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3 The surge: Don't hold your
breath By Mahan Abedin
building did not have official
diplomatic immunity. Not surprisingly, the Iraqi
government agrees with the Iranians. The incident
raised Iranian-US tensions to new levels, sparking
fears that the Iranian-US cold war could
degenerate into a shooting war at any moment.
Moreover, it prompted senior figures from the
Shi'ite bloc, including the influential power
broker Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, to express strong
words against the US action - unprecedented in
the
past four years.
But the tough anti-Iran
rhetoric and the latest incidents should not be
taken as proof that the Americans are ready for a
decisive confrontation. Such a confrontation would
bring the US into direct conflict with powerful
men like Hakim, whose continued support is vital
if the US is not going to be completely bloodied
in Iraq. Moreover, the structures and
personalities that drive Iranian influence are too
widespread and camouflaged to be effectively
targeted, at least in the short term. Some of that
influence is deeply embedded inside the Green
Zone, the nerve center of the Anglo-American
occupation.
It is unlikely that the bulk
of the US military in Iraq is happy with the
aggressive anti-Iran rhetoric. This author has
spoken to several American military intelligence
officers in Baghdad over the past three years. The
consensus among them is that while Iran is engaged
in some anti-US activities in Iraq (including the
supply of sophisticated improvised explosive
devices to insurgent groups), the level of Iranian
activity is dramatically obscured by the sheer
scale of insurgent activity. From the perspective
of these American military intelligence officers,
pursuing Iranian networks in Iraq would be a
wasteful use of resources that could be targeted
at more determined and formidable enemies.
It seems likely that the anti-Iran
rhetoric is designed to resonate with Sunni
opinion in Iraq and the ruling elites in the wider
Arab world, where concerns about Iranian influence
have risen sharply. This coincides with the wooing
of some Islamist elements within Iraq's Sunni
community by the Americans. The Americans have
also encouraged the Turks to allow Sunni-dominated
conferences in Istanbul. One conference held on
December 13-14 in Istanbul featured a vitriolic
attack on Iraq's Shi'ites by Adnan Dulaimi, the
head of the Iraqi Accord Front and a
self-appointed guardian of Sunni Islam in Iraq.
[1]
US has few choices These
new tactics notwithstanding, it is unlikely that
the US can reverse the fundamentals of its policy
in Iraq so late in the day. The US-led occupation
of Iraq has been structurally and psychologically
tied to elements of Iraq's new Shi'ite elites, and
any serious effort to undercut this nexus risks
unsettling the entire US infrastructure in Iraq.
It is not that the United States does not
appreciate the benefits of a more balanced
approach, it is just that the US machine in Iraq
simply can't adapt to such a change at this late
hour.
In light of this, the "new" US
strategy loses much of its novelty.
While
there may be intensive operations against the
Mehdi Army in the early stages - with US and Iraqi
forces recently announcing 52 operations against
the JM in the past six weeks - much of the new
17,500-strong force in Baghdad will likely spend
most of its time battling well-entrenched Sunni
guerrillas in Azamiyah and other Sunni areas. The
Maliki government and the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi
security forces have a vital incentive to
manipulate US military strategy at this critical
time, especially when the US military lacks the
adequate safeguards and oversight to elude such
manipulation.
It remains to be seen
whether the "surge" in forces, and the alleged new
strategy behind it, can yield results. Given that
this is likely to be the last big US push in Iraq,
the determination of American politicians and
military commanders should not be underestimated.
But the configuration of US infrastructure in Iraq
and the dynamics that determine its relationship
with the new Iraqi elites would suggest that the
"new" strategy is doomed from the outset. In fact,
it could exacerbate the sectarian divide by the
summer and make a horrendous bloodletting in
Baghdad - once the Americans begin to depart the
arena - that much more inevitable.
As for
countering Iranian influence, the US surge in
Baghdad may in fact contribute to its growth by
drawing the rebellious Shi'ites (as opposed to the
elites in the Green Zone) closer to the Islamic
Republic. While important sections of Iraq's
Shi'ite community were deeply wary of Iran at the
outset of the invasion four years ago, their
attitudes have steadily changed to the point where
pro-Iranian sentiment in Shi'ite Iraq is pervasive
and near-hegemonic. This will likely subside as
the sectarian conflict eases in the long term, but
for the foreseeable future it seems that the
longer the Americans stay in Iraq the deeper
Iranian influence becomes.
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