| |
Iran's race for nuclear
weapons
By Erich Marquardt
In
March and June, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)requested access to a small complex of buildings
at the Kalaye Electric Company in a suburb of Tehran.
The agency suspected that the Iranians were using this
site to research and develop nuclear weapons. During two
attempts to gain access to this site, the IAEA was
refused. Finally, after construction and cleanup had
been completed at the site, the IAEA inspectors were
allowed entrance. After conducting a thorough search,
the IAEA discovered traces of weapons-grade enriched
uranium.
This is now the second site in Iran
where traces of weapons-grade enriched uranium have been
found; the first discovery took place at the nuclear
facility at Natanz, located in central Iran. Tehran's
explanation for these two discoveries is that residual
weapons-grade uranium was left on second-hand nuclear
equipment purchased from Pakistan. While this
explanation is possible, since Pakistan is a
nuclear-armed state, it is a dubious one at best.
Instead, these two discoveries by the IAEA lend further
credence to the accusation that Tehran is on a course to
develop nuclear weapons.
For the leadership in
Tehran, the quest to acquire nuclear weapons has become
a race. With the United States in inextricable
situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington will have
a difficult time using military power to prevent
Tehran's pursuit of nuclear arms. With troop levels
nearly exhausted, a military attack on Iran would have
to rely mainly on air power, which would not produce the
desired results of completely eliminating Iran's nuclear
program or altering the government structure in Tehran.
Indeed, the Pentagon has been arguing, for the
first time in years, that the US may have to increase
the size of its military. The conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq have exhausted the active duty forces, and the
US has been continually calling up additional National
Guardsmen and Reserves to maintain its current troop
levels. With US forces not designed to fulfill extensive
peacekeeping roles, the US Army's vice chief of staff,
General John Keane, recently admitted, "We do not have
enough military police in the active duty force, as well
as in the Reserve ..." This failure has taxed US troops,
with General John Abizaid, chief of US Central Command,
recently warning the US Senate and House Armed Services
Committee, "We have to address the issue of fatigue."
Based on the preceding statements from US military
personnel, Washington has enough to worry about in both
Afghanistan and Iraq for it to also consider taking
military action in Iran.
Tehran's desire to
develop and acquire nuclear weapons is based on its
deteriorating national security situation. Before
October of 2001, when the US began military action
against Afghanistan, Iran had less to fear regarding its
territorial integrity or the survival of its government.
Afghanistan to the east was plagued by inner turmoil and
did not pose much of a threat to Iran's eastern border.
Iraq, to the west, was more of a concern, yet the United
Nations-enforced sanctions did much to keep Iraq in a
state of perpetual weakness. The UN and the US were
intent on keeping the status quo in the Middle East.
Iran's only major threat, Israel, was being kept
largely at bay, having to deal with its own internal
problems centered on the continuing resistance by its
large Palestinian population. Yet the attacks on New
York and Washington on September 11 would soon alter the
geopolitical makeup in the Middle East and Central Asia.
The attacks on that morning provided justification for
the Bush administration - which consisted of an
abnormally aggressive cabinet - to become involved in
the affairs of Central Asia.
Beginning with its
attack on Afghanistan, the Bush administration greatly
increased its influence in the affairs of Central Asian
states; indeed, before the invasion of Afghanistan, the
US had little to no involvement in the affairs of
Central Asia. During the Soviet era, the US did not have
the military power to become involved in this region,
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US
lacked the political power to become involved. It was
not until Washington could use the justification of
retaliating to the devastating attacks on its homeland
that it could establish military bases in former Soviet
states and therefore increase its influence with the
governments in those states.
After establishing
military bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Bush administration had
engineered the successful projection of US power and
influence into Central Asia that could then be used to
achieve US interests in the region. As alarming as this
sudden influx of US troops and influence was for Tehran,
it was eclipsed by the ability of the Bush
administration to gain political support for not only
overthrowing the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, but in
establishing a military occupation of the country. Plus,
by taking this action unilaterally, the Bush
administration could not be directly influenced by
member states of the UN.
This sudden change of
the geopolitical map on both Iran's western and eastern
borders has led to the conclusion in Tehran that it must
make itself militarily powerful in order to continue to
secure its interests and, most importantly, its
territorial and governmental integrity. This explains
why in recent days Iran has continued to focus attention
on its Shahab-3 missile, which was fully and
successfully tested on July 15, 2000. According to the
Federation of American Scientists, these missiles have
the ability to strike targets within a 1,350 kilometer
to 1,500 kilometer range, putting them well within
striking capability of US forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and also within striking distance of Israel.
By coupling the development of nuclear weapons
with its ability to strike targets in the Middle East
and Central Asia, Iran will have transformed itself into
a powerful state that would be able to protect its
national interests and territorial integrity. If these
ends were achieved, rival states such as the US and
Israel would lose massive foreign policy leverage in the
Middle East. It is for this reason that Israel and the
US are extremely concerned over Iran's continued
development of nuclear technology that could be used to
develop nuclear arms.
It is clear that the
military card is currently not a desirable option for
Washington. The threat of Iranian retaliation in
addition to an extremely taxed US military has caused
Washington to seek alternative means in dealing with
Iran. The Bush administration has been pushing the UN
and the international community to apply political and
economic pressure on Iran. So far, the Bush
administration has achieved the establishment of an
October 31 deadline for Iran to sign an additional
protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
This protocol would allow the IAEA to conduct surprise
inspections of suspected Iranian nuclear sites.
Unfortunately for the White House, it is not clear if
this added pressure will halt or delay Iran's nuclear
plans.
As of now, Iran has said that it will not
sign the additional protocol. In the meantime, work is
continuing on the main Iranian nuclear reactor in the
city of Bushehr, which is being built with the technical
support of Moscow. President George W Bush recently met
with President Vladimir Putin of Russia in continued
attempts to get Moscow to cease assistance to the
Iranian government, but Putin refrained from taking a
solid stance against Russia's nuclear assistance to
Iran. Putin said, "It is our conviction that we shall
give a clear but respectful signal to Iran about the
necessity to continue and expand its cooperation with
the IAEA." Furthermore, the Russian president said that
Moscow would continue to assist Iran's nuclear program,
even if Tehran does not sign the additional protocol to
the NPT that would pave the road to surprise inspections
of Iranian nuclear facilities.
Moscow's reason
for assisting Iran at the expense of the US lies in the
same distaste that Tehran has over the increasing US
presence in Central Asia and the Middle East. By
boosting support to Iran, Moscow is ensuring that
Washington will be unable to further increase its
dominance in the Middle East and Central Asia. One of
the main purposes that Washington has in establishing US
military bases in the former Soviet republics in Central
Asia is to encroach on Russia's borders and limit
Moscow's influence in the rich oil and gas region of
Central Asia. Therefore, while Russia certainly does not
want to damage relations with the US, it will still make
foreign policy decisions - such as supporting Iran -
that will work to contain US influence in Eurasia.
In light of this, Tehran is racing to develop
and acquire nuclear weapons before the US has the
military leverage again to effectively deal with Iran.
But once the main Iranian reactor at Bushehr is loaded
with nuclear fuel - possibly in 2004 - it will become
much more costly for Washington to launch an air attack
on that reactor as any such attack would risk nuclear
fallout. But Washington may not have the military or
political ability to attack Iran before then.
Therefore, the wildcard to this festering
conflict is Israel. Like Washington, the Israeli
government does not want to lose foreign policy leverage
in the Middle East. If Iran were to acquire nuclear
weapons, Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region would
end. This result is undesirable to the leadership in
Jerusalem. In 1981, Israel was in a similar predicament.
At that time, the French were assisting Iraq in
Baghdad's pursuit of nuclear energy at the Osirak
nuclear reactor. Before the reactor was loaded with
nuclear fuel, Israel launched a surprise air attack and
partially destroyed it. Leaders in Israel have warned
that Israel will take such action again, if necessary,
before the Iranian reactor at Bushehr is loaded with
fuel.
If in 2004 the Bushehr reactor is ready to
be loaded with nuclear fuel, the US may quietly
encourage an Israeli attack on Iran. An Israeli attack
would achieve Washington's objectives of weakening the
Iranian government, but without putting US military
forces in jeopardy from Iranian retaliation. The state
of Israel, however, will be at risk from possible
Iranian retaliation with its Shahab-3 missiles. It is
still unclear whether Israel will risk such retaliation
in exchange for its desire to preserve its nuclear
monopoly in the Middle East.
Published with
permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to
content@pinr.com
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
