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COMMENTARY
Turnabout for
Turkey
By Ehsan Ahrari
It is a sad day for Turkey when it has to
consider the advice of Samuel Huntington (of
The Clash of Civilizations fame) about
whether it should continue to pursue its
membership in the European Union (EU), or think
about other options. Huntington is an intellectual
whom Muslim intellectuals love to dislike. But he
is also an intellectual who has created a highly
influential, if contentious, framework of analysis
regarding Islam, a framework that remains a
powerful source of reaction and reflection about
Islamic perspectives on the great power struggle
of our time. Thus, the advice to Turkey from the
old Harvard University professor is worth
considering.
On a visit to Turkey this
week, Huntington is reported to have observed,
"Turkey's history, culture, religion and economy
are so different from those of the EU that its
chances of being accepted into the EU are
virtually nonexistent." What should be Turkey's
other option, then? According to Huntington, it
should either lead the Islamic world, or focus on
nationalism. If it opts for the latter, it should
completely forswear the other two options and
focus on its security and development.
Huntington's suggestion for Turkey
deserves close examination. Ankara's near
obsession with becoming a member of the EU might
be an outcome of a deep sense of inferiority that
it has inherited as an integral aspect of the
legacy of Kemalism, the political philosophy of
Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of
modern Turkey. He came to the conclusion in the
early 1920s that his country's backwardness was
related to Islam, especially in its unwillingness
to incorporate the separation of religion and
politics, as if that type of arrangement could
have become a panacea to Turkey's role as the
"sick man of Europe".
In that conclusion,
Ataturk demonstrated complete ignorance of the
great heritage of the Ottoman Empire, which saw
its civilizational peak under the banner of Islam.
Not that the Ottomans were devout Muslims. In
fact, an argument can be made that they used the
title of "caliph" to acquire legitimacy in their
vast Islamic domain. Even in that capacity, the
Ottoman rulers' actual behavior was more like a
traditional sovereign than an actual caliph, whose
role is classically defined as a legitimate leader
of Muslims, whose legitimacy stems from his
complete devotion to the glory of God and Islam.
When the Ottoman Empire began to falter,
the underlying reasons had little to do with
Islam. Rather, it was the empire's inability to
keep up with the ever-changing requirements of
being a great power, which included, first and
foremost, remaining at the cutting edge of the
revolutionary economic and technological changes
of that era. While an island nation like Great
Britain and an equally minor nation like the
Netherlands emerged as great maritime powers and
acquired empires in far-off lands, the Ottoman
Empire was caught napping about the glories of a
bygone era.
But when Ataturk attempted to
understand the reasons underlying the downfall of
the Ottoman Empire, his imagination (or the lack
thereof) became mired in the inability of the
Ottoman rulers to create a distance between
religion and politics, at the expense of other,
more significant, reasons related to the
ignominious fate that was awaiting the remnants of
that empire in the early 1920s. He saw the primacy
of Islam as the chief cause for the backwardness
of the Ottomans, and found his refuge in a new
"religion", the Western notion of secularism.
Turkey has paid a price for that decision
of 1923 - a decision whereby it emerged as a
secular nation-state after the dissolution of the
caliphate - and has yet to be envisaged in the
ranks of Muslim nations as shining example of
success. In reality, it is constantly seeking an
identity - nervously outside the ivory palaces of
European castles, hoping to be admitted as a
European nation, but sometimes glancing anxiously
at the world of Islam to see whether it can play a
major role. European nations are reluctant to
offer it a seat in their midst, for it is regarded
as a Muslim country. The world of Islam considers
it as less relevant, since it has long refused to
become a part of the hullabaloo and turbulence of
their societies regarding the relationship between
God and Caesar, or become involved in the vibrant
debates over the relevance and modalities of an
Islamic government.
Today's Turkey also
suffers from a collective sense of schizophrenia,
whereby a large portion of its populace is devout
Muslim, but the ruling elites have decided to
remain strongly committed to the notion of
secularism. While Turkey's ruling elite envisions
EU membership as a symbol of prestige, and even a
magnificent feat, many Turkish people view it only
as a way of improving their quality of life and
standard of living. According to a study published
in Turkey in 2002, "The Turkish public, living
under economic crisis, sees the EU as a prosperity
project but also as a way to fight against
corruption and to develop democratic life. Ninety
percent of the Turkish public is unhappy with the
functioning of democracy; briefly, EU membership
is also a democracy project."
There is
little-to-no evidence that Turkey as a secular
government has much admiration at the popular
level in any Muslim country. Only Pakistan's
President General Pervez Musharraf is reported to
have shown admiration for Ataturk, but that was
most likely because he spent part of his childhood
in Turkey, while his father served in the
Pakistani Embassy in that country. Right after
ousting Nawaz Sharif as Pakistan's elected leader
in 1999, Musharraf, during a trip to Turkey,
publicly expressed his admiration for Ataturk, and
compared himself with General Kenan Evren, who
overthrew Bulent Ecevit and Suleiman Demirel in a
coup in 1980. Needless to say, the Turkish
military wasn't exactly elated at Musharraf's
reminder to the world of its past role in
sabotaging democracy. Even Musharraf's public
admiration for Ataturk drew loud criticism from
Pakistan's hardline Islamists, who said they would
reject any attempt to temper Islamic rule in their
country.
By mentioning a potential role
for Turkey as a leader of Muslim countries,
Huntington might be implying that Turkey rightly
claims that role on the basis of becoming a
secular democracy. He might not realize that by
remaining a secular state, Turkey is popular or
seen as a source of emulation only in Washington,
or in some European capitals. No Muslim country
has manifested even public curiosity about
following the Turkish example of becoming a
secular state. On the contrary, in the
post-Taliban Afghanistan, the centrality of Islam
is uncontested. By the same token, in the
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, no one dares question
the primacy of Islam. So, one wonders what would
be the basis of Turkey's claim to the potential
leadership of Muslim nations.
In fact,
Huntington's other suggestion is the right one:
Turkey should focus on nationalism, and, along
with it, on security and development. Turkey
emerged as a nation-state from the ashes of the
Ottoman Empire. As a successor state of that great
empire, it nurtures the dream of becoming a great
power again. Even if that dream appears to be
beyond its reach now, Turkey has the examples of
two currently rising powers to follow: China and
India, which have also emerged from conditions of
near abject poverty. Admittedly, those two
countries represent two different civilizations
and religions, and also have radically different
political systems. However, what Turkey shares
with China and India is the aspiration - the dream
- of becoming a great power once again. Ankara has
to study the blueprints of what those countries
have done in the realm of economics and politics
to create a vibrant economy, and how they are
using their respective economic power to bankroll
their fledgling military power. As a democracy,
India would be a better example for Turkey to
emulate; however, in the area of economic
policies, it must pay close attention to China's
developmental blueprint, since China's economic
progress has thus far been more impressive than
India's.
Turkey is most likely to become a
source of emulation for Muslim countries if it
becomes a world-class economic and military power.
In this sense, without exactly saying so,
Huntington might be asking Turkey to concentrate
on becoming a great power once again.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst based in Alexandria, VA, US. His
columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. He
is also a regular contributor to the Global Beat
Syndicate. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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