Page 2 of
2 Odd
bedfellows: Bush woos Shi'ite leader
By Sami Moubayed
minister from SCIRI with Jawad al-Boulani,
who is more acceptable to Sunni notables.
The US diplomat has also favored dialogue
with insurgents, and pushed for an amnesty to set
free Iraqi Sunnis who had carried arms against the
Americans since 2003. Khalizad, and those who
favor reconciliation with the Sunnis, argue that
this would leave Sunni military power unchecked
and cost the Americans more
casualties in 2007. It would
even lead to a new Sunni boycott of the Maliki
cabinet, and get Sunni notables to call on their
military groups to fight both the Americans and
the Shi'ites, adding fuel to the already raging
civil war.
It is also unwise in that it
would give an impression that the US is taking
sides in a purely domestic sectarian conflict. The
decision to abandon the Sunnis would certainly be
frowned on by America's allies in the Arab world,
mainly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait.
Sensing the outcry caused by the "80% solution",
State Department spokesman Tom Casey refused to
comment on it.
Bush's national security
adviser, Stephen J Hadley, told reporters on board
Air Force One that there was no immediate U-turn
in the US policy on Iraq, adding: "There is a real
sense of urgency, but there is not a sense of
panic." Then comes Abdul Aziz al-Hakim to
Washington, making headlines by asking the US to
extend its troops stay in Iraq.
Why the
Iran-backed Hakim? One reason is that he is one of
the strongest politicians in Iraq today, equaled
only by Muqtada al-Sadr. His visit to Washington
comes days after Muqtada distanced himself from
Maliki because the Iraqi leader had met with Bush
in Amman, Jordan. Muqtada, who commands a large
group in Parliament as well, suspended his
followers' membership in the Iraqi Parliament and
the Maliki cabinet.
If this gap is not
filled immediately, it could cause serious
embarrassment to Nuri al-Maliki. Hakim hurried to
fill it by praising and supporting the Maliki
cabinet, after it had lost Muqtada's endorsement.
Hakim, after all, is powerful and influential
among the affluent in the Shi'ite community.
Although Muqtada is king in the slums and among
the poor, he has no connections to rich and
powerful Shi'ites. Hakim does, through his family
history and through the money of Iran.
True, Maliki might have lost the support
of the poor with the walk-away of Muqtada, but he
still commands support of the rich, thanks to
Hakim. The latter's Iran-backed SCIRI holds the
largest number of seats in the National Assembly.
Hakim is the only leader who manages to keep a
delicate balance between the Iranians and
Americans, appearing to be an ally and friend of
both. For long he and his party were based in
Tehran, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), for
their opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein.
At the time, Saddam's regime was backed by
the United States because it was combating and
weakening the Iranians. Not only were he and his
men on the Iranian payroll, but Hakim made sure
that thousands of well-trained Iraqis from SCIRI's
Badr Brigade, which he commanded, joined the
Iranian army in its war against Saddam. To send
off young Iraqi men to fight other Iraqi men meant
nothing to Hakim, since to him, Shi'ite loyalties
to Iran were (and still are) stronger than
patriotic affiliations to Baghdad.
He
returned to Iraq after the downfall of Saddam's
regime, having changed his rhetoric into becoming
pro-American. Hakim became a member of the
US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council and even
served as its president until December 2003. He
had become the commander of SCIRI after its
original leader, his brother Mohammad Baqir
al-Hakim, was assassinated in Najaf in August
2003.
His arrival in Washington has
overlapping and sometimes conflicting layers to
it, all of which are linked directly to Iran.
First, this is a final coordinated effort
to destroy - or at least curb - the rising power
of Muqtada al-Sadr. Many doubted that Maliki would
actually dare to meet with Bush, and face the
wrath of Muqtada, who threatened to walk away from
the Maliki regime if the premier met the US
president in Jordan. By going ahead with the
meeting anyway, Maliki was clearly feeling strong
enough to take such a bold action, and alienate
his loudest supporters in the Shi'ite community.
It was almost as if Maliki wanted Muqtada
to walk away. Muqtada, who helped bring Maliki to
power this year, has become an embarrassment to
the Baghdad government. Though powerful, he
remains a political amateur, however, and does not
know how to pull the right strings in conduct with
the Americans or different factions of Iraqi
politics. He is at odds with the Sunnis, the
Kurds, the Americans, the Iranians and, more
recently, large segments of Iraqi Shi'ites, mainly
SCIRI and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, whose family
competes with that of Muqtada for leadership in
Shi'ite Iraq. Muqtada's Mehdi Army has
threatened his opponents once too often and many
would like to see it eliminated. Hakim's Badr
Corps can do the job, if given cover by the US and
Maliki. Rather than have two powerful Shi'ite
militias, one would be enough, and this one would
be friendly toward the United States. Muqtada's
men have been accused recently of storming the
Sunni-led Ministry of Higher Education and
kidnapping civilians.
Most of the
sectarian violence recently has been blamed on the
young Shi'ite leader. The campaign against him
started last month, when multiple bombs went off
in Sadr City, killing more than 200 of his
followers. Muqtada, appalled by the powerful
attack, spoke to followers and rather than seek
revenge, he called on them to unite and avoid
provocation.
Second, Hakim in Washington
means Iran in Washington. The Americans are now
facing the serious reality that they only have two
solutions to the violence in Iraq. Either they
re-engage with Syria and continue to alienate
Iran, or they re-engage Iran and continue to
alienate Syria. Becoming friends with both is
impossible - for the Americans - and yet remaining
at odds with both is also impossible. Certainly
the Americans would prefer talking to Damascus.
The price for re-engaging Iran in Iraq would be
too high for the Americans to pay, given the
threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of Tehran.
They would rather talk to the Syrians over
the Golan Heights or Lebanon than give such
concessions to the Iranians. The Syrians, however,
can only control the Sunni street of Iraq (and
even then it has to be done with the help of Saudi
Arabia). For now this task seems too difficult,
especially if the Americans pursue the 80%
solution, angering Riyadh and alienating the Iraqi
Sunnis.
This is what prompted Nawaf Obeid,
a security analyst and adviser to the Saudi
government, to write recently in the Washington
Post that if the US left Iraq, "one of the first
consequences will be massive Saudi intervention to
stop Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias from
butchering Iraqi Sunnis". Obeid added, "The Saudi
leadership is preparing to substantially revise
its Iraqi policy. Options now include providing
Sunni military leaders (primarily ex-Ba'athist
members of the former Iraqi officer corps) with
the same type of assistance - funding, arms,
logistical support - that Iran has been giving to
Shi'ite armed groups for years."
This
shows that the Sunni street will not be pacified
simply by the engagement of Syria in Iraqi
affairs. The Americans must find a solution to
Iran to make the efforts of the Syrians work, and
pacify the anger of the Saudis. Rather than ask
the Syrians to talk to the Iranians on their
behalf, the Americans are doing it through Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim.
Whether he looks, acts or
thinks like Khomeini, therefore, is of little
interest to President Bush so long as he can
deliver in Iraq. The US is desperate for
assistance in Baghdad. If Khomeini were alive and
could help the Americans minimize their losses,
then he too probably would be welcome in
Washington, DC.
Sami Moubayed is
a Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright
2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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