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When regime change meets
reality
By Ehsan Ahrari
A
funny thing happened to President George W Bush's policy
of regime change in Iraq. It had the sobering experience
of bumping into a strange creature in Iraq called
reality. That experience may also be depicted as the
Middle Eastern version of "shock and awe", except this
time the United States was on the receiving end.
Result: Washington is presently conducting a
hardnosed reassessment of that policy, especially
concerning Iran. There is no suggestion that as a result
of that review the option of regime change will be
abandoned. Rather, I would argue that option has been
placed in abeyance pending the outcome of three
developments: the outcome of the US involvement in Iraq,
Afghanistan and the impending presidential elections.
However, the neo-conservatives in Washington are not too
happy about the current pause involving Iran, and they
are going public in airing their discontent.
In
Iraq, it is imperative from the White House's
perspective that a transitional authority is selected. I
call it selection, since the US has ruled out direct and
nationwide elections. Even if that process is completed
without a major breakdown or setback, the exercise of
constitution writing is still potentially explosive,
since the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is
determined to oversee the creation of a secularly
oriented constitution. On the contrary, Shi'ite leader
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has already spoken
unequivocally about the necessity of preserving the
Islamic nature of the post-Saddam Hussein government in
Iraq. Assuming the best-case scenario - ie, creation of
an integrated version of the two clashing visions of the
constitution - no one has any clue whether the security
situation in Iraq will improve or deteriorate, for it
has its own logic, rationale (or the lack thereof), and
momentum.
In the meantime, the US has decided to
meet head-on the growing power and presence of the
Taliban and guerrilla forces in Afghanistan (Operation
Avalanche). The purpose is to, at least, strike a major
blow at the mounting terrorist presence and the
attendant clout before the harsh winter conditions move
into that country. Washington has reached a painful
conclusion that some sweeping measures aimed at
enhancing the internal stability of Afghanistan are
indispensable before the upcoming elections next June.
There have been conflicting reports that
al-Qaeda will remain in the Pakistan-Afghan border area,
or even make a major shift toward Iraq, since the
prospects of challenging the US forces are almost
unlimited in the urban terrain of the latter country, or
so reported to be the calculations of al-Qaeda's
strategists. For the US, neither aspect of al-Qaeda's
alleged preferences is of any relevance. The mission for
the American forces is to eradicate those forces from
both Afghanistan and Iraq. The military operations to do
just that have initiated earnestly. However, the two
reports of accidental deaths of Afghan children in
Operation Avalanche would be used by the enemies of a
stable Afghanistan and of the government of interim
President Hamid Karzai to promote further volatility.
According to all indications, the US forces are likely
to remain bogged down in Afghanistan, at least for the
next six months.
What is sure to be a
determining factor in the future application of regime
change is the US presidential election of 2004. If, as a
result of that election, there is a regime change in
Washington, we have an entirely different ball game. If
on the other hand, Bush is reelected, the implementation
of the policy of regime change in Iran is still likely
to be more difficult than when it was carried out in
Iraq, for at least two reasons.
First and
foremost, the entire original rhetoric that was the
basis of regime change in Iraq - Saddam's alleged
weapons of mass destruction capabilities, or the reasons
provided in speeches and statements by Bush, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, and US Secretary of State
Colin Powell to bring about regime change urgently -
have not yet been proven. Consequently, future arguments
describing any purported major threats emanating from
Iran's nuclear capabilities are likely to be dismissed
by the world community at large as "fictitious" or
"imaginary". That is not to say, however, that US hands
will be tied because of a lack of believability. The
chief constraining factor, then, would be what happens
after a regime change in Iran, as the Bush
administration has been finding out, to its dismay,
after toppling Saddam. It would be easy to win a
military battle, even in Iran. However, it would be
unmitigated hell managing Iran, along with Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Equally important, the international
community is likely to get even more unsympathetic,
indeed, about any suggestion of pulling the American
chestnut out of the fire.
Second, no one knows
which way the North Korean conflict will go. If
Pyongyang were to categorically refuse to unravel its
nuclear weapons program - as the Bush administration is
rightly insisting - going to war might be considered as
a tenable way to resolve that conflict. Undoubtedly, the
East Asian nations would not want Washington to pursue
that course. However, it is difficult to imagine at this
point whether the Bush administration would make a
decision for any sort of military action to resolve that
conflict, at least in the near future. The stakes
involved in military actions against dictator Kim
Jong-il's regime are entirely different from the ones
that existed in the case of Saddam.
The Bush
administration knows these realities and will have to be
careful about dealing with Iran. However, the
neo-conservatives in Washington are becoming
increasingly restless about a seemingly lack of
enthusiasm on the part of the White House to turn up the
heat on the ayatollahs. The alliance between them and
the Iranian royalists residing in the US - much like the
one between the neo-conservatives and the Gucci
guerrillas of the Iraqi National Congress - is quite
active in its own propaganda campaign against the
Islamic Republic. Needless to say, these neo-cons -
especially those who are not part of the administration,
but love to hover close to it for the air of prestige
that such a hovering creates in the eyes of the
Washington media - have the luxury of sitting in ivory
towers in places like the American Enterprise Institute
or the Heritage Foundation, slurp crab bisque soup while
munching on multigrain bread, totally oblivious to the
meaning of that old adage, "war is hell", but discuss
the next war as if they are deciding which movie they
should see next.
The sad irony is that if
Washington decides to bring about regime change in Iran,
neither these neo-cons nor their pro-royalist cohorts
will have to worry about encountering harsh realities in
the streets of Iran.
Ehsan Ahrari,
PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
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