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Al-Qaeda's quixotic quest to go
nuclear
By David
Albright
(With
permission from the Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainable Development.)
Following the fall of the Taliban government in
late 2001, intelligence agencies and the media scrambled
to find documents and other information about al-Qaeda
and its next potential targets. A priority was
uncovering information about al-Qaeda's progress on
acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including
nuclear weapons.
Al-Qaeda views the acquisition
of WMD as a religious obligation. However, it could
develop only limited technological capabilities in
Afghanistan to produce WMD, and few believe al-Qaeda
obtained nuclear weapons while it was entrenched there.
On the other hand, al-Qaeda's determination to get
nuclear weapons, along with its increased ability to
obtain outside technical assistance, lead to the
conclusion that if al-Qaeda had remained in Afghanistan,
it would have likely acquired nuclear weapons
eventually.
Also, although al-Qaeda's WMD
efforts are in disarray, it remains determined to get
WMD. As a result, preventing al-Qaeda and other
terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons or other
WMD must be an overarching goal of the United States and
the international community.
Searching
Afghanistan
General Tommy Franks, commander of
American forces in Afghanistan, said last winter that
detailed searches had been conducted at more than 100
sites in Afghanistan, including about 50 suspected of
being involved in the production of weapons of mass
destruction. Western and Northern Alliance intelligence
officers scoured houses, caves and training camps for
documents, booklets, personnel records, videos,
equipment, materials and other evidence of WMD programs.
Many members of the media who arrived in Kabul
soon after the fall of the Taliban in mid-November 2001
uncovered many al-Qaeda and Taliban records. In Kabul
and elsewhere in Afghanistan, they climbed over walls to
get into al-Qaeda safe houses, gained access to offices,
visited training camps and acquired hard drives from
al-Qaeda computers. CNN, The Evening Standard, The Times
of London, Associated Press, NBC, The Wall Street
Journal, The Washington Post, USA Today, The New York
Times and others reported on the information they found
in videos, on computer hard drives, and in hundreds of
thousands of pages of documents and other written
records. This information provides a detailed snapshot
of the terrorist group's activities in Afghanistan and
abroad. The information includes:
Instruction manuals to train recruits to make and
use a wide variety of conventional explosives;
Details about the daily lives of al-Qaeda personnel;
Pictures or schematics of intended targets,
including nuclear power plants;
Training manuals for teaching recruits who speak
many different languages to wage guerilla and
conventional warfare;
Instructions on operating uncover overseas; and
Instructor and student notebooks describing
techniques of kidnapping and assassination.
Only
a relatively small portion of the records found by the
media, however, were about nuclear weapons or other WMD.
Nor did the intelligence agencies find a significantly
larger amount or vastly different types of nuclear
documents in the records they collected.
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban likely either destroyed
or took many important WMD documents. The media
uncovered partially burned documents and other evidence
that documents had been burned or removed in advance of
the forces of the Northern Alliance and its allies. As a
result, any assessment based on the recovered records
remains partial.
Nuclear documents
The
captured documents reinforce assessments that al-Qaeda
is highly determined to obtain nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld said on January 16, 2001, at a Defense
Department briefing: "We have found a number of things
that show an appetite for WMD." To support his claim, he
cited diagrams, materials, attempts to acquire items,
and specific cases wherein such weapons were discussed
at al-Qaeda meetings.
David Ensor of CNN
reported on December 4, 2002, that according to US
officials, one hand-drawn diagram found either in a
Taliban or al-Qaeda facility showed a design for a
"dirty bomb". With regard to nuclear weapons, US
officials also saw evidence that al-Qaeda was also
seeking to acquire or develop a nuclear explosive
device.
CIA director George Tenet told Congress
in late January 2001 that the United States had
uncovered rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons in a
suspected al-Qaeda house in Kabul. According to a CIA
report released publicly on January 30, 2001, these
"diagrams, while crude, describe the essential
components - uranium and high explosives - common to
nuclear weapons."
Superbomb
document
In November 2001, CNN found an Arabic
document titled "Superbomb" in the home of Abu Khabab,
the code name of a senior al-Qaeda official. This
document, which was assessed by this author in
cooperation with CNN, has some sections that are
relatively sophisticated and others that are remarkably
inaccurate or naive. Over 25 neatly hand-written pages,
the author discusses various types of nuclear weapons,
the physics of nuclear explosions, properties of nuclear
materials needed to make them, and the effects of
nuclear weapons. It is not systematic in its coverage
and the author sometimes covers some subjects in depth
and others superficially or incorrectly. Nor is it a
cookbook for making nuclear weapons, as many critical
steps to make a nuclear weapon are missing from the
document.
Nonetheless, this documents shows that
al-Qaeda was interested in developing a deeper
understanding of nuclear weapons. Some of the
information in the document suggests that the author
understood shortcuts to making crude nuclear explosives.
The document is missing its cover and first
pages, so the author's name or background is unknown.
The date of the document is also unknown. The first page
begins "... since the latter is less stable and
therefore more capable of nuclear fission. For this
reason, anyone desiring to obtain a nuclear weapon must
set up a plant for enriching uranium."
The
author advocates the use of laser enrichment, which he
claims is "simple". In reality, however, laser
enrichment is incredibly complex to master. This
indicates that the author only possessed a rudimentary
understanding of the knowledge to enrich uranium or was
trying to convince the reader to pursue this enrichment
technology for an unstated reason.
The sections
on plutonium and uranium are relatively detailed.
Compared to the sections discussing nuclear weapons,
these sections imply that the author was more
comfortable writing about the nuclear fuel cycle than
nuclear weapons.
According to Ronald Wolfe, the
Arab language specialist who translated this and other
documents found by CNN, the author is most likely
Egyptian. Moreover, the Superbomb document looks like
the type used by professors and lecturers at Arab
universities. To further support this, CNN found student
notes in houses in Kabul, one containing a date of early
2000, that have crude drawings that appear to be based
on the one in the Superbomb document. Thus, an
instructor may have used the Superbomb document to give
a course to al-Qaeda members about nuclear weapons. Some
of the notes in the margins suggest that the instructor
may have not been the author of the document.
In
that document and in student notebooks there are similar
figures of atomic bomb designs using plutonium or
uranium. However, these designs are not credible nuclear
weapons designs. If someone obtained separated plutonium
and built this design, it would not function as an
atomic bomb. Rather, it would be a radiological
dispersal device (RDD). These students, who thought they
were learning about nuclear weapons, were in actuality
learning about making radiological dispersal devices.
The Superbomb document was found in conjunction
with a wide variety of other documents regarding the
manufacture and use of conventional explosives. An
interpretation of this finding is that the students, who
were taking an advanced course in building conventional
explosives, also received instruction in the ultimate
explosive, nuclear weapons.
A student notebook
found by The Washington Post in Kabul supports this
view. A November 22, 2001, Washington Post article
reports that while most of the notebook contains
information written during a general course on using
conventional explosives, the last page contains notes
specifically about atomic explosions. Moreover, some of
the information that appears in the notebook is similar
to what is in the Superbomb document.
Other
records
Other records imply that al-Qaeda had a
more sophisticated understanding of atomic bombs than
what is suggested by the Superbomb document. NBC
reported that hard drives found by US intelligence
agencies had more interesting information about nuclear
weapons than those obtained by the media.
A
document found by a reporter of the London Times, who
was one of the first to search al-Qaeda houses in Kabul,
shows that the Arab readers were partially discerning
about what they obtained. The reporter found a part of a
page of a document that simplistically discussed
hydrogen bombs and other nuclear weapon topics. The
document was typed in English with Arabic notes
handwritten on the page. The document contains several
mistakes, some of which are outlandish. At one place,
the writer of the document compares the chemical
structure of plutonium to the fictitious elements
Saturium, Jupiternium and Marrissum. The writer of the
Arabic notes drew arrows from these three words, to an
Arabic phrase, which translates to: "This is bullshit."
A document found by The New York Times in
Afghanistan discusses precautions for using chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons written by Abul Khabad.
In the preface, he identified himself as coming from
Greece and as a "protector of mujahideen". It is unknown
who this person is, or if it is another spelling or code
name of Abu Khabbab.
The New York Times, in an
extensive report on al-Qaeda documents on March 18,
2002, cited officials who said that papers were found in
Kabul explaining the use of radioactive isotopes in
agriculture and medicine in the same rooms as notebooks
on conventional explosives, further indicating research
into RDDs.
Several documents reportedly
described the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their
effects. In addition, other documents described defenses
against a nuclear attack.
Many documents
contained detailed information about making and using
conventional explosives, including one called RDX, a
high explosive popular with militaries. It has also been
used as an ingredient in "shaped charges" used to
compress the nuclear core of an implosion-type nuclear
design. However, none of the documents reviewed by this
author contained any information about shaped charges.
This finding supports the conclusion that al-Qaeda's
capabilities were limited. However, it also fuels
speculation that al-Qaeda may have favored a gun-type
nuclear design, which is simpler to make and depends on
the use of a propellant to fire a slug of highly
enriched Uranium (HEU) down a barrel into another piece
of HEU.
Foreign assistance
The
documents support the view that al-Qaeda's leadership
understood its limitations and was taking steps to
improve its ability to create an industrial
infrastructure to make WMD. Al-Qaeda realized that
foreign assistance would allow it to overcome its
weaknesses and be more efficient and economical in
making WMD.
A record obtained by The Wall Street
Journal from a computer hard drive appears to be a 1999
al-Qaeda progress report on its efforts to make nerve
gas.(1) The author of the memo complained that the use
of non-specialists had "resulted in a waste of effort
and money", urging the recruitment of experts as the
"fastest, safest and cheapest" route. A June 1999 memo
said the program should seek cover and talent in
educational institutions, which it said were "more
beneficial to us and would allow easy access to
specialists, which will greatly benefit us in the first
stage, God willing".
Al-Qaeda's nuclear effort
benefited from the help of two Pakistani nuclear
scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudari
Abdul Majeed, who have admitted that they had had long
discussions with al-Qaeda officials in August 2001 about
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.(2) Pakistani
intelligence officials told The Washington Post that
they believe that the scientists used a charity they had
created as a cover to conduct secret talks with bin
Laden.
Pakistani officials told The Washington
Post that the scientists reportedly admitted meeting
with bin Laden, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, and two
other al-Qaeda officials over two or three days in
August at a compound in Kabul. The scientists described
bin Laden as intensely interested in nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons.(3)
Bin Laden indicated
to them that he had obtained, or had access to, some
type of radiological material that he said had been
acquired by the radical Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan.(4) Mahmood and Majeed reportedly told bin
Laden that it would not be possible to manufacture a
nuclear weapon from that material.(5) They claim they
provided no material or specific plans to bin Laden, but
rather engaged in wide ranging "academic" discussions,
Pakistanis officials told The Washington Post.
According to another Pakistani official,
however, the scientists spoke extensively about weapons
of mass destruction. He described the scientists as
"very motivated" and "extremist in their views," but
added that they were "discussing things that didn't
materialize, but fall under the breaking secrets
act".(6) Pakistani officials familiar with the
interrogations told The Washington Post that the
scientists provided detailed responses to bin Laden's
technical questions about the manufacture of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons.(7)
Documents
describing the projects of these scientists' charity,
which were found by CNN in Kabul, include plans to
develop uranium mining in Afghanistan. It has been known
for a long time that Afghanistan had uranium resources.
But the fact that these nuclear scientists were planning
to extract uranium is surprising. A nuclear weapons
program may need uranium for components, or as a
material for testing nuclear designs, or for learning to
make highly enriched uranium metal. Such a capability
would also make any weapons program more indigenous.
In summation, these scientists are believed to
have provided al-Qaeda a blueprint for making nuclear
weapons. They are suspected of providing classified
information about producing nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda
or the Taliban or of facilitating access to others in
the Pakistani nuclear program who had that knowledge.
These two scientists, who had years of experience in
Pakistan's nuclear program, could have provided
important tips or direct assistance on managing and
running a complex nuclear project. This type of
assistance would have been critical to al-Qaeda, which
had limited experience in technical projects or their
management.
What was not found
The
documents and other information did not provide any
evidence that al-Qaeda had acquired nuclear weapons.
Prior to the September 11 attacks, many media reports
stated that al-Qaeda had acquired operational nuclear
weapons from countries of the former Soviet Union. No
evidence, however, has emerged that al-Qaeda obtained
any nuclear weapons, despite bin Laden's statement to a
Pakistani journalist published in Dawn on November 9,
2001, in which he claimed to have both nuclear and
chemical weapons. He said that the weapons would be used
as a deterrent against an US attack.
In
addition, no evidence showed that al-Qaeda had acquired
nuclear explosive materials, although this result is
less certain. US experts took "environmental samples" at
about 100 sites in Afghanistan that were analyzed for
traces of nuclear material, chemical weapons and
biological agents. Environmental sampling did not reveal
the presence of plutonium or highly enriched uranium at
any of these sites. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
stated on January 15, 2001, at a roundtable with radio
media, that in one case US experts detected a high
radiation reading, but the radioactive material was
depleted uranium contained in armor-piercing
munitions.(8)
Bin Laden is known to have sought
highly enriched uranium and plutonium. At least two
attempts are known to have been scams. Al-Qaeda may,
however, have obtained natural or low-enriched uranium
or other radiological material in these deals. The
information revealed by these investigations leads to
the question of whether al-Qaeda was completely thwarted
in its quest for nuclear material or whether it just got
smarter and more secretive in its efforts to get the
material.
Nuclear material used in nuclear
weapons (or in many radiological dispersal devices) is
relatively easy to hide or transport. Given that most of
the al-Qaeda leadership escaped US capture, it would be
foolhardy to assume that al-Qaeda would have left behind
any valuable, transportable radioactive material.
Reflecting that uncertainty, The Washington Post
reported on March 3, 2002, that some US intelligence
officials believe that al-Qaeda could already control a
stolen Soviet-era tactical nuclear weapon or enough
weapon-grade material to fashion a crude atomic bomb.
The search of Afghanistan did not reveal a cadre
of al-Qaeda's nuclear scientists and technicians, even
though bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders are known to
have taken a personal interest in acquiring nuclear
weapons and other WMD. But information about the
personnel that staffed such a program is scarce. A few
names, such as Abu Khabab, surfaced in media reports,
but these appear to be code names of individuals. The
fate or current location of any technical or scientific
al-Qaeda personnel remains unknown.
Taking
Stock
Whatever al-Qaeda had accomplished towards
a nuclear weapon capability, its effort in Afghanistan
was ended with the fall of the Taliban government. The
international community is fortunate that the war in
Afghanistan set back al-Qaeda's effort to obtain nuclear
weapons.
Al-Qaeda was putting together a serious
program to make nuclear weapons. But it is hard to judge
how far the nuclear research went.
Although
al-Qaeda was unlikely to develop the capability to make
separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium, it may
have tried to do so or accelerated its efforts to
acquire separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium
overseas. In either case, al-Qaeda would have had to
build the necessary infrastructure to make a nuclear
explosive from plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
The available information implies that al-Qaeda
had only achieved a limited technical capability to make
nuclear weapons, assuming it acquired plutonium or
highly enriched uranium illicitly. Its effort would
likely have needed to concentrate on the simpler
gun-type design of a crude nuclear explosive, which also
means it would have had to obtain at least about 50
kilograms of HEU. Plutonium does not work in a gun-type
design.
The documents strongly suggest that
al-Qaeda was intensifying its long-term goal to acquire
nuclear weapons and would have likely succeeded, if it
had remained powerful in Afghanistan for several more
years. The documents show that al-Qaeda was creating a
quasi-state nuclear weapons program with the tacit or
direct approval of the Taliban government. Moreover,
this effort was largely invisible to the rest of the
world prior to September 11. Although intelligence
agencies were intensely scrutinizing al-Qaeda's
activities, they had little success in penetrating
al-Qaeda's secret WMD programs.
The Taliban
needed al-Qaeda's financial and military support and
allowed its operatives to function relatively
independent of Taliban control. A senior Pakistani
official said in an interview that the annual budget of
the Taliban was US$70 million per year while the budget
of al-Qaeda was $200 million per year. Moreover,
al-Qaeda personnel were far more skilled at running
organizations than the relatively ineffectual Taliban
government personnel.
Al-Qaeda's relationship
with the Taliban regime, which some have labeled
"parasitic," was immensely beneficial to al-Qaeda. It
needed Taliban support to hide any WMD programs from
outsiders. Senior al-Qaeda officials appear to have
realized that foreign assistance was critical to the
success of its endeavors to obtain WMD. As a result,
they would have also realized the importance of the
cover provided by the Taliban regime in its efforts to
obtain sensitive foreign supplies and the help of
foreign experts. Such outside assistance would have been
far harder to obtain without the Taliban regime
legitimizing or fronting al-Qaeda's activities.
A critical lesson of the documents found in
Afghanistan is that groups like al-Qaeda see great value
in the use of nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda, its spin-offs
and like-minded terrorist groups can be expected to
struggle to enhance their chances of acquiring and using
nuclear explosives, regardless of the costs to
themselves.
The risk
remains
Al-Qaeda's nuclear weapons program was
seriously disrupted by the loss of its base of
operations in Afghanistan. We are left to ponder many
troubling questions. Will al-Qaeda reconstitute a
nuclear weapons effort somewhere else? Will this program
be more focused? What did al-Qaeda learn from the
Pakistani nuclear scientists?
Any effort by
al-Qaeda or splinter groups to reconstitute a nuclear
weapons effort will take time. That time permits actions
to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack. Al-Qaeda will
likely need another base and more assistance to master
making a nuclear explosive.
Although a nuclear
weapon in the hands of al-Qaeda remains the greatest
danger, many analysts believe that al-Qaeda will try to
strike at a nuclear facility or attack with an RDD using
stolen radioactive materials. Documents found in
Afghanistan and other information suggest that al-Qaeda
was considering attacks on nuclear power plants in
Europe or the United States. Concern about RDDs
intensified in May and June 2002 following revelations
that senior al-Qaeda official Abu Zubaydah told his
captors that al-Qaeda was interested in producing a RDD
and knew how to do it. Adding to worries was the arrest
of the al-Qaeda operative Jose Padilla in Chicago in May
2002. He was reportedly on a scouting mission for an
al-Qaeda operation to attack the United States with a
RDD.
Profound consequences
Although
the overall chance of al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear
explosive appears on reflection to be low, the
consequences would be profound. A single nuclear
explosion in a major metropolitan area would be
catastrophic. Even a relatively low-yield nuclear
explosion could cause tens or hundreds of thousands of
casualties. A severe earthquake can provide some
indication of the level of damage to be expected from
the blast of nuclear explosion, but it cannot capture
the immense number of burns and radiation injuries that
would follow a nuclear detonation.
Recovery from
a nuclear explosion would be long and difficult.
Financial impacts would be severe. Emotional
consequences for both those most immediately and
indirectly affected would be profound. No one would feel
safe.
The desire for revenge may lead the United
States, or perhaps its allies, to respond with nuclear
weapons, eliminating the perpetrators if they could be
immediately identified, but likely causing untold
suffering to civilian populations. US use of nuclear
weapons could fundamentally alter world order and
institutions.
Preventing al-Qaeda or other
terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons must
remain a fundamental goal of the international
community. Many of the necessary steps have been
identified and are being implemented. Several actions,
however, remain undone.
Steps of
prevention
The existing strategy of the
international community to aggressively pursue global
terrorists remains the most effective way to prevent
nuclear terrorism. Although often stated, the best
defense is a good offense. Governments must be prepared
to target such groups through covert and overt military
means in order to deny them the ability to conduct
nuclear weapons research and development.
The
United States and allied governments are sharing
intelligence about terrorist activities. They understand
the importance of developing a strategy and method to
detect attempts to acquire nuclear weapons or the
wherewithal to make them. A well-accepted priority is
placing agents in terrorist groups and providing
financial and other incentives for members to defect.
Many have pointed out the critical need to
better protect nuclear material worldwide, particularly
in states or regions in conflict or experiencing
instability. Significantly more resources are needed to
develop adequate accounting and protection of nuclear
explosive material and other radiological materials.
Similarly, it is accepted that technical and
procedural capabilities to search for nuclear weapons or
nuclear materials require improvement. Such improvements
are occurring, although far more needs to be done
worldwide.
Often overlooked is the need to
continue to tighten export controls worldwide,
particularly in places like the former Soviet Union and
Pakistan. The production of nuclear weapons requires
material, know-how and manufacturing equipment.
Countries need to improve export controls and be more
vigilant to make it harder for terrorist groups to
acquire needed items. In addition, more attention to the
monitoring of certain exports may uncover terrorist
group efforts to make nuclear weapons. Toward that end,
countries should share more information about their
nuclear dual-use exports.
Information about
making nuclear weapons was actively sought by al-Qaeda.
This sobering fact means that governments need to
continue trying to strengthen their own controls on
sensitive know-how. In addition to national systems,
there is a need for an international set of guidelines
about what types of nuclear weapons information should
remain classified. Nations have a responsibility to have
more open and transparent nuclear programs and policies.
Nonetheless, not all nuclear information should be
released. The oldest information about nuclear weapons
design may be the most useful to terrorist groups. In
addition, declassification guidelines are not always
consistent from state to state, allowing classified
information to be assembled piecemeal from several
countries.
Many governments need to pay
significantly more attention to the activities of
scientists who work in classified nuclear programs and
can "leak" important know-how, equipment, materials or
components. No country can prevent all defections or
leakage of sensitive items, but terrorist groups will
likely depend on outside help to make nuclear weapons.
Acquiring the services of a highly trained expert may be
necessary, or at least could significantly decrease the
time it would take, for a terrorist group to produce a
crude nuclear weapon. Governments, therefore, need to
develop responsible programs to ensure the reliability
of the people in their nuclear programs.
The
safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has a role to play in preventing
terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons. One step is to
continue improving the IAEA's ability to detect
undeclared nuclear activities in states. The IAEA needs
to pay more attention in states that have little
declared nuclear activity, such as Afghanistan, but
where terrorist groups may establish a nuclear weapons
program in secret. There were many indicators that
al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime were interested in
nuclear activities prior to September 11. The IAEA
should use its expertise to flag undeclared activities
in these types of states.
More resources are
needed to improve the understanding of the capabilities
of terrorist groups to make nuclear weapons. Some
believe that a terrorist group could never build a
nuclear weapon, even if it possesses large quantities of
HEU. Others believe that a small group could easily
build a nuclear explosive from HEU. Experience says that
the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
Knowing
what terrorists can do is instrumental in developing an
accurate and comprehensive plan of action to combat and
prevent nuclear terrorism. One step is re-evaluating the
type of nuclear explosives a terrorist may seek. The
design may differ significantly from that sought by a
nation. More needs to be learned about al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups, particularly about who they
recruit, and their potential approaches to building
nuclear weapons. This information is critical to
determining how terrorists may assemble the necessary
materials, equipment, infrastructure, and expertise to
obtain or build a nuclear explosive.
Conclusion
The documents found in
Afghanistan show that al-Qaeda members are neither
supermen nor morons. Their efforts in making nuclear
weapons were far less sophisticated than known state
programs, but their determination to get nuclear weapons
is astounding and their apparent willingness to use them
terrifying. Because many of these terrorist groups will
never give up in their quest for nuclear weapons and
other WMD, the world cannot let down its guard either.
Notes
(1) Alan
Cullison and Andrew Higgins, "Forgotten Computer Reveals
Thinking Behind Years of al-Qaeda Doings," The Wall
Street Journal, December 31, 2001.
(2) Kamran
Khan and Molly Moore, "2 Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin
Laden, Pakistanis Say," The Washington Post, December
12, 2001.
(3) "2 Nuclear Scientists Briefed,"
op. cit.
(4) The Washington Post reported on
June 11, 2002, that the US government had concluded that
al-Qaeda controls enough radioactive cesium, strontium,
or cobalt to mount a radiological attack on the United
States.
(5) "2 Nuclear Scientists Briefed," op.
cit.
(6) "2 Nuclear Scientists Briefed," op.
cit.
(7) Kaman Khan, "Pakistan Releases Nuclear
Scientists for Ramadan's End," The Washington Post,
December 16, 2001.
(8) Roundtable with radio
media Associated Press, BBC, NPR and VOA "Secretary
Rumsfield Roundtable with Radio Media, Defense
Department News Transcript, January 15, 2002. See also
Rumsfeld's comments at the Defense Department Press
Briefing on January 16, 2002.
(Originally
published by the Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainable Development. Reposted with
permission.)
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