Page 2 of 3 The surge: Don't hold your
breath By Mahan Abedin
vaguely and is
a favorite of the enemies of Muqtada al-Sadr.
Certainly there are dozens of what could be termed
"militia" in the south of Iraq. They are often
composed of small groups of armed men who are
usually (but not always) connected to
self-important and eccentric minor Shi'ite
clerics.
Arguably the best example is the
small militia of minor cleric Mahmud al-Hassani,
who is based in Karbala. Hassani used to be
affiliated with the Sadrist
movement but broke away some time ago probably on
account of the movement's close ties to Iran.
Hassani's followers even staged violent
demonstrations outside Iranian-owned buildings in
Karbala and Basra last year.
The militias
could not operate without the agreement (and in
some cases the protection) of the Sadr movement.
In this respect they may be regarded as components
of the movement itself. However, contrary to
Western and Arab media reporting, they neither are
involved in sectarian violence nor pose a serious
challenge to the multinational forces. They are
primarily expressions of the power and prestige of
religious mentors and act as bodyguards in an
increasingly volatile security climate.
Of
course, the Sadr movement is accused of fielding
the biggest militia of all, the so-called Jaish
al-Mahdi (JM or Mehdi Army). But supporters of the
movement are adamant that the Mehdi Army is an
intrinsic feature of the movement itself and does
not constitute the armed wing of the Sadrist
tendency. This is - at best - a half-truth.
While it is true that the primary function
of the JM is to assist the charitable, educational
and other socio-economic activities of the Sadrist
movement, it is equally true that it has
skillfully used these structures as a front to
conduct less benevolent activities. While there is
no conclusive evidence implicating the core of the
JM in the relentless sectarian violence in
Baghdad, it is clear that either rogue elements in
the movement or people recruited by them are
involved with death squads.
The Mehdi Army
cannot be considered a militia, since it is
effortlessly intertwined with the Sadr movement as
a whole. For instance, members of the Iraqi
Parliament and even ministers in the government
have close ties to the JM. If the JM is a militia,
then the Sadrist movement as a whole must be
considered an armed force.
The notion that
the US can effectively tackle the JM is seriously
foolish. The Americans tried to deal the JM and
Muqtada al-Sadr a grievous blow in 2004 but
failed. The JM - although lacking in discipline
and training - managed to hold its own against the
might of the US military in two prolonged
engagements (mostly centering on Najaf) in April
and August of that year.
Today, the JM is
much stronger, with far better discipline,
equipment and training. Any major engagements are
likely to inflict substantial casualties on US
forces, possibly even dwarfing the damage
inflicted by the Sunni guerrilla movement. The
only piece of good news is that the Sadrist
movement seems less than keen on a major
confrontation with the US military.
Last
week Sheikh Abdul-Javad al-Essawi, a prominent
figure from the Sadrist movement in Wasit
province, insisted that the Sadrists are assisting
with the disarmament of the militias and urged
Iraqis to cooperate with the security forces
(Al-Sabah al-Jadeed, January 18). Statements like
these - coupled with the movement's recent
declaration that it would rejoin the Shi'ite bloc
in parliament - have raised hopes that major and
bloody confrontations between the JM and the
Americans can be avoided.
The Mehdi Army
can lie low for several months (or however long
the "surge" lasts) and then reassert its control.
In any case it is clear that no US strategy (even
a determined and prolonged all-out assault) can
remove this political and military force from
Iraqi life. The Sadrist movement is the only
broad-based popular movement in the country and
the only force that can still claim to transcend
ethnic and sectarian divisions.
Indeed,
the movement has some support in Kurdistan
(especially among the Shi'ite Kurds, the so-called
Failis) and can still attract the loyalty of some
of Iraq's Sunnis. However, the latter constituency
has eroded in the past 18 months as the sectarian
conflict has widened and deepened.
Tackling Iran? Over the past
four years the US has repeatedly blamed others for
its blunders and failures in Iraq.
Currently, almost all the blame is being
apportioned to Iran on the basis of the Islamic
Republic's deep and allegedly divisive influence.
The aggressive anti-Iran rhetoric has been matched
by aggressive actions against Iranian interests in
Iraq. The first sign of this was the raid on the
compound of Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim late
last month, during which the Americans seized a
number of Iranian diplomats and intelligence
officers.
Then in early January US forces
raided the Iranian Consulate in Irbil, seizing six
Iranians whom they alleged are connected to the
Quds (Jerusalem) division of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps. The Quds Force is
considered to be the external intelligence and
special operations directorate of the Guards. Quds
Force members are known to have operated in
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Iranians claim the
men were diplomats and accuse the Americans of
kidnapping. The Americans maintain that the
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