Page 3 of
3 Sleeping with the
enemy Interview with Fareed
Sabri By Mahan Abedin
even
lead to the breakup of Iraq. We want Maliki to
succeed. However, if he fails there is no
alternative but to start from scratch.
MA: Going back to the "surge",
what political developments need to complement the
military and security dimensions of this plan?
FS: First of all, the
government needs to pursue national
reconciliation. When Maliki assumed the
premiership in May
2006, he promised national
reconciliation, but this has not happened. Besides
targeting the terrorists, the government needs to
dismantle the militias. National reconciliation is
meaningless without effective action against the
militias, which are the primary source of
instability in Iraq. At first Maliki was reluctant
to confront the militias and their leaders, but as
I said earlier, there are signs that he is
changing his position.
Second, the Iraqi
government needs to demonstrate respect for human
rights. This requires overhauling much of the
security forces that have been built in the past
four years. The widespread abuses of these
security forces have led to an unprecedented
refugee crisis. Millions of Iraqis have either
fled abroad or are displaced internally. This is a
grave national tragedy and if left unchecked, it
will deteriorate into a regional catastrophe with
serious consequences for Iraq's neighbors.
MA: Much of this will be
difficult - if not impossible - to achieve without
curbing the powers of Muqtada al-Sadr. Do you want
to see Sadr and his followers marginalized?
FS: We don't want to
marginalize any political party, but we want to
eradicate the terrorist and military wings of
political parties. The Iraqi government must have
sole monopoly over the use of force in the
country. This is a basic demand. Without this,
peace and security will not be restored to Iraq.
MA: What about the Iraqi
resistance; are they really willing to seek
accommodation with Maliki?
FS: This depends on the
performance of Maliki and his government. If the
government follows through with its promises and
reaches out to all the communities in Iraq, then
the resistance would be willing to sit down and
reach a comprehensive deal.
MA: Will this not be
interpreted as some kind of victory by the
Americans?
FS: The Americans
cannot claim final victory in Iraq. They have
destroyed Iraq and their intervention is seen as a
catastrophic failure by people all over the world.
I just can't see how the Americans can walk away
from all this with their heads held up high.
MA: Finally, does federalism
spell trouble for Iraq?
FS:
It depends on what type of federal system is
developed. If it is a loose federal system which
grants considerable powers to the regions, then
yes, this would spell serious trouble for Iraq. We
have enough divisions to contend with already! But
if it is a more Baghdad-centric federal system,
then it might in fact promote Iraqi unity.
MA: It is interesting you
say this, because your party was originally
decidedly against any form of federalism. You have
clearly changed your position.
FS: As I said earlier, we
have had to make compromises in occupied Iraq. The
Kurds and some of the Shi'as were telling us that
without federalism they would engineer the breakup
of the country. Faced with such a horrible
scenario, what else could we do?
MA: So you are committed to
a federal Iraq?
FS: As long
as the fundamental features of the Iraqi
nation-state, including its core identity, the
official language and the national flag, remain
the same, then we do not have a problem with a
strong - as opposed to a loose and
periphery-centric - federal state. By a strong
federal state I mean that the central government
should - at the very least - have full control
over foreign policy and have complete control over
the military and security forces.
MA: But let me give you two
examples of the kind of developments we can expect
if Iraq evolves into a federal state, its precise
features notwithstanding. Take the recent oil law
and the referendum on the future of Kirkuk, which
is scheduled for this year. Aren't both
developments detrimental to Iraqi unity?
FS: Yes, you are right. We
are telling everybody concerned that decisions
which affect our national future need to be
deferred to a later date. At this moment ethnic
and sectarian passions are running high and it is
not a suitable time to draw up plans that so
fundamentally affect the future of Iraq.
MA: Some of my Iraqi sources
are telling me that it would be better for all
concerned if the Americans withdraw from Iraq
immediately. They say this might lead to a short
civil war but the situation would return to normal
after a few weeks. Do you think this is plausible?
Is the IIP against the sudden and immediate
withdrawal of all coalition forces?
FS: According to information
from an official Iraqi government source, the
Iraqi army and security forces control only 30% of
Iraq. If the foreign forces withdraw, the
terrorists and militias will undoubtedly exploit
the vacuum that would automatically follow. It is
neither practical nor realistic for the foreign
forces to leave immediately - they need to prepare
their withdrawal months beforehand.
The
occupation is responsible for the destruction of
our national infrastructure and they have the
moral responsibility to repair the damage and
prevent Iraq from disintegrating. It is not only
the Iraqi Islamic Party that is against an
immediate withdrawal but the Da'wa Party, SCIRI
[Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq] and the Kurds are all united in calling on
the Americans to at least stabilize the security
situation before departing.
(This article
first appeared in SaudiDebate.com. Published with
permission.)
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