Page 2 of 2 Iran steeled over US pressure
tactics By Farideh Farhi
that the
Iranian leadership, like every other leadership,
may not change course unless there is "lots" of
pressure. But the change of course taken under
intense pressure may not necessarily be what the
US hopes, unless provocation and war are really
what the US is seeking in its new policy.
Contemporary Iran is very different from
both 1953 and 1988. To be sure, Iran's political
environment continues to be highly contentious and
fractured. But this political environment is a
source of strength rather
than weakness, allowing for a wide range of input
in the decision-making process. This is why the
potential for enhanced economic and political
pressure on Iran has intensified already existing
internal debates about the unyielding rhetorical
stance Ahmadinejad has taken and his economic
mismanagement and inflationary policies during
difficult times.
Recent debates show that
for a broad spectrum of significant players and
forces in Iran, the appeal of a negotiated
settlement on the nuclear issue rests on the
desire for improved economic conditions.
But this desire can only be sustained if
the Iranian leadership thinks that negotiations
and compromise on the nuclear issue will indeed
lead to a breakthrough in relations with the
United States and on the abandoning of its policy
of weakening the Iranian regime.
Without
such an incentive, the hardliners in Iran will be
able to run the show based on the argument that no
matter how many concessions are given, US
hostility will not end. Slower economic growth is
the price the Iranian hardliners, and ultimately
other significant players as well, are willing to
pay in exchange for domestic control, especially
since economic and financial sanctions that
exclude oil trade cannot bring the Iranian economy
to a halt.
Hardliners are able to win the
domestic debate on this issue so long as the US
remains insistent on negotiations with
preconditions. Nothing short of a "patron-client"
relationship will satisfy the US administration,
they argue. Given the administration's insistence
on preconditions that it knows none of the players
in Iran can and will accept, those in favor of
improved relations with the US can do little to
undermine the argument made by the hardliners.
The opponents of Ahmadinejad's hardline
policies and rhetoric, such as former presidents
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami,
can and have invoked Iran's international
predicament to fortify their criticism of a
political foe. At the same time, they have shown
no hesitation at all in closing ranks behind the
hardline position if they perceive the Islamic
Republic or its vital interests to be at stake.
Ultimately, while there is quite a bit of
disagreement and public debate in Iran about how
to fend off US hostility, there is no evidence of
a real rift within the regime on policy toward
Iraq, on the right to domestic uranium enrichment,
or on the aspiration to play a broader regional
role.
As such, the inflexible stance taken
by the Bush administration on the
uranium-enrichment issue, which precludes a
concession, even a symbolic one, in return for
enrichment suspension, will have little success in
altering Iran's underlying stance. It is seen as
yet another example of the attempt to weaken the
Iranian regime and not as a meaningful incentive
to compromise or a realistic path toward improved
relations.
This is while on issues
critical to US interests and regional stability,
Tehran continues to hold strong cards, the least
of which is the ability just to continue what it
has been doing for nearly three decades, carry on
while limping economically but carry on unless it
is attacked through a land invasion.
If
the Bush administration's charges against Iran are
taken seriously, the Iranian hardline leadership
can also up the ante in Iraq, increasing the
likelihood of retaliation by Iran, whether
directly or through its allies. Such a policy will
surely harm Iran, but will do the same to US
interests and further inflame the whole region.
Of course, there is the greater danger of
direct military confrontation. Most US officials,
Cheney excepted, maintain that they have no
intention of provoking one. Rather, in the face of
Iranian overconfidence, they argue, the US is
building strength in anticipation of a
negotiation.
But in the absence of real
diplomatic engagement, and with both sides playing
an open-ended game, the effort to weaken the
Iranian hand will be exceedingly difficult to
calibrate or control. The risks of accidental war
are real and frightening unless the recent
announcements regarding the possibility of
negotiations with Iran represent a turnaround
reflective of a genuine desire to avert direct
confrontation and further inflaming of an already
destabilized region.
Farideh
Farhi is an independent researcher and adjunct
professor of political science at the University
of Hawaii at Manoa.
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