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The day after: Lessons from Afghanistan
By Mark Sedra
(Posted with
permission from Foreign
Policy in Focus)
Comparisons between
Afghanistan and Iraq should not be overemphasized as
they simplify and conflate what are complicated and
highly specific situations. Yet one cannot ignore the
striking commonalties that can already be detected
between the reconstruction approach implemented in
Afghanistan and that which is being envisaged for Iraq.
In recent weeks, United States officials have,
on several occasions, referred to Afghanistan as a
"successful" model for reconstruction and
nation-building that should be emulated in Iraq.
Similarly, United Nations planning for post-war Iraq has
drawn heavily on the Afghan experience.
In a
move with tremendous symbolism, a UN planning committee
has chosen Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative
of the UN Secretary General in Afghanistan, to fulfill
the same post in Iraq. If he accepts the appointment,
Brahimi will lead the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Iraq (UNAMI), a structure intended to mirror its
Afghan counterpart, the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
UN and US
veneration of the Afghan nation-building experience
contrasts sharply with its track record. Rising
insecurity, slow economic development and growing public
dissatisfaction with the government currently threaten
the post-war order in Afghanistan. Without delving into
the debate over the merits and legality of the impending
war in Iraq, it is important to ask why the
reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is faltering and
what can be done to avoid such an eventuality in
post-war Iraq.
Afghanistan's lessons
Afghanistan has made remarkable progress since the
fall of the Taliban in November 2001. However,
achievements such as the establishment of a new
currency, the afghani, and the return of 2 million
refugees, have diverted international attention from a
rapidly expanding security vacuum that threatens to
envelope the nascent government.
The Afghan
Transitional Administration (ATA) holds little influence
outside the confines of Kabul; tellingly, President
Hamad Karzai is referred to in some quarters as the
"mayor of Kabul". The bulk of the country outside the
capital is the domain of warlords, who, by controlling
private armies, can defy the central government at will.
The resilience of spoiler groups, such as the Taliban,
al-Qaeda and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami party,
has presented an additional challenge to the
post-Taliban order.
Rising levels of violence
across the country have illustrated the failure of
peace-building efforts and the precariousness of the
government's position. In the past 10 months there have
been 400 rocket attacks on coalition military forces,
scores of terrorist attacks, factional clashes that have
claimed hundreds of civilian lives, the murder of a
prominent cabinet minister, and a narrowly averted
assassination attempt on Karzai.
Efforts to
strengthen the national government, build effective
security forces and stimulate economic development have
failed to stem the tide of insecurity. In particular,
programs to rebuild a national army and police force
have been slow and ineffective. As of March, only 1,700
troops had graduated from the US-supported army training
program and the bulk of the country's 50,000 police
officers remain untrained and loyal to regional warlords
rather than the central government.
Unable to
enforce its writ outside the capital, the ATA has had to
rely on the good will of warlords and the strength of
coalition military forces to maintain a semblance of
legitimacy and control. Unfortunately, personal ambition
rather than largesse has driven the actions of the
warlords and the military strategy adopted by coalition
forces has been motivated more by short-term military
expediency in the ongoing war on terror than the
long-term interests of Afghan security and stability.
Donor failure in Afghanistan
While the
life of the average Afghan has improved slightly over
the past year, economic development has proceeded at a
much slower rate than previously hoped. Unable to
collect tax revenue due to warlord intransigence and
allotted only a 16 percent share of the international
reconstruction budget in 2002, ATA development
initiatives have been paralyzed.
The "Marshall
Plan" for Afghanistan, which President George W Bush
alluded to on numerous occasions in the aftermath of the
fall of the Taliban, never materialized. At a donor
conference in Kabul on March 13, Karzai admitted, "The
needs of Afghanistan ... are much greater than what was
estimated ... at the Tokyo donors conference." He went
on to affirm that an additional US$15-20 billion of aid
was required to put the reconstruction process on track.
Shortfalls in funding, combined with the slow
pace of aid disbursements, the short-term duration of
donor aid pledges and the lack of labor-intensive
investment in infrastructure, have rendered the ATA
unable to deliver on its promises to the Afghan people.
Deprived of their peace dividend, the Afghan populace
has become increasingly restive. With donor fatigue
growing and international attention shifting to the
Middle East and the Korean peninsula, the window of
opportunity for rebuilding the country may be on the
verge of closing.
The anticipated humanitarian
crisis in Iraq will likely be even more severe than that
which has gripped Afghanistan. After 23 years of almost
continuous warfare, the Afghan population, which is
primarily rural and agrarian, has developed highly
advanced coping mechanisms. In contrast, the Iraqi
populace, predominantly urban and dependent on
government support, is much more vulnerable to the
effects of war.
Implications for
Iraq
The level of damage inflicted on Iraq's
infrastructure in the upcoming war is expected to be
unprecedented in scope and severity. Not surprisingly,
assessments of the needs of Iraqis in the immediate
aftermath of the war are ominous. The World Health
Organization (WHO) has estimated that 500,000 Iraqis
could require immediate medical attention due to
injuries sustained during the war and 400,000 could be
stricken with disease caused by the destruction of
sewage and water treatment facilities. It is expected
that less than 39 percent of the population will have
access to fresh water following the onset of
hostilities. Currently, 16 million Iraqis are dependent
on government food rations. The World Food Program has
stated that 10 million people could run out of food
within the first six weeks of the war. A UN official has
called US and UN preparations to feed the Iraqi
population "grossly inadequate".
A refugee
crisis, although not on the scale as that which has
faced Afghanistan, is also likely to emerge. The UN
estimates that even in a short war there could be an
exodus of up to 1.45 million refugees to neighboring
countries. In addition, they expect 900,000 Iraqis will
become internally displaced - adding on to the nearly 1
million existing internally displaced persons. The UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while aware of
scope of the problem, lacks the capacity to confront it.
Of the $60 million that the UNHCR has requested to
prepare for this dilemma, the agency has only received
$20 million. Overall, four key UN agencies - UNHCR,
UNICEF, WFP and the WHO - have only received $40 million
of the $123.5 million they have requested to meet their
targeted needs in Iraq.
The extent of the crisis
and the lack of preparedness of international agencies
to confront it will leave an increasing burden for
humanitarian relief on the US military, a responsibility
it is ill-prepared to handle. The US military's foray
into the area of humanitarian relief in Afghanistan,
while still in an early stage, has achieved few tangible
results and has been met with a torrent of criticism by
intergovernmental agencies and NGOs who have argued that
the military should focus on maintaining security and
leave humanitarian relief to civilian organizations.
In spite of this backlash and the program's
mixed level of success, the US army has introduced a
plan to "embed" humanitarian workers into military units
to deliver relief in Iraq. This initiative, which will
blur the distinction between military and humanitarian
personnel and thereby place civilian humanitarian
operations at risk, will be insufficient to meet the
demands of the situation.
However, with the US
government having allocated only $1 million to position
relief agencies in the region, there appear to be few
other alternatives. This figure stands in stark contrast
to the $2.4 billion that the US government has spent
thus far to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf region.
The US "needs to be sending ships of wheat to the
Persian Gulf, along with ships of soldiers" according to
a UN official. The pronounced discrepancy between
military and reconstruction spending, also present in
Afghanistan where US aid is equivalent to less than 5
percent of the funds spent on military operations - will
have ominous long-term ramifications for the post-war
reconstruction process.
Costs of
unilateralism
The unilateralist position adopted
by the US toward Iraq will make it difficult to secure
international support, particularly from Europe, to
rebuild the country. Chris Patten, the European Union
commissioner for external relations, has warned that as
the war does not have UN approval, the divisive nature
of the issue among EU member states will make it very
difficult for the EU to contribute to the reconstruction
process on a large scale. Current estimates assert that
it may cost up to $30 billion to rebuild Iraq over a
five-year period. This is in addition to the $100
billion that the war will cost the US taxpayer. Without
a large-scale multilateral commitment to Iraq's
reconstruction, such as that secured at the January 2002
Tokyo donors conference for Afghanistan, amassing the
funds required for such a huge undertaking will be
difficult.
Like Afghanistan, Iraq will have to
face an imposing security vacuum in the aftermath of the
fall of the Ba'ath regime. The presence of 300,000 US
troops, which according to US military officials will be
utilized to occupy the country in the immediate
aftermath of the conflict, could have a positive
stabilizing affect that was conspicuously absent in
Afghanistan, where only a relatively small number of
foreign troops were deployed. However, the imposition of
an occupation authority to govern the country for any
longer than a few months could incite a violent reaction
from the populace. Iraqis should have full executive
powers in any governing authority established after the
war. The current US post-war blueprint, which calls for
the establishment of an international civil authority
headed by a high-ranking American military commander
with Iraqi exile leaders serving only in an advisory
capacity, will only arouse apprehension that the US has
imperialist designs on Iraq.
Two other factors
could conceivably trigger an escalation of violence and
instability in Iraq. First, like Afghanistan, Iraq is a
diverse society, divided on ethnic, religious and
factional lines. The Ba'ath regime, like the
Pashtun-based Taliban movement, is predominantly
composed of one ethnic group, Sunni Arabs. Both regimes
viciously repressed dissent emanating from competing
ethnic groups, resentful of their lack of representation
in the government.
The fall of the Taliban in
Afghanistan led to widespread violence, marked by human
rights violations against ethnic Pashtuns throughout
Afghanistan and engendered resentment and
anti-government sentiments within the Pashtun community.
There are fears that revenge attacks against the Sunni
minority by other ethnic groups such as the Shi'ites,
Kurds and Turkomans, who were violently subjugated by
President Saddam Hussein, could emerge following the
war. While it is unlikely that these groups will seek
independence, ethnic-based clashes could nevertheless
fragment the country.
Second, the intervention
of neighboring states could inflame internal rivalries
and generate conflict. The Turkish government has
already sent troops into the northern,
Kurdish-controlled region of Iraq to prevent the
formation of a Kurdish state, which Ankara fears could
arouse nationalist sentiment among the Kurdish
population of Turkey. This could set off resistance by
Kurdish paramilitary groups, deeply suspicious of
Turkish motivations. There are also fears that Iran,
endeavoring to safeguard the large Shi'ite population of
Iraq, may also intervene in Iraqi affairs, arousing the
consternation of the Sunni population of Iraq and
neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia, which has long
feared the extension of Iranian influence in the region.
Regional interference is a problem that has also plagued
Afghanistan, where neighboring states such as Pakistan,
Iran and Uzbekistan have promoted their interests via
proxies. It has had a highly destabilizing effect on the
country, promoting ethnic and factional clashes that
have exacerbated disunity.
In a worst-case
scenario, the imposing cost of reconstruction coupled
with the potential for violent unrest may prompt the US
to implement a minimalist post-war reconstruction
strategy. The objective of such a strategy would be to
stabilize the country and secure America's vital
interests, including the disarmament of the regime and
the safeguarding of oil wells, at a minimum material and
human cost. This could involve establishing a client
government in Baghdad; maintaining a semi-permanent
military presence in oil-producing areas; permitting
limited Turkish intervention in the north; and allowing
regional autonomy on ethnic lines across the country. A
similar situation has materialized in Afghanistan where
the US has installed a client government in Kabul; where
regional warlords hold sway in the provinces; where a
blind eye is turned to the interference of regional
states such as Pakistan; and where a US military
presence is maintained to pursue regional interests,
which in the Afghan context is the continuing hunt for
the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Policy recommendations
A number of
specific lessons can be drawn from the Afghan experience
that should be heeded by the international community
when formulating a reconstruction plan for post-war
Iraq.
First, the aid pipeline to Iraq
must be free of obstacles and cumbersome bureaucratic
constraints. In Afghanistan, the flow of aid continues
to be slow, a factor that has obstructed development and
undermined the central administration's legitimacy.
Second, the bulk of international aid
should be funneled to the indigenous central government
as opposed to NGOs and intergovernmental organizations.
NGO competition for resources, responsibilities and
territory in Afghanistan has led to a "projectization"
of the reconstruction process, a fragmentation of the
process along institutional and project lines.
Accordingly, the process has lacked continuity and
coherence and has been plagued by problems of
transparency and coordination. NGOs play a vital role in
post-conflict settings as facilitators of change. In
Afghanistan they have transcended this role, becoming
agents of change, a position that should be reserved for
local actors.
Third, a pronounced effort
must be taken to promote reconciliation and prevent the
country's balkanization along ethnic or factional lines.
In Afghanistan, regional warlords took advantage of the
security vacuum that emerged in the aftermath of the
Taliban's fall to establish strongholds of varying size
across the country, creating what are in effect
mini-states. Although the presence of over 300,000
American troops will be a strong deterrent against such
an eventuality, it is essential that the process of
reconciliation among Iraq's various ethnic and religious
groups, Sunni, Shi'ite, Kurd and Turkoman is initiated
at an early stage of the post-war period.
Fourth, US and coalition forces must
cooperate closely with the central government,
coordinating their planning and actions with newly
established security institutions. In Afghanistan, the
US has pursued the war on terror with little or no
consultation with the central government. In fact, its
strategy of allying with local warlords has contravened
the ATA's authority and irrevocably damaged its
legitimacy. It is critical that US forces recognize and
respect the sovereignty of the post-war administrations
of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Fifth, pressure
must be exerted on regional states, such as Iran, Turkey
and Saudi Arabia, to refrain from interfering in the
internal affairs of Iraq. Afghanistan has a long history
of being utilized as a pawn in regional power struggles,
a phenomenon that continues to this day with disastrous
implications. The Afghan experience demonstrates the
necessity of securing unconditional regional support for
post-war reconstruction and peace-building activities.
Lastly, in Iraq more emphasis must be
placed on security sector reform, a process that
fulfills a vital criterion of statehood: a state
monopoly on the use of force. Although security sector
reform was prioritized early on in the Afghan
reconstruction agenda, the process has been largely
ineffective due to mismanagement, inefficiency and a
lack of funds. Such deficiencies must be rectified in
Iraq if a new government is to assert its authority over
the country within the next five years.
A theme
that runs like a red thread through these
recommendations is the need to build a strong central
state. While in the long run federal models of
governance may be more suitable for these countries, a
strong and representative central state apparatus is
required to achieve stability and security in the
short-term. In the case of Afghanistan, this policy has
been widely endorsed by policymakers and analysts, yet
it has not been properly implemented.
Afghanistan and Iraq, wracked by decades of
conflict and deprivation, require intensive, long-term
and durable commitments of international support.
Although sustainable change can only emanate from within
post-conflict societies, external support is essential
to provide the fertile ground needed for such change to
flourish.
Peace-building and reconstruction have
faltered in Afghanistan not because of the failures of
the ATA, which has achieved a remarkable degree of
stability under extremely adverse conditions, but
because the international community's commitment to
rebuilding the country has wavered. A steady shift of
international attention away from Afghanistan over the
past six months, a phenomenon that one senior European
diplomat has dubbed the "CNN effect", has expedited the
deterioration of the international commitment to
Afghanistan.
The emergence of a similar shift in
Iraq, perhaps toward the next country on the Bush
administration's "axis of evil", will have similar
consequences for the Iraqi reconstruction process.
Afghanistan has been a proving ground for the world's
ability to collectively rebuild a state and fight the
roots of terrorism in the post-September 11 world. The
results of this first test of the world's resolve have
been less than exemplary and without a paradigm shift in
the international community's approach to reconstruction
and peace building, the prospects for the next test
appear dim.
Mark Sedra sedra@bicc.de is a research
associate at the Bonn International Center for
Conversion and writes regularly for Foreign Policy in
Focus.
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
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