Page 2 of 2 The anti-Siniora craze in
Beirut By Sami Moubayed
Lebanese public at large. While the
Israeli atrocities were taking place in Lebanon,
Siniora's patron Saad al-Hariri was roaming the
world, defending his country's stance but
nevertheless infuriating ordinary Lebanese
citizens. He very visibly wanted to stay away from
danger. But if the Lebanese could stand the
Israeli missiles, then so should have Saad
al-Hariri.
Maronite Patriarch Mar
Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir managed to return
in
the midst of war from a trip to Washington. US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice managed to
land in Beirut also as the war was raging. If they
could do it, then Hariri also could have done it.
But he refused to place himself "in the lion's
mouth" and, as a result, this backfired both on
him and on his prime minister, who appeared on
television cameras and wept during the war.
Again, this angered the public, who argued
that as prime minister, Siniora should be stronger
and more resolute. Right after the war, in
disregard for the support Hezbollah has among the
country's masses, the Siniora cabinet demanded
that the party disarm, using the US-backed UN
Resolution 1559 as cover. This infuriated
Hezbollah. Members of the March 14 Coalition,
including Jumblatt, have labeled Nasrallah a
stooge of the Syrians and Iranians, and addressed
him in very insulting rhetoric, which also
contributed to the accumulating hatred in Beirut.
As a firm believer in democracy, prime
minister Sulh would probably have defended the
people's right to demonstrate against - and bring
down - any government that they feel did not
represent them equally or properly. He was, after
all, the co-creator of the National Pact with
president Bshara al-Khury, a gentlemen's agreement
that, among other things, divided power between
the Maronite president of Lebanon and his Sunni
prime minister. Sulh realized, as early as 1943,
that Sunni ambitions in Lebanon cannot be achieved
unless they are allied with, and supported by,
those of Lebanese Christians.
His outreach
to the Christians and his role in creating an
independent "Greater Lebanon" was surprising to
those who knew him early in his political career,
since back in the 1920s, Sulh had opposed the
division of Syria and the creation of Lebanon,
demanding the independence of "Greater Syria" from
control of the French Mandate.
His career
faintly resembles that of General Michel Aoun. A
former loud opponent both of Syria and Hezbollah,
Aoun has now changed course, creating an alliance
with the Shi'ites of Lebanon, much to the
displeasure of many Christians. Aoun realizes,
however, just as Sulh did more than 60 years ago,
that Christian ambitions can no longer be
achieved, or even preserved, without an alliance
with the Shi'ite numerical majority. Aoun has
ambitions of becoming president of Lebanon, and
this can only be achieved through support of
Lebanon's Shi'ites.
Times have changed,
and Aoun knows it. He needs the Shi'ites to become
king just as much as Sulh needed the Maronites.
The Shi'ites are the political heavyweight in
Lebanon today, represented by Hezbollah. They are
strong. They control charities, schools and
hospitals. They are pragmatic. And they are
legitimate in the Lebanese street. Likewise,
Hezbollah realizes that it cannot come out and
overtly control Lebanon because of the sensitive
sectarian balance and the history of its
Christians. To broaden its control, it has to ally
itself to a heavyweight in the Christian community
such as Aoun.
This explains the marriage
of convenience between Aoun and Hezbollah. Siniora
cannot accept Aoun because if brought to power,
Aoun would be a strong Christian president. He
would certainly overpower the Sunnis, who are now
headed by Siniora and Saad al-Hariri. They would
rather have a colorless president like Emille
Lahhoud, whom they hate and accuse of being
illegitimate, than a strong leader like Aoun.
The latest ordeal in Beirut shows just how
strong Aoun really is. One can understand the
standing of Saad al-Hariri, who inherited
leadership from his father Rafik, has plenty of
money to distribute to buy allegiance, and is
backed by a strong power such as Saudi Arabia.
Hezbollah, for example, can command the street
because it also has legitimacy, war medals, and
religious affiliation and is backed by Iran.
Other leaders such as Jumblatt, Karameh,
Franjiyyieh or the slain minister Pierre Gemayel
all come from towering political families in their
communities. Aoun, however, has inherited his
position from nobody. He created it. He has no
state to fund his campaign and yet his popularity
among Christians is very strong. He is seen as
uncorrupted, something agreed to by enemy and ally
alike, and does not believe in confessional
loyalties.
The biggest example of how
strong a leader he really is can be seen in how
his supporters are willing to obey anything he
says. When he was in exile in France and obsessed
with driving the Syrians out of Lebanon, they were
anti-Syrian to the core. When he was pro-American,
they too were pro-American. When he became an ally
of Hezbollah, they too became loyal allies of
Hezbollah. When a leader with such weight commands
them to take to the streets, they obey him. This
is the same for Hassan Nasrallah.
These
two leaders are yet to play a very important role
in Lebanese politics. This role, however, is
frowned upon by the West and Arab countries (with
the exception of Syria) that do not want to oust
Fouad al-Siniora. It is doubtful whether Nasrallah
and Aoun really like each other, but they are
using each other's community and support for
political reasons: Hezbollah to remain armed,
legitimate and alive in Lebanese politics, and
Aoun to become president.
The US fears
that if a post-Siniora cabinet that is controlled
by Hezbollah comes to power, it can legally ask
the UN troops stationed on the Lebanese-Israeli
border to leave. This would plunge UN Resolution
1701 down the drain and might lead to another war
between Hezbollah and Israel. The biggest problem
poised by the UN resolution is that it keeps
Hezbollah away from the battlefield, which is now
controlled by the UN, and it makes reference to
Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament
of Hezbollah. But even if the demonstrations
succeed in bringing Siniora down, constitutionally
his replacement has to be from the March 14
Coalition, because it commands the majority in
parliament.
The only alternative would be
if the demonstrations not only call for Siniora to
step down but also call for early elections to
bring down March 14 as well. After all, the entire
coalition was voted into power in an emotional
outburst after the assassination of Rafik
al-Hariri last year. If elections were repeated,
it would not come out with a majority anymore.
They coalition members have been tried in
government before and, to many, they have failed.
Aoun, who also was elected in an emotional
outburst after returning from his long exile, is
still new and untested in government. He will try
to offer the Lebanese all of what March 14 failed
to deliver, including security, stability and
broad representation of political groups. It is
too early to discuss elections, however, because
for now the objective is only ousting Siniora.
Many feel that the demonstrations will
succeed and Siniora will step down. But the
constitutional requirements will bring a new prime
minister to Lebanon who is also from the March 14
Coalition. He will share more power with Aoun and
Hezbollah, but based on its strong support from
Saudi Arabia, France and the United States, it
will revert to many of the same policies that
characterized the Siniora cabinet.
Paris
and Washington, after all, do not like to be
defeated. Bringing Siniora down would be a
humiliation to the two countries that endorsed
him. They might tolerate it for now to appease the
angry Lebanese street, but they would see that
this "coup" does not last long.
Meanwhile,
the statue of Riyad al-Sulh watches over downtown
Beirut. Will he witness more demonstrations to
topple the post-Siniora cabinet? Or will he
witness counter-demonstrations from the street
controlled by Saad al-Hariri, calling on the
premier to stay in office?
Sulh knew this
country well. He helped craft its current identity
and knew that in a democracy, street politics are
the secret of survival. One day the street is with
Hariri. The next it is with Aoun. On the third, it
might be with Franjiyyieh or Jumblatt or Arslan.
Its wrath is a beautiful price the
Lebanese pay for their democracy.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst.
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