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Terrorism and proliferation: The new
threats
By Stephen Blank
As
the war with Iraq gets under way we see that the
phenomenon of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction lies at the source of this campaign. In
similar fashion the coinciding crisis triggered by North
Korea's proliferation could also unhinge regional
security in Northeast Asia and international affairs
more broadly. It is therefore quite clear that
proliferation represents one of the greatest threats to
international stability in today's world. And if joined
to terrorism, its threat potential is greatly magnified,
for a number of reasons.
If we are dealing with
an al-Qaeda-type group committed to suicidal attacks,
then the concept of deterrence of that terrorist group
flies out the window. While we would be mistaken to
consider such terrorists irrational in terms of their
own frame of reference, there is no doubt that the
rationality presumed by deterrence theory that presumes
a high degree of concern for survival is misplaced in
this case. Moreover, despite many of the post-September
11, 2001, polemics on this score, it is clear that
al-Qaeda and similarly constructed organizations need
the benefits provided them from via protection of a
state. Even if the evidence linking Iraq to that
organization is meager, there is no doubt that al-Qaeda
would have faced immense logistical and possibly
strategic difficulties in performing that operation and
subsequent ones were it not for the protection of the
Taliban.
Similarly, Iraq and Iran have clearly
led in sponsoring terrorist operations abroad and Iran
has even threatened to extend deterrence to Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Therefore, while it may be unlikely for now
that a state would devolve control over such weapons to
terrorists, it is not at all unlikely that it could use
them to attack its enemies and then shelter them behind
or underneath its umbrella of deterrence. In this case
the possession of weapons of mass destruction,
particularly but not exclusively nuclear missiles and
associated delivery systems, could make the world ripe
for perpetual war.
Worse yet, as the Pakistani
example shows, the toleration of terrorists and the
takeover of key state institutions by their supporters
create a situation of blowback. Here, as in the attacks
on the Indian parliament and in Kashmir in late 2001,
terrorists attack in the hope of creating a war they
believe will eventuate in their taking control of the
sponsoring state, in this case Pakistan. Here it is
particularly disturbing that many Pakistani nuclear
scientists evidently favored giving terrorists or other
Muslim governments the know-how to build weapons of mass
destruction. What is also apparent here is that by
sponsoring, and indeed by continuing to sponsor,
Kashmiri terrorism, Pakistan risks being dragged by
these terrorists whom it sponsored into a war with India
and/or state failure and insurgency at home.
Thus the "crossroads of radicalism and
technology" invoked by the United States is not just a
rhetorical justification for preemption but also
represents an awareness of genuine as well as potential
threats. North Korea's relationship with Pakistan and
the transformation of its foreign embassies abroad into
criminal centers engaged in drug smuggling and
proliferation similarly add to the danger of so-called
secondary or tertiary proliferation, in which states
that themselves were proliferating states then become
exporters of their capability, technology, and know-how
abroad to raise cash, obtain newer systems and
technologies, and win foreign friends. Moreover, North
Korea's earlier record of association with and
sponsorship of terrorism is well known. So it would not
be a stretch for Pyongyang to play this card again
inasmuch as its officials are clearly proliferating
nuclear technology and deeply involved in the
trafficking of narcotics, two key sources of threat to
vulnerable states. Then we would see the patterns now
prevalent in the Muslim world being linked even more to
East Asian threat potentials.
These
considerations should lead us to a broader understanding
of contemporary strategic threats. First of all,
"asymmetric" and strategic threats have become
multi-dimensional. Threats originating in or on land,
sea, air, space, and the ether can strike at a target,
including major strategic targets, in any of those
dimensions.
Second, because of this
multi-dimensionality, which is greatly facilitated by
the accelerating diffusion of high technology (even
technology of the 1970s or 1980s, if used innovatively,
can wreak havoc upon targets), any actor anywhere in the
world, be it an individual or an institution, who
possesses access to the means of carrying out a threat
can target anyone or any object somewhere else in the
world or in space or underwater, or in the cybersphere.
Moreover the originator of these threats need not launch
them from his point of origin. He can set them in motion
from remote locations as Osama bin Laden has done. Then
those carrying out the mission can identify the
appropriate medium and locales wherein they can launch
an attack.
This also greatly increases the
potential for relationships between sponsoring states
and shadowy transnational organizations such as
al-Qaeda. Thus a security threat may come from a
particular state and yet not be of that state.
Consequently, the number of strategic targets expands to
infinity. Anywhere on Earth can become a strategic
target or a "launch pad" for threats possessing a
strategic magnitude quite quickly. This means that no
government can pre-plan sufficient capability to ensure
global and multi-dimensional readiness. Rather the
evolving nature of the threat environment drives
governments, as the Pentagon has been driven, to
consider preemption and novel strategies for sizing a
threatened state's defense forces. But these
considerations mean that the entire system of deterrence
and its accompanying intellectual rationale are called
into question, if not negated.
In conjunction
with the war on Iraq, this means that while US policy is
not above reproach, the threats to which it has
responded and perception of fundamental transformations
taking placed in the global strategic environment are
well founded. Observers on both sides of the issue may
assess US or other policies as they see fit, but to deny
the reality of the fundamental strategic transformations
now under way or to deny the reality of the new types of
threats whose existence has already been demonstrated
would be unwise.
Stephen Blank is an
analyst of international security affairs residing in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
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