| |
A two-sided debate over UN
relevance
By Alexander Casella
NEW YORK - Diplomatic observers at the UN
headquarters confirm that Saddam Hussein's sudden
decision to allow UN weapons inspectors to return to
Iraq caught the Bush administration completely by
surprise.
The end result is that Washington is
now confronted with a diplomatic situation that is far
more complex than the one the US had initially planned
for. Ultimately, many observers believe that Washington
became the victim of its own propaganda; by repeatedly
labeling Saddam Hussein a "homicidal maniac", which he
might well be, the US discounted the fact that a man who
has been able to hang on to power in Iraq for so many
years is by definition a political operator with a
ferocious instinct for survival.
By agreeing to
the return of the UN weapons inspectors, Saddam Hussein
has given to the members of the Security Council an
alternative to their either endorsing, or vetoing, a
unilateral American intervention. Thus, what appeared a
few weeks ago as an open-and-shut case - either the US
would get UN Security Council endorsement to proceed
against Iraq or it would go at it alone - has turned
into a convoluted diplomatic process in which France has
taken the lead in confronting the United States.
Now that the US Congress has voted to authorize
President George W Bush to use force in Iraq, diplomatic
sources feel that there are now three possible
scenarios. In the first, the Security Council would
adopt one resolution with two components: the first
would provide for the return to Iraq of the UN
inspectors with practically unrestricted powers to
ensure the dismantling of all potential weapons of mass
destruction and their production facilities. The second
component would automatically authorize the use of force
were the inspectors to conclude that their mission was
being thwarted by Saddam Hussein.
Such a
resolution would have been tantamount to giving
Washington a multilaterally endorsed blank check to
intervene in Iraq. Three weeks ago, the adoption of such
a resolution, as advocated by Washington, was within the
realm of possibilities. Granted neither China nor France
nor Russia was particularly happy to grant the US a
blank check, but there was a fair chance they all could
have been induced by Washington not to veto such a
resolution to that effect in exchange for some major
concessions.
The last-minute offer by Saddam
Hussein to permit the return of the weapons inspectors
gave France, China and Russia the rational that they
needed to oppose the principle of a single UN
resolution. While it is believed that with major
concession, Russia could still be swayed to support the
American position, France has firmly come down as
supporting a different approach.
The second
scenario, which is now picking up speed, is the one
proposed by France and supported by China and Russia. It
provides that the Security Council adopt a resolution
that demands the return of the weapons inspectors and
expands their role. If the inspectors were at any point
to report that their mission is hindered, the Security
Council would then adopt a second resolution authorizing
the use of force.
The "two resolutions" approach
is strongly opposed by both the US and Britain,
essentially because it would clip Washington's wings by
denying the US the ability to launch a military
operation against Iraq without further consultations
with the UN. Conversely, this is exactly the reason that
the "two resolutions" approach is supported by France.
Indeed, the French Foreign Minister Dominique de
Villepin declared on October 9 that his country "will
not agree to a formula that will provide, before the
facts, a blank check as regards to what should be
undertaken were Iraq not to fulfill its obligations".
While France has agreed to a stricter definition of the
mandate of the UN weapons inspectors, it still remains
opposed not only to the "one resolution" formula but
also to the US demand that the inspectors be escorted by
armed guards.
Paradoxically, the chief UN
weapons inspector, Hans Blix, also has reservations
regarding the "two resolutions" formula, albeit for
other reasons. Blix does not want to commence weapons
inspection and then, in mid-stream, see his mandate
redefined by a new Security Council resolution. The end
result is that, while the negotiations proceed within
the Security Council, the departure for Iraq of the
weapons inspectors has been held up.
The third
scenario would provide for the US, having failed to
obtain UN endorsement, to move on its own, albeit with
British support. Most observers believe that such a
unilateral US intervention would ultimately be supported
by Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt - the bottom
line being that no government in the region harbors any
sympathy for Saddam Hussein. Ultimately most Arab
states, whatever their public position, would be happy
to see the US do the dirty work for them and rid them of
Saddam Hussein, even if this would mean the end of the
special relation between the US and the United Nations.
However, while unilateral US intervention still
cannot be discounted, Bush has recently lowed the ante
by declaring that war is "neither unavoidable nor
imminent". Most observers interpret these words as
meaning that if the weapons inspectors will be permitted
to freely operate in Iraq, war can be "avoided". As for
war not being "imminent", this is intended to mean that
it will take at least six to eight more weeks for the US
military to preposition enough equipment in the area
before they can launch a military operation. Given that
such an operation, for meteorological reasons, can only
be undertaken between mid-December and mid-March, war,
indeed is "not imminent".
With Iraq and the US
clearly not on the brink of war, the focus is on the
ongoing negotiating process within the UN Security
Council, essentially between its five permanent members.
Here it is tough going for Washington. When the Bush
administration took office it brought to Washington all
the skeletons left over from the Cold War that had been
lying dormant in the closet of the conservative wing of
the Republican Party. Getting tough with China,
confronting Russia on missile defense and Chechnya,
promoting "human rights" and raising the level of the
American commitment to Taiwan were the avowed policies
of the new administration.
Then came September
11 and, in its immediate aftermath, the need to court
Russia. Partly this was to ensure that Russia deliver
the Northern Alliance as one of the tools to be used by
the US to overthrow the Taliban regime. Partly it was to
secure Russian cooperation in keeping oil markets stable
during the Afghanistan war. In practice, it meant that
much of the conservative rhetoric had to be abandoned as
the Bush administration slowly realized that it could
not simultaneously conduct a policy of bilateral
confrontation with China and Russia while expecting from
them a multilateral endorsement within the Security
Council.
Within this framework, the statement by
Bush to the effect that the UN must either endorse
Washington's policy on Iraq or become "irrelevant" did
not hold much water. Indeed, for many UN members, it is
exactly by not giving any of its member states a blank
check to use force at its convenience that the UN can
retain a semblance of relevance. That this view is
essentially based on national interest rather than
principle is irrelevant to the issue. Indeed, it was to
promote their national interests that the member states
created the UN as an instrument of multilateral action
in the first place.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
