Page 2 of 3 Shi'ite power bloc in Iraq
takes shape By Babak Rahimi
made in connection with the rise of
sectarian tensions unleashed after the bombing of
the Shi'ite al-Askari Shrine in Samarra in
February 2006. With the absence of a strong
centralized government in Baghdad, Sistani
considered Muqtada's militia as a major force to
protect the Shi'ite community and its sacred
shrines against Sunni extremist attacks.
He even used Muqtada to negotiate with the
Sunni clerics about the looming problem of
sectarian violence. After a major meeting
in March 2006, Sistani
dispatched Muqtada to discuss the escalation of
Sunni-Shi'ite tensions with a number of Sunni
clerics at the Azamiyah Mosque in Baghdad. [10] At
this stage, Sistani appeared to have gained
considerable influence over Muqtada, while his
Mehdi Army was gradually breaking into subgroups,
challenging their former leader for his
compromising stance toward the Sunnis and the
Americans - perhaps partly because of Sistani's
influence.
In an important meeting in
early January this year, Sistani persuaded Muqtada
to end his boycott of the UIA and return to
Parliament. [11] Muqtada agreed, and his followers
returned to Parliament later that month. In
another major meeting in mid-February, Muqtada
sought the counsel of Sistani about attacks and
death threats he was receiving from his own
militia. [12] Following Sistani's advice, Muqtada
reportedly left Iraq for Iran and is now staying
at the house of his cousin Jafar al-Sadr in Qom.
[13] This final meeting highlights the growing
dependence of Muqtada on Sistani's religious and
intellectual authority, which has considerably
increased since the toppling of Saddam's regime.
For now, Sistani appears to have tamed Muqtada,
especially by helping him in becoming a major
figure to advance an anti-sectarian platform.
Muqtada and Sistani share the common
interest of protecting the Shi'ite community
against the ongoing sectarian war and,
simultaneously, promote a unified Iraq governed by
a centralized government in Baghdad. In this
sense, the two are against a federalist system of
government, particularly the sectarian-provincial
model of federalism advocated by Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim.
This common objective has
brought them closer together, while facing
opposition from pro-federal factions, such as the
Iranian-backed SCIRI, which continue to push a
sectarian agenda in the revised version of the
constitution expected to be proposed by the
constitutional committee in mid-May.
Here
the role of Iran in the making of such an alliance
should not be ignored. Although Muqtada and
Sistani do not want Iranian influence in Iraq,
they also realize that Tehran cannot simply be
ignored. Both clerics recognize that Shi'ite
empowerment in Iraq can only be ensured by Iranian
support, and challenging Tehran could only lead to
the consolidation of Sunni power, with the backing
of the US, in Iraq and the region.
Given
the fact that the financial center of his
religious network is based in the Iranian city of
Qom, Sistani has been careful not to upset the
Iranian authorities. He refuses to challenge the
authority of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, despite their
differences in theological outlooks. For instance,
Sistani has so far declined to declare a
fatwa on the production of a nuclear bomb,
since he wants to avoid a confrontation with
Tehran. [14] Sistani has also criticized the
student reformist movement in Iran for its
disregard of Iranian national interests and warned
the students against foreign influences. [15]
He has even praised Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad for his travels to local
regions in Iran and getting involved in the daily
problems of his constituency; he has urged Iraqi
officials to follow in Ahmadinejad's footsteps in
Iraq. [16] Like Muqtada, Sistani considers the
backing of Iran as something necessary in a period
of foreign aggression (ie, by Israel and the US)
and increasing anti-Shi'ite currents in the Sunni
world.
Iran, too, recognizes the influence
of the Najaf Hawza and the Sadrists in Iraq, and
continues to ride the rising tide of the Shi'ite
revival. Tehran knows that Muqtada and Sistani can
play a major role in advancing Iran's interest in
Iraq and the region in case the US decides to
attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
Implications of Muqtada-Sistani
ties The changing relationship between
Muqtada and Sistani signals a dramatic shift in
the political landscape of the Shi'ite Iraqi
community since the fall of the Ba'athist regime
in 2003. While new conflicts have emerged between
Shi'ite groups, especially between the opposition
groups that left the country (Da'wa and SCIRI) and
those that stayed in Iraq under Saddam's reign
(Sadrists), old adversaries are now becoming new
partners as a result of the sectarian conflict
engulfing the country.
Two main
implications are involved. First, despite
theological and ideological differences between
Shi'ite groups and leaders, sectarian identity is
playing a major role in the shaping of future
alliances and conflicts in Iraq. It is an
undeniable truth that with the rise of Salafi
Sunni attacks against Shi'ites, rivalry among
Shi'ite groups subsides, and loose alliances are
formed to protect the community.
Yet while
creating such alliances, each rival group also
prepares to protect its own particular economic
and political interests in various localities
throughout Baghdad and southern Iraq. [17] In
short, Shi'ite relations in Iraq should be
considered both political and sectarian.
Theological and ideological differences play an
important role, but not a prominent one, as
Muqtada-Sistani relations best demonstrate.
Such a dramatic shift, however, also
underlines the unpredictable political situation
in the country, signaling certain unforeseen
challenges that may arise in the years to come. In
this sense, it is hardly an overstatement to claim
that with the death of Sistani, who is 76, new
unforeseen problems will likely emerge in the form
of competition among leading Shi'ite groups to
control the Shi'ite community.
Since the
grand ayatollah has not yet appointed a successor
according to the traditional clerical succession
process, it remains unclear what sort of political
vacuum his death could create. Nevertheless, a
political vacuum will certainly be created. No
other cleric in the post-Ba'athist era has had so
much authority in Iraq, and it is very likely that
his absence will be deeply felt.
The
leading candidate to replace Sistani is the
Afghan-born, Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Muhammad
Ishaq al-Fayadh. He is an old seminary friend of
Sistani since the 1950s and a staunch ally since
1992. Ayatollah al-Khoei, the mentor of Sistani,
reportedly
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