Page 2 of 2 The Iranian bomb in a MAD
world By Dilip Hiro
axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world," Bush
said. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction,
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger."
Bush had already reversed the Bill Clinton
administration's policy of engagement (launched in
conjunction with the South Korean government) on
the issue of the North Korean nuclear program and
had overseen the virtual termination of the 1994
agreement to supply North Korea with two
light-water nuclear reactors at the
cost
of US$4.6 billion in return for a nuclear freeze.
North Korea retaliated by expelling IAEA
inspectors and withdrawing from the NPT in 2003 -
the year the Bush administration launched its
invasion of Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein's
regime, claiming it had an ongoing nuclear-weapons
program that endangered the United States. (It
didn't.)
Kim Jong-il then accelerated his
country's nuclear program, testing a device last
October. By so doing, he strengthened his hand to
ensure the survival of his regime. Thus did
another minor state in search of survival
insurance join the nuclear club.
Iran
plays the nuclear card With Saddam's
regime destroyed and North Korea armed and
dangerous, Iran was the member of that "axis" left
exposed to the prospect of regime change. Partly
to avoid Saddam's fate, Iranian leaders signed the
IAEA's Additional Protocol in October 2003, giving
the watchdog body authority to conduct constant
on-site inspections. A series of reports by the
agency followed.
In essence what these
said was: while the IAEA inspectors had not found
evidence proving that Iran was pursuing a
nuclear-weapons program, they could not give it a
clean bill of health either because Iran had not
answered all questions satisfactorily. In the
words of an IAEA official in Vienna, "The facts
don't support an innocent or guilty verdict at
this point."
The starting point in the
nuclear-fuel cycle is the enrichment of uranium,
which is allowed under the NPT. A low figure of 5%
enrichment makes uranium suitable for generating
electricity; at the high end, 90% is needed to
produce a nuclear weapon. The same machine - a
centrifuge - yields results at both ends of the
spectrum.
From the Iranian leaders'
viewpoint, surrendering their right to enrich
uranium, as demanded by the Bush administration
and its allies, means giving up the path to a
nuclear weapon in the future. Yet the history of
the past half-century indicates that the only
effective way to deter Washington from
overthrowing their regime is by developing - or at
least threatening to develop - nuclear weaponry.
Little wonder that they consider giving up the
right to enrich uranium tantamount to giving up
the right to protect their regime. (Anyone even
suggesting that the US give up this right would be
laughed off the premises. Indeed, the Bush
administration continues to update and upgrade its
vast nuclear arsenal, attempting, for instance, to
develop bunker-busting atomic weapons for possible
future use against Iran's nuclear facilities.)
If the US were to give Iran cast-iron
guarantees of non-aggression as well as of
non-interference in its domestic affairs - just as
North Korea, armed with atomic bombs, is demanding
- that would undoubtedly reassure Iran's leaders
and form a real basis for resolving the problem of
that country's nuclear activities.
After
receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2005,
IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said:
Part of the negotiations should be
providing Iran with security assurances. I hope
... that the United States at a certain point
will become more engaged. We look at the United
States to do the heavy lifting in the area of
security.
Now, ElBaradei is once more
offering pragmatic advice. He has proposed that
the US and its allies should consider allowing
Iran limited enrichment rights within its own
boundaries. He argues that, since the Iranians
have already successfully enriched uranium, the
Security Council's demand that it stop doing so
has become redundant. Instead, the world body
should focus on seeing that Iran conducts its
enrichment activities under IAEA supervision and
that, unlike North Korea, it does not withdraw
from the NPT.
As it is, US credibility in
Tehran is low. On the eve of the January 1981
release of the hostages taken at the US Embassy in
November 1979, the United States agreed in the
Algiers Accord not to interfere in Iran's internal
affairs. In December 1995, however, it began
violating that agreement when, after the passage
of a directive by Congress sanctioning $18 million
for a covert action program against Iran, the
Clinton White House announced that the sum would
be spent to cultivate new enemies of the Islamic
regime.
Since then that annual sum has
risen to $75 million, and the Bush White House has
launched a series of covert operations to
undermine the Iranian regime, dispatched
aircraft-carrier strike forces through the Strait
of Hormuz in classic gunboat-diplomacy fashion,
and had Vice President Dick Cheney issue a series
of warnings to Iran from the deck of the USS John
C Stennis, floating barely 150 miles off the
Iranian coast.
The Iranian response,
despite public denials, has been to play the
single card that history has stamped "effective"
since 1949 - raising the specter of a
nuclear-armed Iran. It is a classic act of
self-defense guaranteed to spread nuclear arms to
other countries in a MAD world where Catch-22 is
the nuclear rule of the day.
Dilip
Hiro is the author of many books on the Middle
East, including The Iranian Labyrinth
(Nation Books). His latest book is Blood of
the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing
Oil Resources (Nation Books).
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
