agenda and see
yourself as part of it - in which case you have to
take whatever repercussions emerge from that,
including perhaps greater escalation in the
domestic level of violence and instability - or
you accept the fact that the United States may
prevail in this confrontation with Iran, in which
case a new a political landscape is drawn for the
Middle East.
But we can't afford to be in
that situation. This is not a Cold War situation,
where an ally like Germany or the UK has to make a
choice. I don't think the
Iraqi government should be forced into that
situation.
Hanging Saddam Hussein NIO: What is your view of the
recent executions of top Ba'ath officials? Will
they aid or detract from reconciliation in your
view?
AA: There's no
question about the degree of the criminality of
these former leaders of Iraq and the way that they
used the most oppressive and violent means to
maintain themselves in power. There's no question
that these people were culpable and were tried -
albeit the environment of the Iraqi special
tribunals was somewhat chaotic. But nevertheless,
these people were convicted, tried mainly fairly,
although chaotically, and found guilty.
The question is whether they should have
been executed given the extent of the sectarian
conflict and heightened sectarian tensions in
Iraq, as well the broader Middle East. My own
estimate is that Saddam should have been tried for
the other crimes for which he was indicted -
including the crimes against the population of the
south, after the failure of the uprising [in 1991]
- so that it becomes clear to all the nature of
the crimes of this regime. And even if the trials
took maybe another year or two or three, it
doesn't matter.
But I think the way that
the executions were handled basically subverted
the purpose of putting Saddam on trial. So the
manner of his death has overwhelmed the litany of
crimes that he had committed and it became his
legacy. People at the height of sectarian violence
remember the way he comported himself in his last
minutes, rather than the decades of oppression and
violence and criminality with which he ruled the
country.
I think, as it were, the cat is
out of the bag now. Having executed Saddam in this
way for the first set of the offenses for which he
was convicted, it's very difficult, I think, to
stop the execution bandwagon - which will increase
tensions, I'm afraid.
NIO:
And why do you think he was not tried for those
other crimes?
AA: Well,
there are a number of reasons, I think. One of
them was the fear on the part of senior Iraqi
ministers that the United States might spring him.
I don't mean spring him and set him free, but
maybe take him outside of the country. There was a
fear about that.
The second reason, I
think - I would call these negative reasons - is
that the government wanted to appear to be strong
and decisive. On the positive side, you can say
that they had met what they thought were the legal
requirements for the execution, therefore it was
something pro forma - although I don't pay
much credence to that because this is not a pro
forma trial, neither is it your usual
criminal.
But I think it has to do with
the first two reasons, that fear that he may, one
way or another, be taken out of the country as
part of some deal that the United States may have
struck with other countries in the area and the
desire to appear decisive and strong.
Cornering the Mehdi Army NIO: You have discussed in the past
a strategy that involves accommodating the groups
that have de facto power in Iraq, such as the
Mehdi Army [of Muqtada al-Sadr], while also
limiting their demands and claims. How can this be
achieved, and do you believe that Washington would
give and sustain support for such an outreach,
given the expected criticisms that Baghdad, with
US support, would be coddling the so-called "bad
guys"?
AA: Well, the Mehdi
Army is part of a movement. It's true, parts of it
are undisciplined, parts of it have turned to
criminality, but they form part of a political
movement that has very strong street support.
Under normal conditions I would say these people
account for up to 70% of the Shi'ite street, as it
were. We're talking about 6 [million], 7 million
people whose political representation takes on
various forms. Politically, they're part of the
Sadrist movement, in terms of militias, various
elements of the Mehdi Army.
Now you can't
really confront the Mehdi Army without taking on
the entire panoply of the Shi'ite groups, or the
large lower-class elements of the Shi'ites that
support this movement. It's a mass movement. So
you can't just excise parts of it and assume that
the others will just fall in line. They may not do
so. I think it's a very shortsighted strategy just
to take on the external manifestations of the
Sadrist movement without trying to accommodate it
one way or another in a political process.
NIO: And you think it is
possible to accommodate but also limit their
demands at the same time?
AA: I can't say they have a
coherent political program. They don't. They are a
large group of people who have borne the brunt of
the deprivations of the Saddam regime in the
1990s. Very little attention was paid to them
politically prior to the overthrow of the regime,
and even the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority]
I know had nothing but contempt for them.
Still, these people are trying to create a
presence for themselves politically. In regards to
whether they are by and large supportive of the
invasion - well, they're not. But they have to be
represented
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