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Vital buffer is
lost
By Michael A Weinstein
The assassination of former long time
Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri on February
14 opens a new chapter in Lebanon's slide toward
instability that began on October 20, 2004 when
Hariri unexpectedly resigned over a
Syrian-inspired move to extend the term of
President Emile Lahoud. Since then, Lebanon has
been in the throes of what observers call a
"political crisis" as the country's political
class has become polarized over the presence of
17,000 Syrian troops in the country and the
scheduling of parliamentary elections that are
supposed to take place in the coming spring.
Lebanon's current phase of political
history begins with the signing of the Taif Accord
in 1989 that ended the country's 15-year civil war
and ushered in a period of reconstruction,
economic renewal and relative political stability.
The war resulted from the breakdown of Lebanon's
delicately balanced and religiously diverse
society under the pressure of an influx of
Palestinian refugees and an ensuing military
conflict between the country's neighbor Israel and
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which
had headquartered in Lebanon after being expelled
from Jordan in 1967.
Created after World
War I, when the League of Nations mandated the
five provinces of the Ottoman Empire that compose
the country to France, Lebanon has a
preponderantly Arab population that is split into
a dizzying array of religious communities,
including Shi'ite Muslims (40%), Sunni Muslims
(20% ), Maronite Christians (16%), Druzes (6%),
and smaller proportions of Alawite Muslims and
Greek and Armenian Christians. During the colonial
period, which lasted into World War II, France
favored the Christians, who at that time composed
slightly more than half of the country's
population, and set up a system of communal
representation, in which the president was a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni
Muslim and the speaker of the National Assembly a
Shi'ite Muslim. The legislature and state
bureaucracy were also staffed proportionally
according to religious confession. The
confessional system of representation, which was
intended to be temporary, persisted after
independence and was restored in a modified form
by the Taif Accord. Estimates put Lebanon's
population at 3.8 million; there are no reliable
figures since there has been no national census
since 1932, preserving the fiction of
Christian-Muslim parity.
Traditionally the
most cosmopolitan country in the Arab world,
Lebanon has reclaimed its role as a regional
financial and trading center through its post-war
reconstruction, yet its social cohesion remains
fragile. The civil war, which was ultimately
tamped down by Syrian military occupation,
revealed deep communal conflict between Christians
seeking to maintain their power in the face of an
unfavorable population balance and Muslims eager
to institutionalize their majority status. The
tendency toward polarization is blunted by the
diversity within each side of the great religious
divide, but that has resulted in severe
fragmentation during periods of instability.
Given the constraints imposed by
confessional representation, Lebanese politics are
not articulated through Western-style political
parties, but through shifting blocs composed of
local notables based in religious communities. The
system functions effectively when competing blocs
organize representatives from each of the major
religious groups so that political competition
takes place over trans-communal issues rather than
spiraling downward into communal conflict, as
occurred during the civil war. In order to avoid
breakdown into hostile fragmentation, Lebanon's
political system requires bridging figures who
transcend communalism and have the negotiating
skills and credibility necessary to make and
maintain the deals that allow the country's major
confessional groups to coexist in peace. Hariri
was the major bridging figure in Lebanese politics
throughout the post-civil war period and his
assassination portends the possible collapse of
the country's tenuous social contract.
Hariri's role as pivot and buffer
Since the end of the civil war, Lebanon has
been in great part a de facto protectorate of the
Ba'athist regime in Damascus, whose military
presence in the country has prevented a renewal of
violent conflict, but has also guaranteed
Damascus' decisive influence in Lebanese politics.
Throughout the time in which Syria has functioned
as Lebanon's power broker, making sure that
Beirut's leadership acquiesced in Damascus'
interests, Hariri was the only politician with
sufficient stature to allow Beirut to achieve a
considerable degree of autonomy in domestic policy
by maintaining a high level of popularity across
confessional groups, skillfully negotiating
winning coalitions among blocs and placating
Damascus just enough to keep it at bay.
Hariri was able to accomplish his
difficult balancing act through the combination of
his immense wealth, which made him independent of
any sectoral interest, and his commitment to
functioning as a bridge builder, which enabled him
to serve as a buffer between communities, and
between the Lebanese political system and
Damascus, as he pivoted among blocs.
The
son of a poor Sunni family from the southern city
of Sidon, Hariri left Lebanon after dropping out
of college for financial reasons and migrated to
Saudi Arabia, where, after holding several jobs,
he entered the construction business, became a
personal friend of King Fahd, received dual Saudi
Arabian citizenship and made billions of dollars
through varied enterprises. One of the richest men
in the Arab world, Hariri used his wealth to enter
Lebanese politics, providing all of the funds for
the 1989 conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia that
ended the civil war.
Afterwards, he
volunteered equipment from his construction
company to clear out the rubble left from the war
and was elected to serve in the National Assembly.
In 1992, Hariri assumed the post of prime
minister, holding that position five times as he
maneuvered through the maze of Lebanese politics,
using resignation as a tactic and then re-emerging
as a coalition-builder with wide popular backing.
As prime minister, Hariri reinforced his
stature by engineering Lebanon's reconstruction
through the private company Solidere, of which he
was the major shareholder, and by using his
international business and political connections
to attract foreign investment and revive the
tourist industry. Although he was criticized by
opponents for profiting from reconstruction
through Solidere and for driving Lebanon into
debt, he was widely credited for playing an
indispensable role in renewing the country's
economy and preserving social peace.
With
the country's economy reviving and the sectarian
militia disbanded - except for the Syrian and
Iranian supported Shi'ite Hezbollah, which has
continued its confrontation with Israel in the
south - the major issue in Lebanese politics
became the Syrian military presence in the country
and Damascus' role as its power broker. Although
the division over whether Syria should remain or
withdraw cuts across confessional boundaries,
opposition to Damascus is concentrated in the
Christian and Druze communities, and pro-Damascus
sentiment in the Shi'ite and, until recently,
Sunni communities. In negotiating the domestic
conflict over the Syrian presence, Hariri managed
to be an effective buffer, pivoting toward
Damascus and away from it, until the autumn of
2004, when Damascus engineered a constitutional
amendment granting Hariri's arch political rival
Emile Lahoud a three-year extension of his
presidential term, in order to head off
presidential elections that might have resulted in
a presidency less favorable to the Syrian
presence.
As the constitutional crisis
loomed, Paris and Washington moved in the United
Nations Security Council to push through
Resolution 1559, which called on Damascus to
withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and for Beirut
to disband non-state militia and permit free
elections. Washington had already imposed economic
sanctions on Damascus in 2003, was pressuring
Damascus to police its border with Iraq and
withdraw its support of Hezbollah, and ultimately
desired regime change in Syria. Paris' support for
the resolution seemed to be based on a desire to
mend fences with Washington after their dispute
over the US intervention in Iraq. The result of
the pressure exerted by Paris and Washington for
Lebanese politics was to strengthen the resolve of
the anti-Syrian opposition.
After the
Lebanese National Assembly approved the
constitutional amendment on September 3 - a day
after the passage of Resolution 1559 in the
Security Council - Hariri attempted to form a new
government, but was unable to do so and resigned
as prime minister on October 20, saying that he
would stay on the sidelines and wait and see if
Damascus could retain its control over Lebanon in
the face of international pressure and domestic
conflict. A pro-Syrian government led by Omar
Karami was installed under the conditions of an
opposition boycott and the abstention of Hariri's
bloc, setting the stage for unbuffered
polarization.
Since the constitutional
crisis, Lebanese politics have been taken up with
arranging elections for the National Assembly in
spring 2005 (no date has yet been set). During
this time, Hariri pivoted toward the opposition
and was accused by pro-Syrian forces of having
engineered Resolution 1559. Now a divisive figure,
no longer able to play the role of buffer, Hariri
was widely deemed the "silent leader" of the
opposition - the strains within and the pressures
from without the Lebanese political system had
become too great for him to manage, although it
was widely assumed that he would make yet another
bid for the prime minister's office if results of
the parliamentary elections were favorable.
The significance of Hariri's pivot toward
the opposition was the possibility that it could
decisively shift the balance of power in Lebanese
politics toward the anti-Damascus opposition by
allying his Sunni base with it and isolating the
Shi'ites. Were that to happen, Damascus' influence
in Lebanon would be diminished, perhaps to the
point that it would have to pull out, and the
Franco-American combination would gain leverage
and have the possibility of prying Beirut into the
Western sphere of influence, weakening and further
isolating Syria's Ba'athist regime. As it
presently stands, Hariri's assassination has
already provoked attacks on Syrian workers and
businesses in Sidon, indicating that his death
might only hasten the process of realignment. Even
more serious for Damascus, a mass march of
hundreds of thousands of Lebanese mourners around
Hariri's funeral on February 17 attracted
participants from all of the country's
confessional groups and took on an anti-Syrian
tone with banners reading "Syria Out".
Reaction to Hariri's
assassination
Although an Islamic
revolutionary group - Victory and Jihad in Greater
Syria - claimed to have carried out Hariri's
assassination on account of his Saudi ties, its
claim was not deemed credible by interested
parties, which used his death as an opportunity to
press their own agendas - all of them deplored the
deed, expressed fears of a return to civil war and
urged the Lebanese people to show solidarity, but
there the similarities ended.
The
government declared a three-day mourning period
and placed the army on high alert, promising to
hunt down the perpetrators and bring them to
justice. In contrast, the opposition, meeting at
Hariri's Beirut residence, blamed Damascus for the
crime - if not for actually committing it, which
they implied it had, then for allowing it to
happen. The opposition called for Damascus to
withdraw its forces from Lebanon, for an
international investigation of the assassination
to be held, and for a three-day general strike to
be mounted.
Some even suggested that
Lebanon be placed under "international
receivership". Maronite Christian leader Michel
Aoun, who had fled into exile in Paris after he
refused to accept the Taif Accord and who still
retains support in his community, promised to
return to Lebanon for the parliamentary elections
and expressed hope that the assassination would
spur the exit of Syrian forces from the country:
"If they are capable of eliminating political
leaders, they are capable of influencing election
results. The Syrians must be reined in." Druze
leader Walid Jumblatt was even more blunt,
accusing the Lebanese government of being "a
regime of terrorists".
Washington and
Paris joined the opposition in placing their focus
on Damascus, but were more restrained. Endorsing
one of the opposition's demands, Paris urged an
international investigation into the
assassination. Washington did not directly accuse
Damascus of the crime, but said through White
House press secretary Scott McClellan that it was
"a terrible reminder that the Lebanese people must
be able to pursue their aspirations and determine
their own political future free from violence and
intimidation and free from Syrian occupation".
Washington followed up on its statement by
recalling US ambassador to Syria Margaret Scobey
for "consultations". The responses of Paris and
Washington reflected their continuing cooperation
on trying to eliminate the Syrian presence in
Lebanon - during her visit to Europe in February,
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had
conferred with French President Jacques Chirac on
further action against Damascus in the UN.
As would be expected, Damascus took an
opposite line to that of its adversaries, blaming
them indirectly for the assassination. Syrian
Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara urged Lebanese to
"reject foreign interference", and Information
Minister Mahdi Dakhlallah said that the crime was
perpetrated by the "enemies of Lebanon" and had
occurred at a time when pressure was being exerted
on "Lebanon and Syria aimed at achieving the
aggressive goals of Israel". Rejecting calls for
an international investigation, Shara stated that
"Lebanese authorities will carry out an
investigation to determine which party was behind
this act". That position was quickly affirmed by
Beirut, which rejected an international
investigation on the grounds that it would be a
violation of Lebanon's sovereignty.
Conclusion
Having lost its
buffer and pivot, Lebanon is now faced with the
prospect of descending into another cycle of
inter-communal conflict. Despite the swell of
popular support for Hariri at his burial services,
reaction to his assassination shows that the deep
divisions in Lebanese society that surfaced in the
civil war had never healed but had simply been
held in check by war weariness, the process of
reconstruction, Hariri's skillful deal making and
the Syrian military presence. With reconstruction
basically accomplished, the bridge builder gone
and the Syrian presence a destabilizing factor,
all that prevents factional breakdown is general
fear of a return to violent conflict and a
possible crystallization of public opinion against
Damascus.
The major external players in
the struggle over Lebanon's future - Washington
and Damascus - face the problem of pressing their
conflicting interests without precipitating a
Lebanese civil war. Washington, which desires
regime change in Damascus, is not yet ready to
pursue military action that would place Lebanon
under "international receivership" and drive
Damascus out of the country. Its past failures to
stabilize Lebanon through direct intervention will
make it shy of repeating the process, as will its
commitments in Iraq and its need to attend to
other world trouble spots. Washington is likely,
instead, to continue leaguing with France through
the Security Council, where its ambitions will
probably be compromised - as they were in
September 2004 - by opposition from Beijing and
Moscow.
Damascus, whose position in
Lebanon has been weakened by the defection of
Hariri's Sunni base in the aftermath of its
attempt to retrench by engineering the extension
of Lahoud's term, is faced with the prospect of
losing its status as power broker and encountering
active resistance to its military presence. Were
Damascus to attempt to crack down on a resurgent
opposition, it would risk growing support among
major international players for Washington's
agenda and might be drawn into a costly and
uncertain military quagmire. Yet if it concedes
its influence, it will open up a power vacuum in
Lebanon that is likely to be filled by forces
hostile to its interests, and its Ba'athist regime
will lose credibility at home. The announcement on
February 17 that Tehran and Damascus will form a
"united front" against Washington reflects a
desire by both capitals to circle their wagons.
Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Naji al-Otari said,
after meeting with Iranian First Vice President
Mohammad Reza Aref, that "the challenges we face
in Syria and Iran require us to be in one front".
In its confrontation with Damascus,
Washington has the luxury of treading cautiously,
as it did when it downplayed the announcement of
the Tehran-Damascus "united front". Damascus, in
contrast, has unwittingly pushed itself into a
corner - it appeared during the 2004
constitutional crisis that Damascus would get away
with its power play, but it did not count on the
consequences of a decisive pivot by Hariri toward
the opposition. Now it can only hope that
parliamentary elections in Lebanon - if they are
held - will not swing the balance of power in
Lebanese politics firmly against it.
Analysts in the Middle East speculate that
Hariri's assassination might have been inspired by
Damascus itself, by rogue elements in its
intelligence apparatus, or by anti-Hariri forces
from one of Lebanon's confessional communities. If
the perpetrators are credibly identified, the
present tensions might be more sharply defined and
shift the balance of power toward one of the
contending sides, but knowing who the culprits
were will not change the basic polarized
situation. Lebanon had lost its buffer and pivot
before Hariri's assassination; his death only
makes obvious Lebanon's failure to heal.
Published with permission of the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
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