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A post-Arafat shift
By P R Kumaraswamy
After weeks of anxiety and
uncertainty, India-Israel relations appear back on track.
A spate of political contacts clearly shows
that despite its past criticisms over the
pro-Israeli policies of the previous right-wing
government, India's Congress Party has come to recognize
the need to continue with India's newly
found friendship with Israel. The death of
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in November appeared to
have removed any lingering doubts in New Delhi
over the place of Israel in India's overall Middle
East policy. Having identified with him for so
long, his death has enabled India, especially the
Congress Party, to look at the broader Middle East
without its traditional ties.
The
Congress Party has been traditionally sympathetic
toward the Palestinians and did not normalize
relations with Israel until 1992. The roots of this
policy can be traced to the early 1920s when
Indian nationalists found a common cause with the
Arab nationalists in Palestine and
remained unsympathetic toward Zionist demands for a
Jewish homeland. Its belated recognition in
September 1950 was not followed by normalization
of relations, and for more than four decades the absence
of formal ties was the hallmark of India's policy
toward Israel. During this phase, Indian policy
ranged from indifference to outright hostility
that reached its crescendo in 1975 when it voted
for the infamous United Nations resolution that
equated Zionism with racism.
The end
of the Cold War and the recognition of new
Middle Eastern realities after the Madrid Conference
of 1991 compelled India to re-evaluate its sour
relations. When the Arabs and Israeli leaders were
seeking a negotiated political settlement, there
was no reason for India to continue with its cold
policy, and formal ties were established in
January 1992. After some initial inhibitions,
bilateral relations have improved considerably and
a number of political, economic and military
delegations have visited one another.
The
relations improved significantly
when the right-wing coalition government
led by the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) came to power in 1998. The
party's prolonged sympathy for Israel and its
determination to move away from the pro-Arab stand
of the Congress Party enabled both countries to
forge closer ties. The desire of the BJP and its
partners to seek closer ties with the US provided
another impetus to the pro-Israeli posture. Its
traditional pro-Western and anti-Soviet policy was
also compounded by its subtle but recognizable
nationalist posture that often bordered on
unfriendliness toward Muslims, domestic and
foreign.
Hence, even though it was the
Congress Party that normalized relations with
Israel, under the BJP the relations assumed high
visibility and publicity. Surprisingly, however,
its closer relations with Israel did not undermine
India's larger interests in the Middle East. The
reasons have to be found in the diminishing
importance of the Palestinian factor in inter-Arab
politics.
Moreover, by the time the BJP
came to power some of the initial military
contacts started bearing fruit. With Western
sanctions following New Delhi's nuclear tests in
1998, India found Israel an important and reliable
ally. Before long, Israel became India's
second-largest military supplier after Russia, and
India became the largest market for Israeli arms
exports.
In 2004, the two
sides concluded a US$1.1 billion deal for the
supply of three Phalcon advanced airborne early-warning
systems to India. Considering the US opposition
to Israel supplying similar spy planes to China,
the Indo-Israeli deal was an important
development. Such convergence of interests among the
three countries led to some Indian leaders
openly suggesting a triangular alliance linking India,
Israel and the US. India also sought to benefit
from Israel's expertise in the upgrading of
weapons and systems. Both sides are also
cooperating in counter-terrorism operations and
Israel is supplying India advanced surveillance
and border management systems. They also benefit
from intelligence sharing and periodic meetings of
senior intelligence officials.
The relations reached a climax in September 2003
when India rolled out a red-carpet welcome to Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The visit came
against the background of growing criticism of
Israel because of its handling of the Palestinian
intifada and Sharon's own isolation from the
international community. His visit was greeted by
criticisms and condemnations from the Indian left
and its supporters. However, contrary to initial
skepticism, Sonia Gandhi, the then leader of the
opposition, met the visiting Israeli leader.
Anti-Israeli stands
At the same
time, it is essential to remember that by 2000
bilateral relations had ceased to be controversial in
India and the visit of Jyoti Basu, the communist
chief minister of the Indian state of West Bengal,
in June that year revealed the bipartisan
consensus vis-a-vis Israel. The outbreak of the
al-Aqsa intifada a few months later, however,
signaled a new trend and anti-Israeli rhetoric
returned. Since the outbreak of the intifada in
September 2000, the communist movement has
demanded the recalling of India's ambassador in
Tel Aviv and the expulsion of the Israeli envoy
from India. The muted response of the BJP-led
government to Israel's strong-arm tactics against
the Palestinians often came under condemnation in
India. The anti-Israeli posture adopted by the
Soviets and its allies, especially after the June
war of 1967, provided a larger ideological
platform for them to adopt a sympathetic posture
toward the Palestinians and Arab
radicalism.
The pro-American and
pro-Israeli policy of the previous government
remained an anathema to the Indian left, as well
as a section of the Congress Party. Military
relations, which grew significantly during the
past few years, particularly come under stinging
criticisms.
Indeed, some of the senior
leaders in the present government headed by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh have in the past expressed
reservations over closer ties with Israel. Current
Education Minister Arjun Singh, for example,
expressed reservations when then prime minister
Narasimha Rao decided to establish diplomatic
relations with Israel in 1992. Likewise, Petroleum
Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar was highly critical of
the Oslo Accords and in one of his weekly columns
even depicted Israeli leader Shimon Peres as a
"terrorist".
Above all, the government of
Manmohan Singh depends upon the "outside" support
of communist lawmakers for its survival. As
discussed earlier, for long they have been
vociferously opposed to diplomatic ties with
Israel, especially the military-security
dimension. Even when they were prepared to admit
formal diplomatic ties with the Jewish state, they
consider military ties as an infringement of
Palestinian rights and collaboration in the
anti-Palestinian actions of Israel.
Therefore, in the
weeks following the parliamentary elections last May, there were
concerns that by giving into the dictates of his
communist allies and their supporters within the
party, Manmohan might slow down the phase of
Indo-Israeli relations. The Common Minimum Program
of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
explicitly declared, "Traditional ties with West
Asia will be given a fresh thrust. The UPA
government reiterates India's decades-old
commitment to the cause of the Palestinian people
for a homeland of their own." Indeed, last
September, India's junior foreign minister harshly
criticized Israel after his meeting with the
besieged Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in
Ramallah.
However, despite strong
pressures from his coalition partners, Manmohan is
signaling that India is not planning any drastic
shifts in its Middle East policy. Indeed,
developments in recent weeks indicate that
Indo-Israeli relations are progressing both on the
political as well as military fronts.
Mid-November shift
Ironically, the demise of Arafat not only brought about
long-awaited reconciliation between the Palestinians
and influential Arab countries such as Syria and
Kuwait, but also facilitated the new Indian
government to abandon its hesitation over
continuing with the policies of its predecessor
vis-a-vis Israel.
Arafat's death appears to
have resolved the uncertainty over the sense of direction
of Indian foreign policy and refocused the
primacy of bilateralism in its policy toward Israel.
Within days after Arafat's demise, a senior
delegation from the Israeli Foreign Ministry
was in New Delhi and conducted the first high-level
consultations since Manmohan Singh became prime
minister. This was followed by the meetings of the
Joint Working Groups (JWG) on defense and
counter-terrorism, both of which took place in
Israel in early December.
The same month
also witnessed the visit of Israeli Deputy Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert. Finance Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, who was supposed to have accompanied
Olmert, was held up by a coalition crisis over the
budget.
If the political rapprochement was
not sufficient, toward the end of December, Israel
Military Industries announced that it had secured
a $130 million lucrative defense contract from
India. It is obvious that negotiations were
initiated by the BJP-led government and perhaps it
is likely that the December meeting of the JWG on
defense would have discussed similar ventures.
One could argue that the annual meetings
of the JWG and consultations were routine and
should not be seen as substantial movements.
However, given the uncertainty surrounding the
bilateral relations since the resounding defeat of
the pro-Israeli BJP government, such "routine"
meetings do signal a clear message.
The
gradual decline in the Israeli-Palestinian
violence, high expectations after the
Palestinian elections in January and the desire of
the new Palestinian leadership to mend fences with
the Arab world have enabled the UPA government in
India to re-examine its initial reservations
vis-a-vis Israel. Much of the 1990s was marked by
tensions between Arafat and key Arab personalities
over the Kuwait war and the Oslo process.
At the same time, it is difficult to
ignore the negative vibes. Already, there are
complaints that the new government has not "moved
away" from the BJP policies and is continuing with
its special relations with Israel. Despite its
public pronouncements to the contrary, the
Congress-led government is accused of not
exhibiting sufficient support for the
Palestinians. The absence of either the prime
minister or Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi
at Arafat's funeral in Cairo last November was
interpreted as an Indian desire not to
"antagonize" Israel.
Domestically, the
government would not be able to ignore the
coalition compulsions, especially if
Israeli-Palestinian violence intensifies. At the
same time, India, especially the Congress Party,
could not ignore the turn of events since the
death of Arafat. Not only is there a newfound
rapprochement between the Palestinians and Israel,
but also between the Palestinians and the wider
Arab world. Palestinian leader Abu Mazen's visit
to Syria, Lebanon and finally Kuwait marked an end
to the tension that prevailed between Arafat and
these countries.
Conclusion
It
would be an exaggeration and even incorrect to
argue that the road to Washington passes through
Israel. At the same time, friendly ties with the
Jewish state do help India in seeking a common
cause with the US. When New Delhi and Washington
have serious differences over issues, such as the
Iranian nuclear program, the Iraqi conflict and
Syrian support for militant Muslim groups, they
converge on Israel.
At the regional level
also, relations with Israel are no longer
controversial. With the sole exception of Egypt,
none of the Arab and Islamic countries has
publicly expressed any concerns over Indo-Israeli
ties. Even Iran, known for its anti-Israeli
rhetoric, is keen to promote political and
economic ties with India, rather than be concerned
about Indo-Israeli ties. The ongoing debate in
Pakistan over the need to reexamine Islamabad's
traditional hostility towards Israel is also
favorable to India.
At the same time,
Pakistan is extremely weary of growing military
ties between the two countries and even
unsuccessfully pleaded with the US to scuttle the
Indo-Israeli Phalcon deal. For the time being,
China has not shown any anxiety in public, but
given the Sino-Israeli tension with the US over
military sales, China may not remain indifferent
for long.
Abandoning its newly found
relations with Israel is unlikely to bring any
significant diplomatic gains for India. At the
same time, Indo-Israeli ties would not remain
immune to any intensification of
Israeli-Palestinian violence, especially with the
Congress Party in power.
Published with
permission of the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
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