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Syria keeps US at arm's
length
By Brian Maher
Syria
has a critical role to play in the success of the
American effort in Iraq and in America's larger Middle
East strategy. The infiltration of foreign militants
into Iraq from Syria, which has contributed to the
area's instability and has hamstrung US efforts to build
a viable post-war Iraq, has been an ongoing concern for
Washington. Nearly half of those detained in Iraq by US
forces since the end of major combat operations have
entered through Syria, according to US officials.
Before the US invasion of Iraq, Syrian diplomacy
seemed to work at cross-purposes. On the one hand,
Damascus recognized that it could not afford to become a
US enemy, while on the other hand it understood that
Washington's plans for the region were incompatible with
its own. Damascus professed public support for the US
"war on terrorism" and offered tangible support by
providing valuable intelligence on al-Qaeda, as well as
other militant groups in the region. Nevertheless,
Damascus attempted to sabotage US invasion plans,
successfully lobbying to deprive Washington of Arab
support in the United Nations and helping to sow
division among the Western powers, fearing the political
fallout from an American victory.
These efforts
ultimately failed to prevent the US invasion, and
Damascus was put on the defensive by the rapid US
victory in Iraq. A nervous President Bashar al-Assad,
fearing that Syria may be the next US target, began to
eagerly bend to US concerns, pledging to cooperate with
the Americans and cracked down on Islamist activity in
his country. Under heavy US pressure, Damascus closed
its border in April and apparently expelled a number of
ranking Ba'athist officials, including Iraq's chief
nuclear scientist.
Following the intensification
of the guerrilla campaign against the US occupation over
the summer months, Syria began to consider its policies
anew, sensing US weakness. The almost daily attacks were
becoming a needling distraction to the American effort
and Damascus realized that a successful, expanding
insurgency would place the US in a political
straitjacket, hemming it in, precluding it from focusing
its energies on Syria. The border area became
increasingly porous and scores of militants were allowed
free passage to ply their trade in Iraq.
Syrian
denials of complicity in this activity ring especially
hollow - there is only one highway running between the
two countries and the Syrian border is teeming with army
forces tracking smugglers attempting to peddle their
wares without paying off corrupt officials. If Damascus
truly sought to seal the border area, there would surely
be reports of dead militants, eagerly presented to
Washington as proof of Syria's fidelity.
Not
surprisingly, Washington has brought considerable
pressure to bear on Damascus to seal its borders with
Iraq and crack down on Islamic militants. The US is
forging a regional coalition to isolate Syria, and
recently Damascus has been forcefully reminded that it
cannot afford to antagonize Washington indefinitely.
With implicit US support, Israeli warplanes struck a
suspected terrorist camp near Damascus, the first
Israeli raid on Syria in 30 years. Damascus realizes
that such an attack could only be carried out with US
countenance and no doubt considers it a less than subtle
expression of Washington's dissatisfaction with Syrian
efforts.
In addition, Turkey has joined the
American camp by offering up troops to assist the US
occupation. Of course, approximately 130,000 American
troops lie beyond the Syrian frontier, powerfully
reminding Damascus of American reach. Washington hopes
that surrounding Syria in such a fashion will force
Damascus to reconsider its strategies and yield to
American concerns.
These developments are
significant because Syria figures into a broader
American strategy to apply pressure to the rest of the
Middle East, and Iran in particular. Iran represents a
more substantial threat than Syria, especially with its
potential nuclear capability, and Washington hopes to
treat Syria in a way that resonates with Tehran. Should
Iran obstruct US efforts in Iraq to an appreciable
degree, Washington hopes to make an example out of a
militarily weaker and politically vulnerable Syria,
highlighting to Tehran the high cost of interference.
This would ostensibly bring Iran and other
countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, into
line, fearing that they could be next on Washington's
list. However, the Bush administration is concerned that
the perception of American impotence in the face of an
increasingly capable insurgency will embolden the
opponents of the US presence in Iraq. The insurgency has
frittered away the psychological impact that the fall of
Baghdad produced on Middle Eastern regimes, which may be
a dire portent for America's future in Iraq if visible
progress is not made.
Damascus may gamble that
the US lacks the political capital and resources to
challenge Syria directly, in which case it could greatly
increase the cost of the US occupation. Of particular
concern from Washington's perspective is the ability of
Hezbollah to initiate a potentially devastating
insurgency against occupation forces. Damascus uses
Hezbollah to advance its foreign policy objectives and
exerts substantial control over the organization. Syria
unleashes Hezbollah when it suits its purposes, as it
did in the Shebaa Farms territory, or reins it in when
it senses danger. Damascus would undertake a mighty risk
by allowing Hezbollah to incite resurrection in Iraq.
Hezbollah's passivity thus far is an indication that
Damascus is highly appreciative of the risk.
Both Washington and Damascus recognize that
matters have not reached the level of open
confrontation, leaving ample leeway for diplomacy. In
the end, Damascus is aware of Washington's ability to
inflict injury and desperately seeks to avoid direct
confrontation with the US. Most likely, it will try to
reach some sort of accommodation with Washington. Recent
reports out of Iraq suggesting that the flow of foreign
militants transiting through Syria has slowed may be a
sign that Damascus is feeling the pressure.
Washington, in turn, is not in a position to
seek conflict with Syria at this time and will continue
to pressure Syria indirectly. Any actions against Syria
will be limited to the diplomatic and economic spheres -
for now at least. The carrot will be an integral part of
Washington's strategy in addition to the stick, despite
the passage of the Syrian Accountability Act, which some
fear will remove a critical bargaining tool.
The
Bush administration realizes that Damascus wants to
avoid direct confrontation but will target Syria
rhetorically when it wants to send a message to the rest
of the region. Because of this, there may be little that
Damascus can do in the face of such posturing, short of
complete capitulation to Washington's long list of
demands that targets Syria's larger role in regional
affairs and weapons proliferation. This is not
especially likely since many of these demands clash
directly with powerful Syrian perceptions of
self-interest. But it will do enough to avoid direct
confrontation in the short run at least, which is
certainly in Damascus' best interest.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to
content@pinr.com
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