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Iraqis dream of a return to
'normalcy'
By David Isenberg
In all
the discussion about whether or not to invade Iraq, the
opinion of one very large and important constituency has
largely been ignored: namely, that of the Iraqi people.
To the extent that it has been considered, it has been
treated as a stereotype; either the people will welcome
invading forces as liberators, or they will oppose them
as foreign invaders.
But the truth is both more
complex and surprising, according to a report released
by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based
non-profit multinational organization that works to
understand, prevent and resolve deadly conflict
worldwide.
To write the report, ICG researchers
interviewed "dozens of Iraqis" in south/central Iraq,
largely from Baghdad and Mosul, in September and October
2002 to learn what people are saying about the ongoing
crisis. While ICG acknowledges that the sample is
neither large nor representative of the entire
population, it found that the willingness of the Iraqis
to talk openly was a "strong indication of the regime's
diminished ability to instill fear and of the feelings
shared by many Iraqis that some kind of political change
is now unavoidable".
Among the most significant
findings of the report:
The Iraqi government is embarked on a multi-faceted
effort to co-opt large segments of the population and to
tighten its control.
For many Iraqis, a US strike now appears inevitable,
and preparations are being made based on that
assumption.
Attitudes toward a US strike are complex. There is
some concern about the potential for violence, anarchy
and score settling that might accompany forceful regime
change. But the overwhelming sentiment among those
interviewed was one of frustration and impatience with
the status quo.
Perhaps the most widespread
attitude was a desire to return to "normalcy", ie, an
end to the abnormal domestic and international
situation. A significant number of Iraqis interviewed
expressed the view that, if such a change required an
American-led attack, they would support it.
Thoughts about a post-Saddam Iraq remain
extremely vague and inarticulate. Iraqis at home appear
genuinely uninterested in topics that currently are
consuming both exiled Iraqis and the international
community, in particular the makeup of a successor
regime and the question of federalism as a means of
accommodating the conflicting political aspirations of
Iraq's various communities, in particular the Kurds. The
Iraqi regime's repression has devastated civil society
and any autonomous form of political organization. The
result is a largely depoliticized and apathetic
population.
The opposition in exile, touted by
some in the international community as the future
foundation of Iraq's political structure, is viewed with
considerable suspicion and, in some instances, fear. The
notion of leaving the country's destiny in the hands of
an omnipotent foreign party has more appeal than might
be expected, and the desire for a long-term US
involvement is higher than anticipated.
With
regard to efforts by the Iraqi government to tighten its
control, the report noted that the regime is seeking to
minimize the risk of disruptions in historically
vulnerable areas. This is especially so in southern
Iraq, where military governors have replaced civilian
governors. Also, Iraqi territory has been subdivided
into four security zones managed by super-prefects in
coordination with local Baath Party officials and tribal
leaders.
But in addition to the stick the regime
is also resorting to the carrot. It is seeking to buy
off the population, or at least the middle class, which
has seen its fortunes evaporate under the sanctions
regime. According to the report, public services such as
transportation, water and electricity have registered
notable improvements, particularly in Baghdad. Income
from illegal oil exports, outside the oil-for-food
program, and massive printing of currency has injected
substantial liquidity into the market.
Perhaps
the best-known recent step was the "general,
comprehensive and final amnesty" which, with a few
exceptions, applied to all Iraqis sentenced to prison.
Over 100,000 prisoners were released.
The most
interesting conclusion by far was the very strong
yearning of those interviewed for a return to normalcy.
As one interviewee said, "Before the war and the
sanctions, our dinar was strong and our purchasing power
was the envy of the Arab world. We want to return to the
period of prosperity our parents lived through in the
1970s."
Most considered the claim that the
United States is motivated by the desire to rid Iraq of
its unconventional weapons to be a mere excuse. Yet in
order to end the era of sanctions and international
isolation, many Iraqis appear ready to accept almost any
alternative to the status quo, and foreign intervention
is considered to be the most realistic way of achieving
that goal.
In short, hostility to the idea of an
invasion of Iraq appears far stronger outside Iraq than
in Iraq itself.
Another somewhat surprising
conclusion was that Iraqis do not expect large-scale
strife after an invasion. Many of those interviewed
stated, "since so many Iraqis were associated with the
regime, self-preservation would insure against
widespread vendettas and acts of violence".
For
many Iraqis the most probable conflicts in the future
are likely to be based on conflicts within and between
heavily armed tribes or on socio-economic cleavages that
have been exacerbated by a decade of sanctions.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
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