war against the Mahdi Army and
has promised to crush it if he returns to power.
As all of this was happening, violence ripped
through Iraq over the weekend, claiming that lives
of over 50 people on Friday, with two car bombs in
Basra and another in Kirkuk. Sunni clerics at
Friday prayers accused Maliki of compliance with
Shi'ite militias.
One month ago it seemed
that Maliki's days were numbered and sources in
Baghdad claimed that the United States had given
him a deadline of June 30 to get his act together,
given their great disappointment at how his
Baghdad security plan had failed.
He had
to end the violence, disarm the militias and
reconcile with the Sunnis, or leave office. The
political activity of Allawi, and his visit to
numerous Arab states, highlighted speculation that
he was preparing to replace Maliki and had
promised the Americans to do all of what Maliki
had failed to achieve since coming to power in May
2006. Things then started to change in Baghdad.
There is increasing fear that an Iraq
without Maliki at this stage would spell more
danger for the region as a whole, and more
sectarian violence in Baghdad. In as much as the
Americans want to "punish" Maliki for failing to
curb sectarian violence, they also need Maliki to
prevent the repetition of the same kind of
violence if there is ever a cabinet change in
Baghdad.
The argument now seems: having
him, with all his shortcomings, is better than
dealing with the unknown if he leaves office.
Maliki's reconciliation with the Kurds, his stance
on Kirkuk, the support of Talabani (who has
President George W Bush's ear), and fear from the
unknown under Allawi have seemingly sent the June
30 deadline into history. David Satterfield, the
assistant secretary of state for Iraq, was quoted
in Al-Hayat on June 10 as saying that Washington
had complete faith in Maliki.
That brings
all talk about a near post-Maliki Iraq to a halt,
and automatically, heightens fears on what the
future of Kirkuk might be, given Maliki's stance
on the Kurdish affair, his support for the
referendum and his rapprochement with Talabani.
Satterfield's words turn a new chapter in "the
struggle for Kirkuk" - a chapter that if carried
out as planned spells trouble and violence for
Iraq and the entire region.
Sami
Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd.
All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
